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Domestic market size constraints in small late developing states are expected to  
influence the economic growth process in general and indigenous firm performance 
in particular. The role and contribution of policy-makers in overcoming these 
constraints can therefore be significant. This thesis evaluates the role and 
contribution of public venture capital - as a significant industrial policy initiative - to  
shareholder value creation in growth-oriented indigenous firms in Ireland.
Three main themes are investigated. Firstly the rationale and context for micro-level 
industrial policy interventions in Ireland is considered. Secondly, the role and 
contribution of public venture capital to indigenous firm performance and thirdly the  
factors differentiating between performing and non-performing firms are explored.
Using mixed methods research this study finds that in a small late developing state 
such as Ireland, 'job creation7 has been elevated from an industrial policy perspective 
to the de facto  national objective. Enterprise policy development for indigenous 
industry however remains largely emergent and fluid, fifty-four years on from the 
advent of the national export-oriented industrial policy. In the absence of a 
deliberately-stated enterprise policy, this emergent micro-level approach has led the  
states7 economic development agency into areas outside its originally intended
remit. This goes some way to explaining the plethora of micro-level policy 
instruments available in Ireland to growth-oriented indigenous firms. Further, this 
study also finds no conclusive evidence that an 'equity gap' existed in the analysis 
period. However, as a consequence of attem pting to close this perceived gap, the 
Irish state now finds itself with an investment portfolio of over nine hundred direct 
share investments in indigenous firms. The Irish State, through its economic 
developm ent agency, has thus become the largest venture capital company in 
Europe.
The portfolio of state-selected firms in the analysis (n = 51) for public venture capital 
investment are found not to perform as anticipated by the theory of change mapped 
out in the study. A quantitative model developed for the study also finds that there is 
no statistically significant association between firm performance as measured in the 
study and the value of the public venture capital invested in each firm. The cross­
case and contribution analysis in the study further confirm that the contribution of 
public venture capital to indigenous firm performance in Ireland was marginal at 
best.
The primary barrier to  profitable growth for the indigenous firms receiving public 
venture capital support in the analysis period was the firms 'Limited endowments of 
managerial resources' (Penrose, 1959) to manage the growth process and not a lack 
of risk capital as perceived by agents of the State. Policy implications of the findings 
are also considered in the study.
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Chapter 1 
Indigenous Firm Performance in Small Developing States: The Role and 
Contribution of Public Venture Capital in Ireland -  Introduction
In global terms, small open states are, owing to their limited physical capacity and 
degree of sectoral specialisation, niche players in world markets. Typically, they have 
a small number of international markets leading to export concentration, increased 
instability and, in extreme situations, economic retardation. The literature also 
suggests however, that in spite of their limitations, small states are poised to  
experience growth if they are open to trade and investment, invest heavily in human 
capital and/or are well-endowed with natural resources. Indeed, many small states 
have higher per capita incomes than many larger states in the same region of the  
world although, with regard to the limitations cited above, this growth is likely to be 
more volatile (Easterly & Kraay, 2000; Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009).
In addition to the structural characteristics of small states noted above, it is 
im portant to note that the internal policies pursued, institutional strength and the  
competitiveness of the firms in the economy will also have a bearing on their 
economic growth. It is thus a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors 
which determ ine the ability of small states to grow economically (Armstrong & Read, 
2003).
Economic enterprise in the state results from the matching of resources and 
opportunities by entrepreneurs to create value (Garnsey, 1998). Firms are the 
entrepreneurs conduit for transforming these factor inputs into added value outputs. 
M ayer & Ottaviano (2007) further note that it \s firm s  which trade and not nations 
perse. In small open states, this is of particular relevance since small states are more
dependent on their stock of internationally-trading firms to deliver profitable export 
earnings than larger states. These earnings are necessary to pay for the high levels of 
imports required to  make up the difference between domestic consumption and 
production resulting from the high levels of sectoral specialisation. Thus, policy­
makers in small open states recognise the critical role played by internationally 
trading firms in generating export earnings and are constantly seeking ways to  
stimulate greater international growth and development from their entrepreneurial 
and firm stocks.
This study considers the contentious issue of the role and contribution of the state 
support system to the international competitiveness of the firm stock in a small open 
economy. It focuses on the case of Ireland. Specifically, it considers the Irish State's 
attem pts at stimulating the growth-through-internationalisation of its indigenous 
industry by direct public venture capital (PVC) injections. This is approached 
empirically by evaluating the role and contribution of these capital injections to  
indigenous Irish firms' growth performance over an extended tim e period. Evaluation 
methodologies of state support programmes are of themselves contentious. This 
study helps to fill some of the knowledge gaps in the industrial policy evaluation area 
using evidence from Ireland. It also helps address the research gap that exists on 
indigenous firm growth behaviour and performance in small states.
1.1 Research Context
Ireland is a relatively small country with a population o f 4.6 million (2012) which is 
trade dependent and reliant upon export-led growth (ESRI, 2009). Subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises located in Ireland account for approximately 91 per cent of
the Ireland's exports in value terms (Forfas, 2009). All commentators on the Irish 
economy agree that Ireland's success in attracting mobile Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has been the key factor that has led to its prolonged economic growth from 
1991 to 2001 (O'Connor, 2001).
W ith increasing competition for FDI emerging from European and Asian states, 
Ireland needs to seek out alternative future sources o f economic growth. The unique 
combination of factors that created sustained growth in Ireland during the so-called 
'Celtic Tiger' period (1994-2007) cannot be expected to hold in the future. The focus 
o f Irish policy-making therefore needs to shift to the future growth potential of 
indigenous firms - particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)1 .Table 1.1 
provides a breakdown of the size distribution of Irish-based firms. Of the 84,412 
SMEs in Ireland in 2005, less than 3,500 (four per cent) had internationalised to any 
degree (Enterprise Ireland, 2009). Indeed indigenous firms only contribute 
approximately nine per cent (in value) to tota l exports (Forfas, 2009).
This reflects not only the overwhelming dominance of the multinational sector in 
Ireland's export performance but also the lower levels of productivity, R&D intensity 
and innovation in the indigenous sector (Oireachtas Committee on Enterprise &
Small Business, 2007).
1 This dissertation uses the official EU definition of SMEs shown below:
Enterprise category Headcount Turnover or Balance sheet total
■ ..."' / .  ■
medium-sized <250
..... . . . . ■ ■ 
£ € 50 million <; € 43 million
small <50
-
5 € 10 million6 ' . ' -V '■ N ' ’ £ € 10 million
micro < 10 £ € 2 million £ € 2 million
Table 1.1: Profile of Distribution of Firms in Ireland






' *" ^ . c, - f  *•»* ' js (xl ■
-  IT
EU -24•• ' < - f -
average
Value % EU -  26 
€ average
Micro 72,340 85.3 91.8 208,312 22.4 29.6 17,219 19.6 21.1
Small 9,853 11.6 _ _ 6.9 200,199 21.5 20.6 12,787 14.6 19
Medium 2,219 2.6 1.1 211,483 22.7 16.8 18,854 21.5 17.8
SMEs 84,412 99.5 99.8 619,993 66.5 67.1 48,860 55.6 57.9
Large 402 .5 .2 311,926 33.5 32.9 39,005 44.4 42.1
Notes to the Table: SMEs are predominantly indigenous in nature. However the numbers quoted do include a small number of 
overseas firms who are 'scaling up'. Large firms are mainly FDI firms but the figure quoted also includes a small number of 
indigenous firms in traditional sectors such as retail, tourism, food production and construction related activities.
(Source: Eurostat SBS data base, 2004 and 2005 da ta / SBA fact sheet Ireland, 2009)
A contributory factor to this relatively weak performance by indigenous firms may 
have been the inadvertent crowding-out o f indigenous industry in the economy by 
the FDI (Matsen & Torvik, 2005) and the property-driven boom to 2007. In addition, 
the expected technology and knowledge spillovers from FDI have not materialised to 
the degree envisaged by policy-makers and the creation of linkages is at the lower 
end o f the value chain (Garhart et o i, 1997; O'Sullivan, 2000; Gorg, 2007).
Combining these issues with the acknowledged loss o f competitiveness in the 
economy as a whole resulting from the economic boom and subsequent global 
downturn in 2008 brings the growth challenge into sharp relief (NCC, 2009). The 
future international competitiveness of Ireland needs to be founded upon improved 
levels o f productivity and innovation throughout the economy. Indigenous industry is 
therefore where the greatest improvements can potentially be made (Small Business 
Forum, 2005; Forfas, 2007). SMEs account for 99.5 per cent of firm stock, 66.5 per 
cent of industrial employment but only 55.6 per cent of value added to the economy 
(Table 1.1; Deakins & Freel, 2006).
The Irish State, through its development agencies has been actively attem pting to  
stimulate increased export activity from its indigenous stock of firms since the 1960s 
(Breznitz, 2007). W hile indigenous exports have increased substantially in value since 
then and their composition has evolved into more technology-driven sectors, the 
prognosis is not all positive. The contribution of indigenous exports in Ireland has 
reached a plateau in recent years with growth of just 1.2 per cent in value between  
2000 and 2005 -  an acknowledged boom tim e for the Irish economy (Forfas, 2006). 
This calls into question not only the international competitiveness of Ireland's SME 
stock but also the effectiveness of the State support system for these firms.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
The issues highlighted in the previous section can be framed into a number of related 
research questions. Firstly -  What role does public venture capital play in 
accelerating the growth performance o f indigenous growth-oriented SMEs in small 
late developing states and how might its contribution be evaluated at f irm  and policy 
level? Three related but subsidiary questions also arise and these are concerned with 
other factors which might positively influence firm growth performance in 
indigenous firms. Conversely, what are the constraining factors on indigenous firm  
growth in small states? Finally, what lessons, if any, can be learned from the Irish 
experience and how might these apply to the international development of growth- 
oriented firms from other small later developing states?
M ore specifically, these research questions are stated as research objectives. The 
first objective is to evaluate the role and contribution of direct public venture capital 
(as a policy instrument) to stimulating or accelerating the growth performance of
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Irish growth-oriented SMEs. The second objective is to identify the other possible 
factors positively influencing firm performance in grow th-oriented SMEs in a small 
state. This is followed by identifying the possible constraining factors on firm growth 
performance in indigenous SMEs in Ireland. Based on these empirical findings, a 
fourth objective is to recommend a future role for State support for the growth and 
developm ent of Irish SMEs. The final objective is to assess w hether the lessons 
learned from the Irish experience might be applicable to other small later developing 
states.
This study utilises a mixed method research design and data collection/analysis 
strategy (Johnson & Onwvegbozie, 2004; Bryman, 2006; Plano Clark et al., 2007; 
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2007) to address the  
research questions and objectives outlined above. W ithin the 'mixed methods' 
research genre, the approach taken here is referred to as 'sequential mixed methods 
research' - where one methodology is followed sequentially by another. It is thus a 
double-phase research design. M ore specifically, because this study uses 
quantitative methods followed by qualitative methods, it is referred to as a 
'sequential explanatory research design' (Saunders et al., 2012). Triangulation of the 
data is thus achieved by combining archival data (secondary) with interview data 
(primary) to give complementary perspectives on the same firm data. Combining this 
data triangulation with the methodological triangulation in the study strengthens the 
robustness of the overall findings and gives the study increased internal validity 
(Patton, 2002).
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis
The outline of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review, in the first instance, mapping 
the theoretical and empirical work on the growth of small states. This is followed by 
a review of the literature on the growth of the firm in the context of the small state.
It incorporates definitions and the measurement of the firm growth concept, the 
influences and determinants (and constraints) on the growth of these firms. The 
review of the literature then focuses on and explores the role and contribution (and 
evaluation) of state support systems for firm growth.
Chapter 3 is a contextual chapter on Ireland. It discusses the drivers of its economic 
growth and the contribution of FDI and indigenous industry. It also outlines the State 
support system in Ireland and the challenges it faces as it attempts to chart a course 
that will allow the state to grow in a more balanced fashion in future. The 
development of a comprehensive and sustainable enterprise policy is seen as a major 
policy gap.
Chapter 4 examines the research philosophy and research design underpinning the  
research process and explains the mixed method approach undertaken in the study. 
The quantitative and the qualitative methodologies employed for collecting and 
analysing the data generated are discussed and described.
Chapter 5 is the first empirical part of the study and involves a research programme 
to  quantify the contribution of a direct public venture capital investment programme 
to  growth-oriented indigenous SMEs. The study is underpinned by a proprietary 
dataset (n=51) developed specifically for the study. This dataset includes all of the
major indigenous sectors (e.g. ICT, internationally-traded services, Cleantech, 
industrial products, lifesciences, consumer goods and agrifood). This part of the  
study investigates the contribution of direct public venture capital -  as a policy 
instrument of the Irish State support system -  to the growth and development of the 
indigenous internationally trading sector during the period 1999 -  2010.
Chapter 6 is a cross-case analysis o ften  representative firm-level cases drawn from  
the overall cohort of firms in the study. The chapter identifies the key influences and 
determinants of indigenous firm growth in small states other than public venture 
capital, based upon the experience of Ireland. Each firm-level case includes an in- 
depth interview with the key informant - the founding entrepreneur (8 cases) or the 
current managing director (2 cases) in the firm.
Chapter 7 is a cross-case analysis of the constraints -  both internal and external to 
the firm -  for indigenous firm growth in Ireland. The chapter utilises frameworks 
drawn from the literature review to analyse the barriers to growth in the indigenous 
case firms in the analysis.
Chapter 8 is the final empirical research chapter in the study. It comprises a 
'contribution analysis' (Mayne, 2001, 2008, 2012), which is a theory-based  
evaluation methodology. This analysis incorporates the findings from Chapter 5, 6, 7 
and further case material into its meta-analytic fram ework to assess the overall 
contribution of public venture capital to indigenous firm performance in Ireland. 
Chapter 9 outlines the policy implications of the findings in the study.
Chapter 10 draws the study to a close and outlines the principle findings, the policy 
implications for other small developing states and the limitations of the research.
The study culminates with the identification of avenues for further research.
The thesis is underpinned by ten firm case studies drawn from the overall cohort of 
firms included in the study. These ten cases analyses are detailed in Volume Two.
The cases chosen for participation in the study were selected on 'theoretical 
sampling' grounds for their overall sectoral representativeness in the cohort of firms 
in the study (Glazer & Strauss, 1967; Pettigrew 1988; Strauss & Corbin, 1988; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002). While there is no ideal number of cases, Eisenhardt 
(1989) recommends between four and ten, noting that: 'with more than ten cases, it 
quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and volume of the data' (p. 
545). This study thus utilises the maximum number of recommended cases. These 
firms are listed in Table 1.2. The descriptive case analysis of each firm is confidential 
and outlined in Volume Two. Volume two is therefore made available fo r  
examination purposes only. Sections 2.2 - 2.4, Chapter 2 however outlines the  
theoretical background to the case analysis. The structure of the individual case 
analyses can be found in Appendix C.
Table 1.2: Selected Cases &  Case Coding
Case num ber Code Case number Code
1; ' . . •: •; - ' *' ' ; Foodl
. . m
6
2 Biotechl 7 ICT3
3
Biotech 2
■ u . as ■* ‘ . * ; ; ■ v. •
ICT4
4 Consum erl 9 ICT5
Chapter 2 
Indigenous Firm Performance in a Small Late Developing State: 
A Literature Review
Chapter 1 highlights the research objectives of the study. These investigate the 
relationship between country size and wealth creation in a small late developing 
state (Ireland). In particular the research objectives focus on the contribution made 
by internationalising SMEs to economic growth. The role and contribution of the 
state support system in assisting these firms grow-through-internatonalisation is also 
considered.
To provide the requisite theoretical and empirical background, it is necessary to 
review a number of distinct but related literatures. These are: The literature on the 
uniqueness or otherwise of small states -  their similarities to large economies and 
more importantly their differences, real and perceived. These states are 
differentiated from larger states in the literature along a number of key dimensions
i.e. structural make up, terms of trade, economic vulnerability and population size.
If, as the literature suggests, firms are major drivers of economic growth and 
development in small states - particularly internationally trading ones - then it is 
essential that the disparate research approaches to the theory of the growth of the 
firm are investigated. The emphasis in this dissertation is on indigenous firms (SMEs) 
as these constitute 99 per cent of firm stock, over 60 per cent of total employment 
and over 50 per cent of value added across Europe (Deakins & Freel, 2003).
Having investigated the theories and approaches to firm growth, it is then necessary 
to explore the literature on the influences and determinants of value creation in
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indigenous firms in small states. A closely related strand of literature is the literature  
on the growth constraints faced by firms in the small state. This is addressed also.
Fundamental questions remain in the literature as to what constitutes firm growth, 
how is it measured and how appropriate are these measures to value creation in the 
firm? This strand of the literature also considers the im portant issue of how firm  
growth in the indigenous firm is financed.
Finally the literature review is concluded by examining the literature on the role and 
contribution of the state support system to the process of indigenous firm growth- 
through-internationalisation in small states. This strand reviews the literature on the 
enterprise policy options and instruments available to policymakers in the small 
state. Further it investigates the difficulties of isolating the effects of these policies 
and it considers the options for evaluation of these policy choices. This literature  
strand is contextualised by the preceding strands.
2.1 Economic Growth in Small States
One of the key distinguishing factors between small and larger states is population 
size. This is frequently used as a proxy for both domestic market size and the local 
labour market. In the 1970's the UN institutions adopted a benchmark of one million; 
the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) (1998) uses 1.5 million, Easterly and Kraay 
(2000) use one million and Armstrong and Read (2000) use three million in their 
respective analyses to classify small states. There remains much debate in the area 
over the most appropriate measure(s). Other measures such as GDP or GNP, 
geographic area, terms of trade and composite size and characteristics measures
have been used (Armstrong and Read, 2003; Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009) but 
population appears to offer a better approximation of what constitutes a small state. 
It is contended here that although 'smaller' developed states like Ireland 
(population.4.6 million), New Zealand (population 4.1 million), Finland (population 
5.3 million ) or even Denmark (population 5.4 million) for example fall above the 
maximum threshold of population size discussed above they face similar economic 
development issues to small states of approximate size. Indeed there is a case to be 
made for increasing the population threshold given the increase in population in 
Singapore for example (The original benchmark state) -  total population of 4.8 
million with 3.6 million citizens (Singstat, 2008). Baldacchino and Betram (2009) sum 
up the uncertainty in the literature over small state size categories when they note 
that smallness is essentially an arbitrary term  - the median sovereign state in the  
world has a population of 5.3 million (Finland). ComSec (2006) and Qureshi & Te 
Velde (2008) recently adopted an upper threshold of 5 million. The issue, irrespective 
of population size, is w hether 'small' or 'smaller' states suffer from an economic 
growth viewpoint from their 'smallness'?
In terms of their explanatory power of economic growth, the Endogenous growth 
models (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Barrow & Martin, 1995; Jones, 2002; Mankiw, 
2003, Armstrong & Read, 2003) and the Export-Led thesis (Obstfelt & Rogoff, 1986; 
Sharma & Panagiotidis, 2004) seem to be most appropriate to the small state case. 
Orthodox economic growth theory (Lewis, 1955; Solow, 1956) implies that due to  
scale issues (i.e. small domestic market, limited domestic demand, small firm size, 
higher unit cost, limited firm numbers etc.) that this would favour a tendency 
towards natural monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures and therefore 'sub
-op tim ality ' (Armstrong & Read, 1998). Further, this suggests that small states are at 
a perpetual disadvantage in growth terms when compared to larger states. Empirical 
evidence however does not bear this out and small states have outperformed their 
larger counterparts in economic growth terms in many regions of the world. This 
indicates that despite their small size and considerable constraints, small open states 
in particular are poised for growth if they are open to trade and investment, invest 
heavily in human capital and/or are well-endowed with natural resources (Easterly &
Kraay, 2000; Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009).
2.1.1 The Unique characteristics of Small States
Compared to larger economies then, there are a number of dimensions on which 
small states display unique characteristics, these are:
A small domestic m arket - this implies an inability to achieve critical mass in terms of 
supply and demand making the cost of production higher in smaller states than 
larger states. This is particularly so in industries and sectors where scale economies 
are important. Indeed the small domestic market further threatens the development 
of indigenous technologies and also the emergence of fast growth hi-tech industrial 
sectors (Kuznets, 1960; Briguglio, 1995). Technological innovation is by its nature 
limited because local firms can't invest in large scale R&D. Small states therefore 
tend to rely on technologies produced abroad (M ilner & Westway, 1993). Thus 
success in attracting inward investment can be particularly important in helping 
'seed' host country R&D stock. Local indigenous industry can then benefit from these 
R&D spillovers - given certain conditions (O'Gorman & Kautonen, 2004; Read, 2004).
Lack o f natural resources - Another disadvantage frequently attaching to small states 
is the lack of natural resources (Armstrong & Read, 2002). This leads to  the states 
dependence on imports of key natural resources for domestic consumption and as 
key inputs for their internationally trading sectors. Conversely an overabundance of 
natural resources can create its own problems for other sectors of the economy. This 
can lead to 'Dutch disease' (Resource Curse Thesis) -  the so called 'Paradox of Plenty' 
(Auty, 1993). This is illustrated in Corden and Neary's (1982) seminal article on the 
subject. The term  'Dutch Disease' is a double misnomer as the term  refers to what 
essentially is a positive exogenously derived event for the host state (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 
2003). This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 in relation to Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and Ireland but Matsen and Torvik (2004) remind us that 'some 
Dutch disease is always optimal' in the sense that a positive fraction of the resource 
wealth should be consumed in each period. Therefore to foster economic growth it is 
im portant for small states to invest the rents earned from their natural resource 
endowments or FDI into knowledge-driven internationally tradable sectors or low 
growth may persist (Armstrong & Read, 2002; Jansen, 2004).
Sectoral specialisation - Given the relatively small scale of the state in global terms, 
sectoral concentration can be expected in indigenous industry in small states e.g. in 
Jamaica it is tourism and bauxite production (Staines, 2005). In Ireland it is 
predominantly tourism and agrifood in indigenous industry- 
pharmaceuticals/chemicals, medical devices, electronics and ICT in foreign owned 
firms (Forfas, 2006). Indeed there is strong empirical evidence to support the 
presence of niche specialisation in indigenous firms in small states (UNCTAD, 1977;
Armstrong & Read, 2002; 2003). The sectoral specialisations found generally in small 
states are predominantly tourism, financial services and natural resource exports.
Openess to trade  - Another distinguishing characteristic of small states is their high 
degree of openness to  trade. Given the differences between consumption and 
production (sector specialisations) mentioned above, domestic demand can only be 
m et by high levels of imports. These imports need to  be paid for and so the small 
state needs to export to help fund the imports thus providing an intuitive rationale 
for the export-led growth thesis (Kuznets, 1960; Armstrong & Read, 1998; Read, 
2003).
Finally, there are other endogenous factors which will affect the Small States ability 
to grow economically. These relate to the internal policies pursued, the strength of 
the institutions of the state and the competitiveness of firms in the economy. These 
endogenous factors are discussed in more detail in Section 2.7 of this Chapter and 
Chapter 3 on Ireland.
2.1.2 The Vulnerability of Small States
Easterly and Kraay (2000) maintain that small states have received excessive 
attention in the literature as special cases calling for special policy measures. They 
point out that small states have higher per capita income that others in their 
respective regions and do not differ in growth performance from larger states. 
However they do point out that smaller states are more vulnerable to growth 
volatility due to  terms of trade shocks and other environmental threats. W hile this is 
related to their trade openness - on balance - the benefits of trade openness to 
growth are positive. However this inherent vulnerability is reflected in the higher
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costs attaching to the growth path of smaller states which consequently leads to 
greater risk exposure (UNCTAD, 1988).
There are thus significant structural differences between small and large states -  
with both on different paths to achieving economic growth and the creation of 
wealth (Katzenstein, 1985). In so far as both groups are capable of economic growth, 
the issue then becomes one of managing and maximising the benefits from the 
drivers of growth whilst minimising and reducing/eliminating the constraints on 
growth at both a macro and micro level (Baldacchino, 2007). Indeed Armstrong et al. 
(2003) maintain that the sources of vulnerability for small states can be categorised 
into those relating to  economic, political, strategic and environmental issues.
As small states can be regarded then as structurally different from other larger 
states, these differences have clear implications for the states ability to grow. The 
export-led growth thesis and endogenous growth theories highlight two further 
significant structural issues which affect economic development.
Firstly the export-led thesis highlights the impact which the degree of openness to 
trade - the so-called trade multiplier effect (Ashoff, 1989) has on small states. Whilst 
this openness can increase the small states economic growth prospects, it also raises 
the small states vulnerability levels to exogenous shocks. Briguglio's (1995) 
vulnerability index is useful in this regard in highlighting the issues faced by small 
states. However it's cross sectional nature has been criticised by some researchers 
(Armstrong & Read, 2002). UNCTAD (1997) and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
(1998) have also developed indices of vulnerability for small economies. Baldacchino 
and Bertram (2009) argue that vulnerability and it's antidote in the literature -
'resilience' represent essentially a 'structurally deterministic' view of the issues 
facing small states. These authors advocate a 'strategic flexibility' model as a 
counterpoint to the determinism of the vulnerability/resilience approach.
Secondly, the endogenous growth models of human capital show the comparative 
advantage that investment in education, training and learning by doing (LBD) can 
bestow on a small state (Armstrong & Read, 2003). The development of the concept 
of human capital theory is attributed to Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974). This can be 
defined as the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) embodied in people (Coff, 2002). 
It includes not just factual, 'how to ' KSAs but also tacit KSA's which are difficult to  
articulate (Polanyi, 1966 cited in Crook e ta l . 2011). The appeal that human capital 
development can have for a small state becomes evident when it is unable to  
generate significant investment in physical capital due to market size constraints. The 
appeal increases when it is further realised that human capital - in terms of 
knowledge creation - is not only not size constrained but is also not subject to 
diminishing returns. Human capital investment, in these circumstances, will increase 
the collective 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) in the economy, thus 
compensating for the small state's lack of investment in R&D (Briguglio, 1995; 
Armstrong & Read, 2003).
Indeed human capital development is of such importance to small state growth that 
the states relative size, far from being an impediment to economic growth, 
sometimes can act as a further stimulant of human capital development. As greater 
social cohesion is expected to exist in smaller states (compared to larger states), this 
social cohesion can lead over tim e to the development of considerable social capital
(Putnam et al., 1993; Baldacchino, 2005). However this increased cohesion can also 
have some negative side effects leading on occasion to increased levels of cronyism, 
corruption, insider dealing and inefficiency. This is likely if the appropriate 
democratic, legal and regulatory frameworks are not sufficiently independent and 
robust (Transparency International, 2009).
Related to the degree of openness of the small economy is the volatility that 
attaches to the state's income. This can be particularly acute in developing countries 
(Ramey & Ramey, 1995). The equation for growth for the small economy then must 
ensure that the positive effects of openness to trade and the high levels of human 
capital investment overcompensate for the negative effects of income and terms of 
trade volatility in the medium to long term . The effects of the trade multiplier can be 
seen most starkly in small states with high degrees of trade openness (Ashoff, 1989).
Another issue that impacts income in the small, open economy is its ability to affect 
its terms of trade (Easterly & Kaay, 2000; WTO, 2003, Jansen, 2004). This is 
particularly true for states which depend heavily or exclusively on indigenous 
industry to develop international trade. Those small states hosting significant foreign 
direct investment (FDI) face different issues around the structure of their exports and 
thus their terms of trade. Positive local linkages and spillover effects however would 
be expected to em anate from this mobile foreign direct investment into the host 
small states economy (Read, 2004). However, the local impact of these spillover 
effects depends on the MNCs strategic rationale for their investment in the small 
state (resource seeking, efficiency -  seeking, market seeking or strategic-asset 
seeking). The technological development of indigenous industry and its absorptive
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capacity levels are also an im portant factor in the leveraging of positive linkage and 
spillover effects (Forfas, 2005). The effects of FDI however are expected to be 
positive -  employment and technology wise - but limited in other respects given the 
narrowness and shallowness of domestic economic activity (Read, 2004).
As niche players and primarily price takers in the global economy then - severe 
fluctuations in trade levels can adversely affect income stability and economic 
growth in the small state. In global terms the small, open state typically has a limited 
number of markets, which can lead to export concentration, increased instability and 
economic growth retardation in turn (MacBean, 1966; MacBean & Nguyen, 1987). If 
an exogenous economic shock is severe enough to a small, open economy then this 
can ultimately lead to balance of payments problems further impeding economic 
growth (Jansen, 2004).
In addition to trade shocks (and FDI export levels) outside of its control, the small 
state may have to contend with the effects of natural disasters. This, of course, 
depends on a particular state's geographic location. In relation to locational effects, 
Read (2003) contends that whilst the growth of any country is likely to be influenced 
by the economic prosperity and dynamism of the broader region to which it belongs, 
little attention so far has been paid in the literature to the impact of location on the  
growth of small states. Indeed membership of a 'regional convergence club' can 
contribute significantly to the economic growth of a small state particularly if the  
small state is located within a wealthy and dynamic region and in close proximity to  
larger markets (Armstrong & Read, 2003). Even for small states outside regional 
convergence clubs, geography is not necessarily destiny and the endogenous policies
pursued can have a major impact on the small states growth trajectory (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012). However small states with populations below a threshold of one 
million tend to exhibit extreme specialisation term ed 'economic speciation'. This 
involves a decision -  conscious or otherwise -  to embrace 'crowding-out' or 'Dutch 
disease' as a growth strategy (Bertram & Poirine, 2007).
This section of the literature identified the structural characteristics which will affect 
the small states ability to grow economically and examined how these influence the 
internal policies pursued, the institutions of the state and the competitiveness of 
firms in the economy.
2.2 The theory of the growth of the indigenous firm in the small state
Facilitating the competitiveness and growth of knowledge intensive, entrepreneurial 
firms is therefore an important role for policymakers in small open developing states 
(Carr, 2000b). This dissertation concerns itself with questions around the optimal 
methodology for achieving this at a micro-policy level. Before this key question can 
be addressed though, this section reviews the literature on the connection between  
firm growth and economic development in the small open state. The literature 
subdivides into tw o broad streams. The literature on the firm growth process is 
reviewed and summarised in Table 2.1. This is a summary of the literature from the 
differing research traditions and the various approaches taken by each in describing 
the process of firm growth and its relevance to small states. This is then followed by 
a review of the literature on the determinants o f and the influences on the firm  
growth -  Section 2.3. There are a number of conceptual frameworks and research 
approaches which have attem pted to explain theoretically and empirically small firm
growth. The approaches taken are many and varied but usually reflect the 
background and worldview of the researchers in question (See: Table 2.1). Foss 
(1996) makes a clear distinction between those approaches which derive from  
orthodox economic thought and those which he classifies as 'Knowledge-based 
approaches'. Foss does not explicitly deal with the entrepreneurial approach and this 
is discussed in more detail in the next paragraph. The essential difference is that 
these knowledge-based approaches derive from 'organisational theory'. He further 
explains (p. 470) that the economics-inspired 'theory of the firm ' literature can in 
general trace its origins to the work of Coase (1937) and his classic 'The Nature o f the 
Firm'. In this conceptual approach the firm is seen as an 'efficient contractual entity'. 
Property rights, incentives and contracts thus occupy centre stage. In contrast, the 
organisational theory approaches can trace their heritage to the work of Penrose 
(1959). In her classic 'The Theory o f the Growth o f the Firm', Penrose introduced not 
only a radically different view of the firm to the pure contractual approach of Coase 
but she also introduced new ways of viewing the role and purpose of firms in an 
economy. She postulated that the firm, in addition to being a contractual entity is 
also a possessor of distinct knowledge (technological and organisational) which the 
firm uses to gain advantage over its competitors. Thus terms such as capabilities, 
core competencies, organisational learning, competitive advantage, tacit knowledge 
etc. were introduced into the popular lexicon of management thought (Foss, 1996).
These developments have had enormous impact on the development of 
management thought - particularly in smaller states. Penrose's approach 
demonstrated, theoretically at least, that sustainable comparative and competitive
advantage could be built on dimensions other than scale. When this advantage is
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knowledge-based (i.e. innovation developed through investment in human capital, 
R&D, education, training and learning by doing) then developing an asset like 
knowledge which is not only not size constrained but is also not subject to  
diminishing returns has distinct advantages for the small open state (Armstrong & 
Read, 2003). This investment in human capital will, it is hoped, increase the collective 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) in the state to compensate for the 
small states under-investment in R&D (Briguglio, 1995; Armstrong & Read, 2003). 
These insights, further developed through the endogenous growth models of human 
capital, have spawned a raft of research streams and approaches (Connor, 1991) 
culminating in the approaches to firm growth detailed in Table 2.1.
Casson (2004) argues that the theory of the firm should be viewed through 'the lens 
of entrepreneurship' as it is the missing influence in the leading theories of the firm. 
Baumol (1996) further reminding us in his typology that 'the entrepreneurs are 
always with us'. Entrepreneurs' move between productive, unproductive and 
destructive behaviour depending on the nature of the incentives they face. Thus it is 
the rules of the game which is most important and not the supply of entrepreneurs 
perse. Much work remains to be done however in the entrepreneurship field 
despite its history (Cantillon, 1755), in terms of definition, specification and most 
importantly on its almost singular focus on the entrepreneur. The firm is 
acknowledged then as the key economic transformation vehicle of factor inputs to  
added value economic outputs in the state -and  is therefore the appropriate unit of 
analysis in this study. However, close attention is also paid to the role and influence 
of the entrepreneur, in recognition of the acknowledged close association between
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ownership and management in small firms (Storey & Greene, 2010; Smallbone & 
W yer, 2012).
M ayer and Ottaviano (2007) remind us that it is firms and not nations which trade - 
thus the entrepreneurial approach will be treated, for the purposes of this review, as 
a distinct but closely related (and influential) stream to both the economic and 
knowledge-based streams. Table 2.1 summarises the three broad research streams 
discussed and their relevance to the small state. The associated internationalisation 
approaches are also highlighted as the firm growth concept is closely associated with 
the process of firm internationalisation (Buckley & Ghauri, 1993; Welch & 
Luostarinen,1988; Ibeh, 2006, 2012). This close link between firm growth and 
internationalisation suggests that a constant flow of growing, early internationalising 
firms (Fritsch, 2008) is essential to the growth prospects of export-led small states.
2.3 Influences on and the determinants of indigenous firm growth in 
the small state
There appears to be, as yet, no pre-eminent approach emerging to prescriptively 
explain the growth process in SMEs and consequently no clear agreement on the key 
determinants of growth. This is due, in the main, to the myriad factors which have 
been proposed (and sometimes tested) to determine the growth of small firms 
(Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007). This is complicated by the interaction amongst these 
factors. Thus researchers, recognising the large unexplained variations in the possible 
determinants of the growth construct are focusing more attention on the possible 
'influences' on small firm growth (Davidsson & Klofsten, 2003). This would appear 
to be a less deterministic approach and there is broad agreement in the literature
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about what the main 'influences' are on small business growth. These have been 
summarised in the fram ework developed by Storey (1994).
Storey's fram ework has been modified by Smallbone and W yer (2006, 2012) in their 
attem pts to update, categorise and summarise the influences on small firm growth. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the myriad factors involved. Smallbone & W yer state that their 
approach incorporates aspects of the four main theoretical approaches mentioned  
by Gibb and Davies (1990; 1991). Theses are the Personality dominant approaches, 
Business management approaches, sectoral and market-led approaches and 
organisational development approaches. Their fram ework groups the variables 
influencing growth into the four categories of - management strategy, 
characteristics of the entrepreneur, characteristics of the firm -  all identified by 
Storey (and all internal factors to the firm) but they separate out the influence of the 
external environment (linking internal factors to external) which had been 
highlighted by Gibb and Davies (1990).
The inclusion of the external environment as a separate category of factors is 
im portant here as one of the major size-related differences between small and large 
firms is how they interact with their environment. Indeed Welsh and W hite (1984) 
reaffirm the importance of the external environment to small firm growth when they 
state that 'external forces tend to have more impact on small businesses than on 
large businesses'. Larger firms having a greater ability to shape or control their 
environment -  much as larger states can do.





Note: Smallbone & Wyer's framework (2006:103; 2012) is based on Storey's (1994:124) framework on the 
influences on the growth of small firms and the work of Gibb & Davis (1990; 1991). Storey does not treat the 
external environment separately in his framework but Smallbone et al. and other researchers in the small firm 
strategy literature make clear (O'Gorman, 2006, 2012; Hill & Jones, 2009) that the external environment is such 
an important influence in shaping the trajectory of the growth of the small firm (particularly in the small state) 
that it must be treated separately.
2.3.1 Empirical evidence on the respective influences
Storey and Greene (2010) further refine the framework by noting that the factors 
influencing growth can also be re-categorised as pre start-up factors (Characteristics 
of the entrepreneur), at start-up factors (primarily characteristics of the firm) and 
post start-up factors (Managem ent strategy). Table 2.2 details the influences and 
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Storey and Greene (2010:305) note, after their extensive review of the empirical 
research in the area, that the folowing factors have been shown, on balance, to have 
positive associations with firm growth. These are: Pre-start -u p : Prime age, higher 
education and male gender have direct influence on firm growth performance with
personality having indirect effects. Negative effects were found relating to 
unemployment. At start-up factors: Limited company and location. In post start-up  
factors the authors found unclear impacts from all of the other potentially influential 
factors considered. This means that consistent empirical evidence is currently not 
there to support these other factors which are popularly thought to influence firm  
growth. This could change over tim e but there are also significant methodological 
and variable specification issues which remain to be addressed.
These 'unclear impact' factors are at: Pre-start -u p : Team entrepreneurship, prior 
management experience, prior sectoral experience, in business before and family 
background. At start -up : Initial size, sector. Post start-up: Formal business plans, 
entrepreneurial skills, strategy, external environment, equity financing, innovation. 
Thus much business growth remains unexplained -  this does not imply that 
business performance is a 'random walk' but it does imply that chance or luck has a 
role, perhaps a much greater role to play, than is generally appreciated (Penroose, 
1959; Garnsey, 1998; Coad, 2007; Hill & Jones, 2009; Storey & Greene, 2010). Thus 
Delmar et al's. (2006) cluster analysis study is particularly important in recognising 
that firm growth is associated (more or less) with the directly observable 
demographic variables of the firm, i.e. firm size, firm age, industry affiliation (sector) 
and ownership/governance structures (limited liability) (pg. 205). Location was also 
found to be a significant factor (Storey & Greens, 2010). Thus a useful starting point 
for analysing the impact of independent variables on firm performance in the small 
state is to begin with the geo-demographic profile of indigenous firms.
2.3.2 The role of human capital in firm growth performance in the small state
Table 2.2- Column 1 (Characteristics of the entrepreneur) highlights the important 
role of firms' human capital stock -  particularly at the ownership/leadership team  
level -  in influencing prospects for growth. This is im portant in small states given the  
close relationship between ownership and management in small firms. M ore recent 
meta -  analytic reviews in the area of human capital and firm performance do show 
-  despite the myriad definitional and methodological issues encountered - that there 
is a significant, albeit small, positive relationship between human capital levels and 
firm performance. In particular, the association is strongest when the knowledge, 
skills and abilities (KSAs) are firm  specific rather than of a more general nature (Crook 
et al., 2011). Further, it was found that entrepreneurial success is also more closely 
associated with the outcome of human capital investments; i.e. the successful 
acquisition and transfer of knowledge and skills, than human capital investments per 
se and where the firm's knowledge, skills and abilities have high rather than low task 
relatedness (Unger et a i ,  2011). However, performance can also vary depending on 
w hether the entrepreneur(s) leading the firm are habitual (serial or portfolio) or 
novice entrepreneurs. Evidence on the link between the entrepreneur's prior 
business ownership experience and subsequent superior firm performance is mixed 
(Wright et al., 2012). There is, however, some evidence that portfolio entrepreneurs 
outperform both novice and serial entrepreneurs (Westhead et al., 2003).
2.3.2 Managing firm growth in the small state
Given the nature then of the internal and external characteristics highlighted in Table
2.2 it can be seen that the role of the owner/manager(s) or entrepreneur(s) or
leader(s) is considered crucial to the growth prospects of the small firm.
Managem ent in growing businesses -  particular small and medium sized businesses -  
must deal with changes which are 'unknowable and unpredictable in terms of timing 
and consequence' (Stacey, 1990). Open-ended change is increasingly what owner- 
leaders in growing firms are facing and Bradley (1985) notes that sustainable 
competitive advantage can only be developed if the leadership team develops the  
capabilities and competencies to cope, predict and comprehend changes in the 
external environment. That there is still so much debate around the characteristics of 
the firms' management which exerts the most influence on firm growth and value 
creation is no surprise. This is so when the myriad tasks around organisation, control, 
strategy, operations, communication, leadership etc. that senior management are 
observed performing in small firms is considered (O'Gorman et al., 2005; Barringer & 
Jones, 2004; Floren, 2006). In this context it is also worth noting that the work of 
senior management in small firms differs fundamentally from that of senior 
managers in larger firms, particularly in relation to strategy formulation (Bradley et 
al., 1985; O'Gorman, 2006, 2012) and marketing/innovation management (Stokes, 
2006; Shaw, 2012). It has been observed that small firms strategise, innovate and 
market more informality than large firms and so, by implication, studies and 
conclusions drawn from large firm research are limited in their application to our 
understanding of the role of managers in small firms (Mintzberg, 1973; O'Gorman, 
2012) particularly owner/managers (Saraswathy, 2012). Future research will perhaps 
focus on the work of top managers in growth-orientated versus non growth- 
orientated small firms. Indeed Floren (2006) advises that improvement of 
management in small businesses will not occur until researchers develop a better
understanding of w hat top managers in small firms really do, why they behave as 
they do and most importantly how it relates to firm performance. Smallbone et al. 
(1995) did note - in their ten year longitudinal study of firm growth - that it is the 
management/leadership teams' ability to develop and implement robust 
product/m arket strategies which was the key differentiating factor between high 
growth and low growth firms. O'Gorman (2006, 2012) further noting that it is not the 
strategy process perse  which differentiates between successful and unsuccessful 
firms but the ability to create competitive advantage from the strategy process. 
Storey and Greene (2010:215/216) conclude that after more than two decades of 
firm growth research there are just four known 'stylised facts' about small firm  
growth. These are:
1. Firms that grow (even modestly) are more likely to survive.
2. Fast growth firms are highly unusual. They make up no more than five per 
cent of any business population
3. Growth is 'spotty' from period to period.
4. Smaller and younger firms tend to grow more quickly than larger firms.
Whilst these 'truisms' apply to business populations generally - individual firms can 
and do prove exceptional. At this point in tim e (2013) it would seem that the 'firm  
growth' research community has not identified the 'blueprint' or DNA for success 
and this may indicate that, given the body of evidence accumulated so far, it does 
not exist. M ore importantly, it demonstrates the crucial role that 
luck/chance/serendipity plays in firm growth and value/wealth creation - both in 
large and small states. In small states though the margins for error are finer - firms 
are smaller and more vulnerable (as are small states) but conversely they have
greater strategic flexibility and can deploy more rapidly on international markets. 
Through strategic choice then they identify opportunities and try to exploit them  
(O'Gorman, 2006, 2012). Thus high task-related KSAs (Unger et al., 2011) - 
particularly when manifested in 'diagnostic capabilities' (Arnold et al. 2004) and 
implementation skills (Merson, 2011) - are necessary but not sufficient attributes for 
successful commercialisation and internationalisation. The benefit of luck or chance 
(Penrose, 1959; Garnsey 1998; Coad, 2009; Hill & Jones, 2009; Storey & Greene, 
2010) is also necessary and may be sufficient for a successful growth-related  
outcome when allied to high-task-related human capital investment (KSAs).
2.4 Barriers to growth for indigenous firms in the small state
Barriers or constraints on the firms' growth trajectory can emanate from its 
proximate and distal external environments and/or from internal factors. Rapidly 
changing technological, competitive and market environments create growth 
difficulties not only for technology firms but increasingly for more traditional firms 
also (DeBurca et al. 2004; M ohr et al., 2010).
The industry sector where the firm chooses to compete, or finds itself competing can 
be particularly important. There are three aspects to this competitive positioning 
influencing individual firm growth performance. These are the industry structure, the  
nature of the competition and the limitations of the chosen markets (Porter, 1980; 
McGahan, 2004). Moen (2002) notes that markets tend to become more 
heterogeneous over tim e thus creating 'niche' opportunities for smaller players. It 
remains for the firms' management to recognize and exploit these opportunities, by
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developing sustainable competitive advantage through its growth strategies (Arnold 
e t a i ,  2004: Hill & Jones, 2009; Merson, 2011).
Growth barriers can also be of an internal nature (O 'Gorman, 2001, 2006, 2012). The 
internal barriers highlighted are in many cases the corollary of the drivers of and 
influences on value creation within the firm. Merson (2011: p.88) referring to these 
tw o opposing influences on firm growth as the 'driving and restraining forces' in his 
'force-field' analysis. Highlighted internal barriers can include: Firstly the owner 
managers themselves and secondly size-related constraints including the 
organizational culture, finance, attracting and retaining talented staff and marketing 
problems. In addition, the assets of the business may be inadequate to underpin 
growth and the management may not be experienced in or unable to build a 
balanced management team (Smallbone & W yer, 2006, 2012).
O'Gorman (2012:399) approaches the barriers to growth from a strategic 
management perspective and classifies the barriers to growth as 'the strategic 
problems of small business'. However a cursory look at this classification shows the 
similarities to Smallbone and Wyer's. O'Gorman however does not differentiate 
between internally and externally generated challenges but lists them  as: Lack of 
financial resources, marketing problems and customer concentration, management 
and human resources, over-reliance on the entrepreneur, lack of systems and 
controls and lack of technological skills. Bessant et al. (2005) also developed a 
typology to capture the internal and external barriers to growth. The variables 
identified by Bessant e ta l., are captured in their Tipping point/absorptive capacity 
fram ework and are incorporated into Table 2.3. These authors identified - from a
review of the literature - six 'barriers' to growth in the small firm and these are: 
M arket entry, operational improvement, availability of finance, formal systems, 
strategy and People management. This typology is contrasted to Smallbone & Wyer's 
(2006; 2012) and O'Gorman's (2006, 2012) in Table 2.3. The variables common to all 
three approaches are then incorporated into the empirical analysis in Chapter seven.
In summary then - the barriers to small firm growth can be subsumed under the 
rubrics of internal factors  (owner-management and resource-acquisition related) and 
external factors  (Rapidly changing environment, Industry structure, competition and 
market limitations).
In the small state, the impact of each of these factors on indigenous firms is 
magnified given the small domestic base and the relatively smaller scale of the 
enterprises. However the external environmental factors are likely to have a greater 
bearing on small firm performance in small states given their vulnerability to 
environmental and term s-of-trade shocks (Ramey & Ramey, 1995).
Table 2.3: Typologies o f barriers to  small firm  grow th
Smallbone & Wyer 
(2006, 2012)
O'Gorman (2006, 2012) Bessant, Adams & Phelps (2005)
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Internal Over-reliance on the entrepreneur
Obtaining Finance
Inadequacy of existing assets for 
underpinning growth
Technological skills Operational improvements
Difficulties associa 
building and team . . . - f o r  ■
(Source: Bessant et al., 2005; O'Gorman, 2006, 2012; Smallbone & Wyer, 2006, 2012 - adapted by author)
Thus the strategy choices available to - or foisted upon - firm management becomes 
increasingly im portant (O'Gorman, 2012). The literature clearly implies that 
management competence (including its diagnostic, analytic and absorptive capacity 
abilities) and its resource mobilization capabilities are captured in the strategies 
pursued (O'Gorman, 2001). These strategies demonstrate the managements of 
indigenous firms' ability to develop, despite the external barriers presented, 
sustainable competitive advantage. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that 
whilst the entrepreneur is always with us (Baumol, 1996), high or fast growth firms in 
small states are exceptional. The indigenous firm which then grows through 
internationalisation is truly exceptional (Mayer & Ottaviano, 2007), or at the very 
least serendipitous (Garnsey et al, 2006; Hill & Jones, 2009; Storey & Greene, 2010).
2.5 Measuring and describing indigenous firm growth in the Small 
State
McKelvie & Wiklund (2010) review the literature on firm growth and categorise it 
into three distinct but related streams of: Firstly, growth as an outcome - 
deterministic studies with growth as the dependent variable. Secondly, the outcome 
of growth - growth as an independent variable, and thirdly the process of growth - 
organic v acquisition v hybrid growth processes. These authors note that, the 
'growth as an outcome' is (as Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007 have also contended) the 
predominant literature stream. Some measure of growth is used as a dependent 
variable, and various predictor variables are used to try and explain variations in the
dependent variables (Storey, 1994; Smallbone & Wyer, 2000; Baum et al., 2001; 
Gilbert et al., 2006; Delmar, 2006; Shepherd & Wiklund, 2009). The literature on this 
stream, according to the authors, has a number of drawbacks, mainly relating to the 
unit of analysis (the firm), differences in modes of growth (organic/acquisition/ 
hybrid), variation in growth rates over tim e (appropriate tim e periods for analysis), 
and perhaps most importantly, the measures of growth.
2.5.1 Measures of firm perform ance-the  empirical evidence
Achtenhagen et al.{2010) in their review of 56 articles investigating firm growth from  
1997 to 2008, found that their results confirm the earlier reviews of growth 
measures in that 42 per cent of studies used sales growth, 27 per cent used 
employment growth and 16 per cent used a combination of measures. Similarly 
Dobbs & Hamilton (2007) in their comprehensive review of the literature on 
deterministic studies from 1999 to 2005, note that employment growth is used in 22 
studies, sales growth in 19 studies, and asset growth in a small minority of cases. It is 
important however, to point out that only 18 of the 34 studies cited above cover 
periods of five years or more. Only six of the cited studies cover periods of five years 
or more and (as in this dissertation) use multi-sectoral data. W einzimmer et al. 
(1998) also raises the issue of the appropriate growth measures to apply. These 
authors conduct a comprehensive review of 35 studies in leading journals in the area 
between 1981 and 92, and find that 83 percent of studies used sales as a growth 
measure with 75 per cent using only sales growth. Employment growth is used as a 
measure in 17 per cent of the studies with asset growth used in eight per cent of 
them . In his study of growth measures, Delmar (1997) reviewed 55 empirical studies
published between 1989 and 96, and finds that 31 per cent of studies use turnover, 
29 per cent use employment, 18 per cent used multiple indicators and 12 per cent 
use subjective indicators. He concludes [a la W einzim m er et al., 1998) that different 
choices of growth indicators results in different outcomes even when tested on the  
same data. None of the meta-analysis distinguished between small and large states.
Storey and Greene (2010) further note the limitations of using 'backcasting' studies 
(as described above) to study such a complex phenomenon. They conclude that 
whilst the findings in these studies may help in descriptive analysis; they have not 
been tested for predictive or forecasting purposes.
2.5.2 Value creation
It is surprising then that scholars from the entrepreneurship stream - researching 
firm growth - have not focused on Value creation and capture' (in terms of return on 
invested capital - ROIC) to any great degree as a dependent variable. This is an 
established and now generally accepted methodology for evaluating firm  
performance in the strategic management and financial management literatures 
(Copeland e ta l, 1996; Rappaport, 1998; Baldwin, 2002; Hill & Jones, 2009; Arnold,
2009). See Appendix 1 to this chapter for a description of the importance of ROIC as 
a performance measure. M ore importantly, Appendix 1 demonstrates the clear 
relationship between the drivers of ROIC and management strategy.
2.5.3 Turnover as a growth measure
Sales and employment growth measures (absolute and relative) are clearly the most 
popular dependent variable measures used in empirical growth studies by firm  
growth scholars. These may be non-controversial measures but they are, on their
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own, regarded as incomplete measures of the true 'economic value' created by the  
firm. Davidsson (2004) noted, when commenting on 'high growth firms', that 
differing results are achieved when absolute and relative measures of the same 
variables are used on the same dataset, leading him to conclude that what 
constitutes 'high growth' firms depends entirely on the measures used. Sales and 
employment appear to be popular in the firm growth literature because of the 
relative ease of access to this information in certain developed countries (Davidsson, 
2004; Anadike-Danes et al. 2009; OECD, 2010). Turnover (as shown in Appendix 1) is 
the 'top line' driver of enterprise growth (and an indicator of the success or 
otherwise of management's strategy at increasing turnover and possibly company 
value) and therefore can be regarded as an im portant driver of organisational 
growth. However this is not the same as value capture for the firm. Post-tax 
profitability levels are a measure of this. There is thus an important trade-off 
between revenue growth and profitability levels as shown in Appendix 2 to this 
chapter, which management must be aware of i.e. driving for revenue growth needs 
to be balanced with concerns for profitability levels as diminishing returns sets in 
beyond a certain point and shareholder value can be adversely affected (Hill & Jones, 
2009: Chap. 11). This can result in destruction of shareholder value and is, in essence 
'bad growth' (Arnold, 2009).
2.5.4 Employment as a growth measure
Employment growth, on the other hand, is generally regarded as a consequence of 
enterprise growth and is not therefore, of itself, a satisfactory measure of firm  
growth performance. This despite its recommended use (in addition to turnover) by
the OECD (2010) for categorising high-growth firms (Eurostat-OECD, 2007). Some 
scholars attem pt hybrid measures (See: Delmar, 1997) but these have not gained 
traction in the literature so far even though they have the potential to offer a more 
robust growth measure than either sales or employment (Davidsson et al., 2006). 
These authors note that researchers in the firm growth area in future will need to 
focus on either myriad dependent variable measures or agree to settle on one if 
cumulative knowledge is to develop in the area. As noted in the literature, both 
approaches have their drawbacks and it is likely that the debate will continue until 
either approach or a new approach gains the ascendency.
2.5.5 Shareholder value creation as a growth measure
To obtain a more complete and accurate firm growth performance measure which 
acknowledges the customer value created and captured by the firm, we do not need 
to look far. The firm, through its legal requirement to file annual returns and 
accounts in developed countries (as a limited liability entity), has readymade value 
creation and capture metrics available. This allows researchers to analyse the 
financial performance of the firm. These financial accounts are an annual evaluation 
of management's strategic performance. They indicate (retrospectively) how well 
management's strategies contributed -  or not -  to shareholder value creation or 
destruction (Rappaport, 1998; Hill & Jones, 2009: p.93; Arnold, 2009). Analysing 
financial performance over a longer period, allows researchers to see management's 
strategy in action and to gain insights into its success or otherwise at creating 
shareholder book value. M ore precise measures of the 'economic value' created by 
SMEs would be measures such as economic profit (EP) (Fernandez, 2003) or
Economic Value added (EVA®) ( Bennett Stewart 111, 1991), but these measures 
require more detailed financial information than SMEs are typically required to file 
on an annual basis. They are therefore more applicable to public companies.
Measures of the financial growth of firms are available for use by researchers in the  
firm growth space and have been used successfully by some such as Becchetti and 
Trovato (2002) who look at movements in the profitability and the return on the  
invested capital in Italian firms. Shareholder value creation or destruction then can 
be annually tracked as a growth measure. Christopher and Peck (2004:121) note 
that:
W hilst there can be no argum ent th a t long-term , sustained profit has to be the goal of 
any commercial organisation, there is a growing realisation that if profit is the end, 
then w e should spend m ore tim e examining the means w hereby it is achieved.(p.121)
Profit is a measure of how successfully a firm achieves its commercial goals -  
profitability as a percentage of the capital invested in the business (ROIC) is regarded 
as the prime measure of how effectively value is created for shareholders (owners) in 
a business over tim e (Baldwin, 2002). See: Appendix 1 to this chapter for a full 
explanation. Unprofitable or 'bad' growth below the cost of capital to the business 
destroys shareholder value -  growth above the cost of capital conversely creating 
value. Thus the tw o main drivers of increased enterprise or shareholder value are the  
return on invested capital and the growth rate of profits. By successfully pursuing 
strategies that result in a high ROIC and by growing operating profitability after tax, 
shareholder value can be maximised (Hill & Jones, 2009: Chap.l Appendix, p.37).
Indeed, positive increases in shareholder value on an annual basis in small private 
firms primarily arise from profitable returns (trading and otherwise) and/or fresh 
injections of capital during the financial period. Decreases in shareholder value can 
only come from losses during the year and/or withdrawals of retained earnings (or 
losses on disposal of assets) and/or the payment of dividends to shareholders. Access 
to the annual financial accounts of private firms over prolonged periods allow 
researchers to track the historical performance of firms and, more importantly, the 
success or otherwise of managements' growth strategies. These performance 
measures aggregated over a cohort of firms allows longitudinal analysis of firm  
performance to be undertaken, thus meeting a necessary requirem ent of researching 
firm growth (Davidsson, 2004; Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007).
The principal way then to increase shareholder value is by focussing on ROIC, profit 
growth and high profitability levels (margins) (Baldwin, 2002). This prioritisation has 
been applied to publicly-quoted companies over many decades and the same 
principle can and should be applied to small and growing firms -  notwithstanding the  
difficulties of accessing, using and interpreting accounting measures of profit 
(Rappaport, 1998). This 'going concern' measure is particularly problematic for the 
valuation of new technology based firms (NTBF's) (Storey & Tether, 1998) and for 
technology start-up's given their heritage deficit (Audretsch & Link, 2011; 2012). 
Nevertheless profitability measures do, at the very least, provide a benchmark for 
NTBF performance.
This need for focus on profitable growth and ROIC is finally been acknowledged in 
the entrepreneurship/small firm growth literature (Davidsson e ta l., 2009; Steffans
et al., 2009; Davidsson et al., 2010). The empirical research results of these authors 
suggests that the pursuit of early profitability followed by 'profitable growth' rather 
than the pursuit of growth (scale) perse  (growth to profit) appears to be a more 
robust strategy for the longer term  survival of young, small, growth-oriented firms. 
Thus profit/invested capital related growth measures are important measures to 
track over tim e when researching growth patterns in small, growth oriented firms if 
shareholder or firm value creation is the focus. O'Gorman (2001) cautions that even 
for businesses which achieve growth -  this may come from market growth itself and 
not due to managerial choice or competence.
Given the wide acceptance and understanding of the relationship between 
profitability levels, profit growth, capital invested and firm value in the strategic 
management literature (Hill & Jones, 2008; Johnson & Scholes, 2009), strategic 
marketing (Doyle, 2010) and the corporate finance literature (Rappaport, 1998, 
Baldwin, 2006; Arnold, 2009), it is important that future growth performance 
measures in the firm growth literature have the:
Explicit inclusion of company value in future work, as this is arguably a more
terminal goal than either growth or profitability1 (Davidsson et al.,2008:19).
This is an acknowledgement by some leading scholars in the 'entrepreneurial' 
research stream that 'value creation' measures may perhaps be the future of growth 
performance measurement. Indeed it is a further acknowledgement that the  
literature is remiss in having downplayed or ignored these insightful measures for so 
long. In spite of the large number of studies which have used incomplete measures 
like sales and employment to estimate growth, concerns about the validity of firm
growth measures persist in the entrepreneurship literature (Cho & Pucic, 2005). It is 
im portant to rem em ber also that Capon et al., (1990) highlight the need to focus on 
'shareholder value creation' in growth measures as early as 1990 in their m eta­
analysis of firm financial growth measures then in use. Their suggestions however 
have only recently regained traction in the academic literature on firm growth 
(Davidsson e ta l., 2008a; Steffens e ta l., 2008; Davidssion e ta l., 2010). These 
researchers, using Swedish and Australian data have investigated the relationship 
between profitability and growth in the small firm in the smaller state and conclude 
that 'profitable growth' is a superior long-term strategy for the entrepreneur than 
'g ro w th -to -p ro fit' strategies. Whilst growth-to-profit strategies may be appropriate 
to firms with disruptive innovation or operating at the edge of the technology 
envelope (R&D based), it is not a strategy which is appropriate for the majority of 
firms operating towards the incremental end of the innovation continuum.
2.6. Financing indigenous firm growth in the small state
Financing of firm growth is an important topic in the small state from both a demand 
and supply side perspective. Figure 2.2 illustrates how firms' financing requirements 
and sources of finance change over the lifecycle of the growing firm (Berger & Udell, 
1998). This approach implicitly supports the propositions of the Pecking Order 
Theory (POT) of firm finance, which holds that firms will attem pt to finance from  
internal sources (retained earnings) before they seek external finance (Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Flogan & Flutson, 2005). SME financing strategies in smaller 
states broadly follow international practice - (Mac an Bhaird, 2009; Mac an Bhaird & 
Lucey, 2010). In small states the availability of state finance at the seed and venture
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stages of the financial lifecycle signals the belief that there is a 'finance or equity gap' 
for growth oriented firms which the financial system cannot or will not fill (Jarvis & 
Schizas, 2012). Storey and Greene (2010) note that since 'information opacity' is a 
feature of small business finance, there is always evidence of 'market failure', 
implying that there may be a role for state intervention to correct the situation. 
Empirical evidence is required to validate the existence of an equity gap and 
unfortunately the literature is less clear on specifically what constitutes an equity gap 
and how this might be measured (Mulcahy, 2005a). Whilst the life cycle model is a 
descriptive representation of the broad financing process for firm growth, it needs to 
be treated as a broad approximation of the process (Berger & Udell, 1998; Gregory et 
al., 2005). The financial lifecycle approach suffers from the same predictive validity 
issues as the lifecycle models in the firm growth literature (Greiner, 1972; O'Farrell & 
Hitchins, 1988; Flanks eta l., 1994; O'Gorman, 2001). Since most small firms do not 
grow or grow erratically, the model cannot apply to all firms in all situations. By 
seeking to raise outside equity the firm's shareholders (through its management) is 
signalling its growth intent and its recognition that it must dilute its shareholding if it 
is to attem pt to increase the future firm value (Carpenter & Peterson, 2002). Firms in 
technology-driven sectors with initial high initial expenditure on R&D (Sunk costs) 
generally employ higher levels of external equity and lower levels of internal equity 
than traditional firms. Technology-driven firms typically are not generating enough 
(or any) profits to m eet their investment needs -  at least in the early years after 
start-up. Indeed lack of collateralisable assets is also a problem for these firms and 
they must depend upon cash flow based financing options or the personal assets 
and/or guarantees of the shareholders (Mac an Bhaird & Lucey, 2010; Jarvis &
Schizas, 2012). Valuing such enterprises then is particularly problematic (Audretsch & 
Link, 2012a, 2012b) as the value of the business may be in proprietary knowledge 
assets which are 'off-balance sheet'.
2.6.1 Financial Bootstrapping
Financial 'Bootstrapping' (Bhide, 1992; Winborg & Lindstrom, 2001) referred to by 
Berger and Udell (1998) in Figure 2.2 as 'initial insider finance' is an under researched 
area in the literature. It would appear to be an important skill for entrepreneurs to 
learn as it teaches them how to manage with a 'profitable growth imperative' 
(Steffens et al., 2009) and identifies for them the link between cash flow, 
profitability, profit growth and ROIC (Hill & Jones, 2009). Failure to raise sufficient 
finance or to manage growth financing can lead to 'overtrading' or other cashflow or 
undercapitalisation related difficulties (Merson, 2011). Bootstrapping also allows the 
founder to develop their customer value proposition (CVP) before seeking outside 
investors. Taking a bootstrapping approach to funding a venture also suggests that 
the entrepreneur is applying an 'effectuation logic' to entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy, 
2012) rather than the assumed 'opportunity analysis' approach (Davidsson, 2012). In 
the effectuation approach the entrepreneur takes an iterative, emergent but 
controlled approach to business development rather than pursuing a deliberate 
grand vision. Acquiring outside finance before the firm is 'investor ready' (Mulcahy, 
2005a; Mason & Kwok, 2010) can prove detrimental to the interests of the founding 
entrepreneur - particularly if growth targets are not met. Barker (2002) - cited in 
Merson (2011) concludes:
.... a lot o f entrepreneurs think they need money to build the business faster when
they actually haven't figured out the business equation yet (Pg. 35).
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Figure 2.2: Firm continuum and sources of Finance*
Firm s iz e _________________
Firm age  _____________
Information availability -►
Very small firms, Small firms, possibly
possibly w ith no with high growth
collateral and no potential but often
no track record. w ith lim ited track record.
M edium-sized firms. 
Some track record. 
Collateral available, 
if necessary.
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-jShort-term Financial Institution loans |—►







M 1 Public debt
’"Whilst the sources of finance are broadly applicable in Ireland, one major difference is the presence 
of the state -  through Enterprise Ireland, its economic development implementation agency 
(Enterprise-lreland.com)- in the seed and venture funding space, the provision of public venture 
Capital and grant assistance. (Source: Berger & Udell, 1998).
2.6.2 Financing Knowledge-intensive firms in the small state
There are a number of implications for growth-oriented firms in small states. Firstly 
this review suggests that profitable growth should be pursued by entrepreneurs if 
they wish to retain control of the business in the long term . Growth, in these 
instances, is carefully managed but 'good7 growth ensues as the entrepreneur is 
guided by the 'profitable growth imperative' in creating shareholder value. If, on the 
other hand, the entrepreneur wishes to harvest the business in the short to medium  
term  or aspires to leading a fast or high growth firm then they can pursue scale 
driven strategies -  funded in part by outside investors, generally private equity or 
venture capitalists. Whilst this can be regarded as 'bad growth' in the traditional 
sense -  the ultimate objective is a 'trade sale' or IPO and shareholder value may be 
realised in this way. This is potentially a more rewarding but more uncertain path in
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the short term  for the entrepreneur. The approach adopted by the entrepreneur will 
depend on their personal goals for the business (O'Gorman, 2012: 394).
This knowledge-driven growth model, developed internationally for new technology 
based firms (NTBFs) is most appropriately applied in fast developing markets and/or 
to disruptive technologies or with disruptive business models. This model underpins 
the classic 'venture capital' approach to funding firm growth (Gompers & Lerner,
2001). It has been shown to be applicable to only a small percentage of young, 
potential fast-growth firms in any given economy (M urray et al., 2012). Venture 
capital providers are increasingly migrating to larger deals and to follow-on rather 
than start-up funding. Therefore angel investors or angel consortia are becoming 
increasingly important in back filing the market gap vacated by venture capital firms 
(Mason, 2006).
Within the small state, the available pool of potential fast growth projects will be, by 
definition, comparatively small. The number of projects will depend on the states 
level of technological sophistication and the dynamism of and investment in the local 
innovation eco-system in facilitating or stimulating innovative start-ups (Edquist & 
Hommen, 2008).
Making private equity and/or venture capital more easily available to firms in the 
state without correcting for the acknowledged strategy and structural weaknesses in 
growing firms (O'Gorman, 2006; 2012) may result in suboptimal allocation of scare 
resources in the small state - particularly if there is direct state involvement (Lerner, 
2009; M urray & Liu, 2009; Bertoni et al., 2011; M urray et al., 2012, Barry et al.,
2012).
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2.7. The role and contribution of the State Support System to  
indigenous firm growth performance in the small state
2.7.1 Macro and micro level policies.
The role and contribution of the state to indigenous firm growth remains an area of 
contention in the literature (Bennett, 2012). If, as Baumol (1996) contends the 
entrepreneur is 'always with us' and Marris (1999) observes that firm contribution to 
social welfare probably lies in the realm of competitive dynamics then what role is 
there for industrial policy and the institutional fram ework in the small state.
Storey & Greene (2010) note how macro-economic factors such as taxation,
regulation, immigration and competition policies exert powerful influences over
indigenous firm activity, principally because small firms are exposed to the
vagrancies of the external environment. The state therefore faces difficult policy
choices in how it treats the interests of its indigenous firm stock and the general
taxpayer. Storey & Greene (2010) further add that the justification for using public
funds to  support SMEs is because of their job creation abilities, their contribution to
economic development, the sustainability benefits and finally because they are a
core political constituency. However controversy arises in how  the state should assist
growing firms beyond creating the right enterprise environment for them (Baumol,
1996; Lerner, 2009; Hart et al, 2009). Bennett (2006) further reminds us that:
The first point on which it is im portant to be clear is that entrepreneurs and managers, 
not governm ents, develop small business. But governm ents can have a profound 
effect on all firms, particularly small firms operate and the ir opportunities to grow. 
Indeed, governm ent policy and its influence on the 'institutional environm ent' o f a 
country, region or locality has become a key focus o f efforts to help improve how  
small firms develop and economies com pete (p.49 /5 0 )
Bennett (2012) further opines that, at the micro-intervention level, the case for 
direct government action has traditionally been justified by the 'm arket failure', 
public interest and government as strategic planner arguments (See also: Breznitz & 
Zimmerman, 2008; 2010). The lack of empirical evidence justifying direct micro-level 
intervention however does not seem to deter governments, particularly in smaller 
states from attem pting to target direct assistance at 'growth-oriented' firms (Lerner, 
2009: Storey & Greene, 2010; Mason & Brown, 2011).
2.7.2 Micro-level policy rationale
Governments can apparently justify very few  elements of micro -  level policies on 
either the supply or demand side based on the available empirical evidence to date. 
This point is re-affirmed by Bannock (2005), Davidsson (2008c), Bridge e ta l. (2009) 
and Bill et al. (2009) in their respective findings. Storey & Greene (2010) further 
reiterating that despite the myriad micro-level instruments in use, the quality of 
impact evaluation is generally inadequate or non-existent.
How, where, when and why Governments intervene at microeconomic level to assist 
SMEs largely depends on the prevailing political ideology and historical context of the 
state in question (Breznitz, 2007, 2008, 2012; Mason & Brown, 2011). When  
governments intervene at the micro level they attem pt to pick or make winners, or 
at least attem pt to avoid picking losers. Targeting is seen as a very attractive public 
policy approach when viewed from the 'perceived need', 'additionality' or 'value for 
money' perspectives (Bennett, 2012). However Dobbs and Hamilton (2006) remind 
us that firm growth is 'idiosyncratic' and depends on 'context specific variables' 
whilst Coad (2009) notes that empirical findings on firm growth so far have shown it
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to be 'almost random' in nature and thus highly unpredictable. Storey and Greene 
(2010) therefore contend that - given the predilection of governments (particularly in 
smaller states) to target firms for assistance (whether the reasons are well founded 
or not) -  then, at the very least, a robust monitoring and evaluation process should 
be enacted to evaluate the impact of the intervention and to facilitate policy 
learning.
The OECD (2008) cite four important reasons for the need to formally evaluate the 
impact of small business policies -  the substantial amounts of taxpayer sums 
invested, to establish how effectively that public money is spent, the political 
imperative/accountability and the need for efficient policy delivery. In short - there is 
an 'opportunity cost' to using state funds for intervention policies (Mulcahy, 2005a).
Storey and Greene (2010) acknowledge however that it is the ability of a sovereign 
state to nurture new 'fast-growth' firms (Gazelles) which is probably the [italics 
added by authors] most important element in enterprise development. This largely 
explains the focus on and resources committed by governments to growth-oriented  
SMEs (Brown & Mason, 2012).
The literature in this area looks at approaches to micro-level state intervention to 
support/encourage/stimulate an enterprise culture by selectively identifying and 
supporting those entrepreneurial SMEs which Georgellis et al.{2000) define as those 
'with a strategic intent to grow'. These are the fast-growth or high growth firms 
which make a disproportionate contribution to employment (Henerekson & 
Johansson, 2008; OECD, 2010). Carr (2000b: 410,412) notes that:
The policy o f selectivity has tw o strategic aims. First, to identify and support
entrepreneurial small business. Second to shape and nurture a strategic m in d se t.....
Though entrepreneurs are encouraged to be more strategic in their approach there 
are limitations on the efficacy of such order (P.410,12).
These are im portant points as Section 2.4 of this chapter shows that typically SMEs 
do not engage in overt formal strategic planning nor do they engage in traditional 
marketing planning. Strategy tends to be informal and intuitive -  emergent rather 
than deliberate. Marketing tends to be more entrepreneurial than corporate 
(Bradley, 1985; O'Gorman, 2006; Stokes, 2006, Shaw, 2012). This can have serious 
implications for micro-level intervention policies which are targeted at these firms. 
These interventions can be seen as an overt attem pt by the state to impose a 
strategic and rational approach to business planning - in the belief that suboptimal 
performance (and the likelihood of business failure) are closely related to a lack of 
attention to business strategy (Beaver & Ross, 2000). This approach needs to be 
treated with some caution for the reasons cited earlier. However Carr (2000b:410- 
11) notes that:
It can therefore be suggested that selectivity can be understood as a system by which 
strategic order is imposed on entrepreneurial 'chaos' with firms being advised on how 
best to develop their produce and market.
Its aim [the selectivity process -  added by author] is to professionalise the way in 
which entrepreneurs approach their business and to promote the development of a 
strategic orientation. In doing this, selectivity requires the collaboration of 
entrepreneurs in these practices of self-shaping, self-cultivation and self-presentation 
(Pg. 410,12).
Thus, the state and the SME owner can be at cross-purposes - not so much over 'the 
opposition to selectivity and rationality perse' but sometimes around the selectivity 
criteria that is applied. In small states with a 'developmentalist' heritage, the state 
can be deeply implicated in attempts to 'fashion' entrepreneurial behaviour within
small firms {ibid) - in trying to make winners. However sometimes the state finds it 
difficult to apply truly objective criteria given the higher levels of social cohesion that 
exists in small states, and therefore policy implementation can revert sometimes to 
policies more akin to 'blanket' support. This is generally regarded as non-strategic 
and suboptimal {ibid) i.e. it is satisficing rather than optimising behaviour. O'Gorman 
and Cooney (2007) note that most developed nations do not have a formal, coherent 
enterprise policy guiding policy interventions and thus a piecemeal approach ensues 
causing duplicity and sub-optimality. This helps to explain the plethora of micro-level 
policy interventions in small states. O'Gorman (2006:402) thus cautions:
It is important that policy makers appreciate the problem is not with the strategy 
formulation process but, rather, the development of a clear competitive 
advantage [bolding added by author] (pg.402).
At the level of the firm, it is about developing competitive advantage or differential 
firm advantage (Cavusgil & Nevin, 1985; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Porter, 1995, 
O'Gorman, 2012). Comparative advantage (whilst most important at the macro level 
of the host nation) is but one part of the competitive advantage make-up of the firm  
at the micro level. It is entrepreneurial firms which compete and trade 
internationally and not nations (M ayer & Ottaviano, 2005; Bennett, 2006, 2012). 
Porter's diamond model (1990), Rugman and D'Cruz (1993) double diamond model 
and Hollensen's (2004: 85) synthetic model all try to encapsulate the complexities of 
the internal factors and the competitive/environmental factors that 
internationalising firms face (See also: Cassidy et al., 2010; Van den Bulcke et al.,
2010). The impact of this environmental uncertainty is magnified for from small
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states who are obliged to internationalise early -  particularly those seeking organic 
growth opportunities in the same product/m arket sectors (Merson, 2011).
Given the myriad internal and external influences and determinants involved in SME 
growth, the instability of the growth construct itself, the complicating influence of 
the growth-through-internationalisation process, the questionable logic of state 
intervention at micro-level and it is little wonder that the contribution of stimulus 
interventions by the state remains difficult to evaluate. Most cases therefore are 
simply not rigorously evaluated (Storey, 2000; OECD, 2004: OECD, 2008; Storey & 
Greene, 2012). Until impact evaluation becomes an integral part of the policy making 
process, policy learning's will not be captured and cumulative knowledge banks on 
the firm growth process will not be amassed by policymakers (Papaconstinou & Polt, 
1997).
Figure 2.3 is a representation of the 'theory of change' hypothesised to occur when 
the small state makes a micro-level intervention in its indigenous growth-oriented  
firms aimed at accelerating firm growth.
2.7.3 Isolating the effects of micro-level policy instruments
Impact evaluation has an integral role to play in the policy making process in these 
circumstances. Evaluation cannot be left at the end of the line but instead, it has to 
be a key elem ent of initial policy formulation (OECD, 2008). Morton (2009) notes 
that:
Im pact evaluation encourages a shift in the focus o f policy evaluation from  the past to  
the fu ture and promotes the use o f evaluation for policy learning rather than simply 
for cost containm ent or control, (p.4).
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Once the policy is operational, all organisations and individuals responsible for 
delivery have to be aware that evaluation is to take place. It is recommended that 
monitoring and formative and summative evaluation should be integrated into the 
programme design (Walker & Wiseman, 2006).
Once the evaluation has been undertaken it should be used as the basis for dialogue 
with policy makers, with the objective of delivering better policy. The outcome of the  
evaluation can then become an input into the debate on the most appropriate ways 
for governments and SMEs to  co-evolve to pursue economic growth (Breznitz, 2007, 
2012). Policy formulation can thus become 'evidence-based'. Policy can thus be 
improved through a process of'radical incrementalism' (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998).
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This approach emphasises the need for a clear high-level view on SME policy's long 
term  strategic direction. Near term  initiatives or experiments can then be 
contextualised by this longer view. W ithout this blueprint the near term  initiatives 
begin to lose coherence (Brown & Hagel, 2003) and a smorgasbord of policy 
initiatives ensues (Bennett, 2012). In tandem with this Simonian (Simon, 1968) 
'incremental' learning approach, the state can also involve itself in 'market making' 
i.e. putting in place the conditions for new markets and acts as co-ordinator or 
facilitator where there are obvious co-ordination failure (Sissons & Thompson, 2012). 
This requires policy makers to have superior research and diagnostic skills, be pro­
active and forward looking, but also effective at working with business and 
institutions (Link & Link, 2009).
Attempting to evaluate the effects of programmes is complex and difficult as there 
are myriad influences on and determinants of the performance of an SME - other 
than that of programme participation (Figure 2.3). In essence, only when all known 
factors (including chance) are controlled for can the impact of the programme be 
accurately estimated. Given the paucity of cumulative knowledge in the firm growth 
space and the lack of agreed specificity around the number of key variables, it is little 
wonder that there is controversy in the impact evaluation field over the most 
appropriate approaches and methodologies.
The OECD (2000) identified seven headings under which policy interventions could 
be assessed. These are: Rationale, Additionality, Appropriateness, Superiority, 
Systemic Efficiency, Own Efficiency and Adaptive Efficiency. Each of these areas is 
important in its own right and should receive the appropriate attention if designing 
policy instruments but the most important is the concept of Additionality. This is
defined as the true impact of the scheme/programme. Theoretically this makes great 
sense and whilst it is not always easy to quantify, it is likely to be reflected in a 
measure such as additional output, or growth in employment or growth in sales, 
exports, profits or assets that can be attributed to the existence of the policy. In 
other words activity that would not have taken place without the policy programme 
but is attributable to the firm participating in the programme. Figure 2.4 (Oldsman,
2002) is a simplified view of the process. It shows, for any given outcome, that policy 
impact can be considered as the difference between the observed outcome with the 
intervention and what would have happened without the intervention -
the counterfactual. Figure 2.4 shows these two outcomes diverging after the time  
when the policy is implemented.
This illustration is most applicable to 'Hard' support programmes (financial support) 
but is clearly more challenging to measure the effects of 'soft' supports such as 
consultancy, training, management development etc. The diagram also does not 
show that the state intervention can also result in a negative outcome for the firm or 
cohort of firms in a programme.









Storey (2000) developed an approach to try an overcome the limitations of the  
evaluation methodologies of that tim e. His six stage approach attempts to evaluate 
the impact of specific programmes on firm behaviour and performance. This 
approach was subsequently adopted by the OECD (2004) and has now become the 
recommended approach of the OECD (2008). Whilst recommended as 'best practice' 
by the OECD, no exemplar case or empirical studies has yet been published to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of the approach. Its usefulness remains an open 
question until such tim e as an empirical research base has developed. It also appears 
to be more appropriate for estimating the shorter term  effects of programmes.
Rigorous evaluation seeks, by some means, to contrast the views or actions with 
those of non-recipients in order to present the counter factual (White, 2010). The 
difference between actual changes and the counter factual is viewed as the impact of 
the policy (See Figure 2.4 above). The OECD recommended approach is applicable to  
discrete policy instruments only and does not measure the effects of multiple 
instruments or take an economy-wide approach. Impact evaluation, as discussed 
here, is inappropriate for applying to the broader macro-level research questions 
which are typically addressed by statistical or macro -  economic modelling (M orton, 
2009).
Storey's approach to evaluating micro-interventions introduced the notion of using 
mixed research methods in evaluation. Nevertheless Curran (2000) highlights the 
methodological problems encountered when attempting to evaluate SME small 
business policies and support through this methodology. On a broader level the net 
contribution of the policy or programme has to be offset ultimately against
deadweight (defined as desired outcomes which would have resulted even if the 
policy or programme had never been initiated) and displacement (defined as the  
result of the policy or programme where other firms not involved cease to trade or 
have lower sales or employment or suffer higher costs) (ibid).
Curran claims that the most appropriate evaluation design to control for these 
myriad external influences on SME programmes are versions of the 'matched control 
sample' approach to establish the counterfactual -  essentially a true experimental 
approach (W hite, 2009). Storey (1998) however does acknowledge the difficulty of 
'matching' firms given the myriad factors to consider in relation to the characteristics 
of the firm, the characteristics of the entrepreneur/m anagem ent/ownership, the 
nature of the business strategy and the external environmental factors facing the 
firm ( Smallbone & Wyer, 2012). Even firms in the same sector and locality may serve 
very different markets (Curran & Blackburn, 1994). The methodological problems 
above are compounded by issues around sample framing and response errors and 
selection bias. Valid comparison between assisted firms and other firms can be 
affected by administrative selection, self-selection or moral hazard (Storey, 1988; 
Bennett, 1997). Taken together the problems of sampling, response bias, self­
selection and establishing control samples, make rigorous impact evaluation 
extremely difficult (Curran, 2000).
The limitations of quantitative experimental techniques alone can be offset to some 
extent by using qualitative techniques such as depth interviews, focus groups and 
case studies. In addition to adding richness and depth to the overall findings, these 
methodologies can also help identify the firms behavioural and organisational
changes attributed to the programme or policy. This approach would appear, as far 
as possible, to offer a methodological approach to the measurement of the strategic, 
operational (increased sales, profits, employment) and behavioural changes (change 
in organisational cognitive and absorptive capacities) postulated to happen in Figure 
2.3. Changes in the environment provoke policy change which in turn initiates state 
intervention which in turn stimulates the hoped for changes in the strategic, 
operational and behavioural performance of the firm to create economic value. Thus 
the contribution of the state micro-level intervention may be assessed along these 
three dimensions. Table 2.4 shows the monitoring and evaluation possibilities 
available for various intervention programmes and policies (Storey, 2004).
Table 2.4: Types of Government micro-level intervention instruments for SMEs and 
the measurement of outcomes for the policy instruments
P r o g r a m m e M o n i t o r i n g E v a l u a t i o n C a u s a l M e a s u r e m e n t
r e l a t i o n
□ □ □ □ □ 1_ o u t p u t  — 
o u t c o m e
c o s t
P r o v i s i o n  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n
o o w e a k h i  a h
S e m i n a r .  T r a i n i n g o o o w e a k l o w
C o n s u l t a t i o n .  M e n t o r i n g o o w 'e a k l o w
G r a n t o o o o o o s t r o n g l o w
L o a n  G u a r a n t e e o o o o o o s t r o n g l o w '
E q u i t y  p r o g r a m m e o o o o o o s t r o n g l o w
T a x  i n c e n t i v e o o o o o s t r o n g h i g h
(Source: OECD, 2004)
2.7.3 Theory based Impact evaluation approaches
In situations where the counterfactuals (as a precursor to establishing additionality), 
cannot be reliably established or where it is not possible to construct satisfactory 
control groups due to data quality or access issues then theory-based impact 
evaluation (TBIE) approaches is more appropriate (Weiss, 1998; Stame, 2004;
Carvalho & W hite, 2004; Rogers , 2007; W hite, 2009; Funnell & Rogers, 2011). The
Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE) -  an industry representative
group explain the benefits of theory based impact evaluation as follows:
The application o f the theory-based approach implies that a well designed impact 
evaluation covers both process and impact evaluation questions. Policy relevance is 
thus enhanced as the study can address questions of why -  or why not -  an 
intervention had the intended impact, not just w hether it did. (W hite, 2009:p.3)
Thus TBIE examines the underlying assumptions of the causal chain from inputs to 
outcomes in a particular programme or policy. The 'theory' in TBIE therefore refers 
to the underlying theory behind the intervention programme. TBIE provides a logical 
fram ework for analysis within which both quantitative and qualitative techniques can 
be used to evaluate the impact of the intervention. Despite its undoubted 
acceptance in principle by the evaluation research community, W hite (2009) notes 
that few  studies to date appear to meet the promise of the approach in practice.
One theory-based approach which has gained in popularity since it was first 
proposed is Mayne's 'Contribution analysis' - developed from his work on results 
monitoring systems (Mayne, 2001). In sum the 'Contribution analysis' either confirms 
the postulated 'theory of change' in the policy instrument or suggests revisions to 
the theory where results prove otherwise. Mayne (2012) notes that a 'contribution 
analysis' will rarely provide definitive proof. Causality is provided in probalistic terms. 
This is differentiated from the 'attribution' issue in evaluation studies in that 
attribution  is used to both identify the cause of the effect and also measures it 
quantitatively. Attribution studies attem pt to establish how much of the effect is due 
to the intervention but they require the establishment of the counterfactual to be
effective (Leeuw & Veessen, 2009; W hite, 2010). Whilst attribution studies are 
appropriate in the development field, in the business field their use has proven more 
problematic due to the instability of the growth construct and the myriad 
confounding factors.
TBIE is a pragmatic alternative to the attribution approach. The six stage 
'Contribution Analysis' is an iterative process which builds a chain of evidence and 
argument to get to a conclusive situation where 'plausible association' does or does 
not exist (Hendricks, 1996). For 'Contribution Analysis' scholars then contribution is 
defined as:
In light o f the m ultiple factors influencing a result, has the intervention made a 
noticeable contribution to an observed result and in w hat way? (M ayne, 2012:p.273)
Thus the impact on firm performance by micro-level policy instruments can be 
evaluated whilst taking account of the change theory and myriad influencing and 
determining factors present. The resultant 'contribution analysis' studies could then 
input into the enterprise policy-making process so that future SME policy at firm  
level can be 'evidence-based'.
2.8 Summary and Conclusion
Small states are unique in the issues that they face. They are structurally different 
from larger states. These differences have implications for the small state's ability to 
grow economically. The equation for growth then for the small state must ensure 
that the positive effects of openness to trade and high levels of human capital 
investment overcompensate for the negative effects of income and terms-of-trade  
volatility in the medium to long term.
In addition to the structural characteristics I it is important to realise that the internal 
policies pursued, institutional strength and the competitiveness of the firms in the  
economy will also have a bearing on economic growth. Thus it is the combination of 
exogenous and endogenous factors, which determine the small state's ability to 
grow economically.
The stock of (SMEs) then in a small state is a key engine of economic growth, 
particularly those that are in internationally traded sectors. However an operational 
fram ework which distinguishes between growth and non-growth firms does not 
currently exist despite the number of differing research traditions investigating the 
issue and the number of empirical studies already carried out to date.
The ability to understand and predict the determinants of small firm growth has 
increasingly occupied researchers but studies to date show that firms do not grow in 
an orderly sequential fashion. Growth may occur in surges, may be reactive rather 
than proactive or may not occur at all. Since the mid 1990s over thirty significant 
independent variables have been identified by researchers as 'being of significance' 
in helping explain firm growth. However significant unexplained variation remains.
A consensus exists in the literature on the measures of the dependent or growth 
variable. Employment growth, sales growth and asset growth respectively are the 
most popular. Increasingly 'shareholder value creation' is being considered as a more 
complete measure of a firm's achievement and thus profitability, profit growth and 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) are poised to assume greater importance in the 
'firm growth ' literature in future.
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Due then to the myriad factors involved, (not to mention the interactions between  
these factors) in determining firm growth, there is no one pre-eminent approach 
emerging and so researchers are contenting themselves with theorizing on the  
'influences on' firm growth. There appears to be broad agreement in the literature, 
that the main influences revolve around the interplay of the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur, the strategies of management, the characteristics of the firm and the 
characteristics of the external environment. Factors - identified in empirical studies - 
which, on balance, appear to influence firm growth are: at prestart -u p  phase - prime 
age, higher education and male with personality having an indirect effect: At start -  
up -  Location and whether the firm is limited liability. At post start -u p  there are no 
clear factors identified as yet. Considering firm growth in the small state then, the 
observable 'geo-demographic' factors identifies in wider studies are an appropriate 
starting point.
Another aspect of the firm growth literature reviewed here is the 'barriers to 
growth' or 'constraints on growth' literature. These barriers are analysed in the 
literature by dividing them into those that are of an external nature and those that 
are of an internal nature. The literature finds that it is management's ability to 
comprehend, deal with and respond to the firm's environment, mediated through its 
strategy, that ultimately exerts a major influence on the growth trajectory of the 
firm. However large unexplained variation persists and this may be attributable to 
omitted variable bias and the role of chance or luck.
After more than two decades then of firm growth research then, there are just four 
known 'stylised facts' about small firm growth. These are: Firms that grow (even
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modestly) are more likely to survive; Fast growth firms are highly unusual, they make 
up no more than five per cent of any business population; Growth is 'spotty' from  
period to period and smaller and younger firms tend to grow more quickly than 
larger firms.
Whilst these 'truisms' apply to business populations generally - individual firms can 
and do prove exceptional. At this point in tim e it would seem that the 'firm growth' 
research community has yet to identify the 'blueprint' or DNA for successful growth 
and the research may indicate - given the body of evidence accumulated so far - that 
it may never be found.
One of the other key factors influencing or stimulating SME growth can be the state. 
Given the lack of integrative theory and indeed the lack of consensus on specific 
growth determinants, serious questions are raised in the literature over the 
applicability and effectiveness of public policy initiatives in the area - particularly 
micro-level interventions.
With the constraints on state resources in Small States and an apparent lack of a 
guiding 'Enterprise policy', it is suggested that isolating the effects and evaluating the 
effectiveness of micro-policy instruments should be a priority for policy makers.
Thus a crucial issue becomes one of isolating and evaluating the net effects or 
'Additionality' of state micro- policy instruments on firms' performance to determine 
if the desired change has occurred. Did the policy instrument help 'accelerate' 
growth in a measurable way and did the state obtain added value from the 
programmes? Evaluation methodologies applicable to micro-policies are discussed 
from a theoretical and pragmatic perspective. The literature review suggests that
whilst counterfactual methodologies make most theoretical sense, in practice Theory 
Based Impact Evaluation (TBIE) approaches hold more promise. A TBIE methodology 
which focuses on contribution rather than attribution and appears to hold most 
promise from a pragmatic perspective is 'Contribution Analysis' -  a systematic 
approach to arriving at creditable causal claims.
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Appendix 1
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o f s trateg ies value
(Source: Hill &  Jones, 2009)
To increase shareholder value, managers must pursue strategies that increase the 
profitability of the company and grow the profits.
A firms Profitability and Profit Growth are determined by two main factors:
• The overall performance of its industry relative to other industries
• Its relative success in its industry as compared to the competitors
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Appendix 2 
Managing firm growth
The Tradeoff Between Profitability 
and Revenue Growth Rates
Need to m axim ize long-run shareholder returns  
by seeking the right balance between com pany  
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Chapter 3 
Ireland -  A Case study of a small late developing state.
International trade has been central to the growth of the Irish economy since the 
1960s (O'Connor, 2001). As Ireland has a relatively small domestic economy with 
the attendant levels of industrial specialisation, it needs to import to a greater 
extent when compared to countries with larger domestic economies. Such imports 
must, in the long run, be financed by export sales (Marin, 1992). However this 
export-led growth hypothesis, based on the proposed positive link between exports 
and output (Sharma & Panagiotidis, 2004) still remains controversial.
Nevertheless as a trade dependent economy (ESRI, 2008), Ireland would appear to 
face tw o main challenges. Firstly to develop specialisation in sectors that yield the 
greatest possible value added. Secondly, to produce these goods and services with 
the greatest efficiency possible (Forfas, 2006). This is an equally difficult task when 
the size of the population (less than 4.6 million) is factored in (CSO, 2012). The 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 informed us that small economies, despite their 
scale-related constraints are poised for growth if they invest heavily in human 
capital and R&D, and are open to trade and investment (Armstong & Read, 2003). 
However, in an increasingly globalising world, the small open states vulnerability to 
income and terms of trade volatility also increases (UNCTAD, 1988; Easterly &
Kraay, 2000).
In recent years, also in line with global trends in more developed and late 
developing economies, the export growth performance of the services sector in 
Ireland has outpaced that of manufacturing (Forfas, 2006, 2013). Across the OECD,
services activities now account for an increasing proportion of economic output and
employment. In Ireland two out of every three jobs, and sixty four per cent of value
added in the economy is accounted for by services (Forfas, 2008). This has given
rise to the debate that developed, and late developing economies are undergoing
some form of 'deindustrialisation' (Rawthorn & Ramaswampy, 1998). This will
result, according to the more bearish commentators, in the future development of
an 'hourglass' economy with high value added service jobs at the top, an
increasingly denuded manufacturing sector in the middle and low value added
service jobs at the bottom (Brinkley, 2006). However this structural changes plays
out over the coming years, there is general agreement at supranational (EU) and
national policy level, that we are entering an era, where:
The strength o f its knowledge industries and Europe's capacity to diffuse knowledge 
across the to ta lity  o f the economy are fundam ental to its success and are key to 
lifting its growth o f productivity to compensate for falling population growth and pay 
for its social models (Kok, 2003:6).
The 'knowledge economy' or 'knowledge-driven economy' has arrived.
3.1 The knowledge economy
The knowledge economy is difficult to define precisely because, as the Work 
Foundation (2006) acknowledged, the commodity it rests on -  knowledge - is hard 
to define with any precision. This, of course, creates problems for the quantification 
and measurement of the concepts (Arrow, 1962). However the World Bank 
Knowledge Assessment M onitor (KAM) (2009), attempts to describe the pillars of a 
knowledge economy along four dimensions. The four pillars are; a states' economic 
and institutional framework, the quality of its education system, its national 
innovation system and its ICT infrastructure. Ireland ranked 11th in the world in
2012 across the 148 variables measured. Interestingly it does not include a 'quality 
of life' metric, which is widely seen as an important factor and the fifth pillar of a 
knowledge economy. This pillar is seen as essential in attracting in 'knowledge 
workers' to the host nation (Florida, 2003).
The W ork Foundation (2006) has attem pted to operationalise and adopt for its own
research purposes, the following working definition of what constitutes 'the
knowledge economy' within a state. It is:
The share o f national income and em ploym ent produced by the innovating 
organisations, combining ICT and highly skilled labour to exploit global scientific, 
technological and creative knowledge networks (p. 2).
One of the key enablers of the knowledge economy is the intensive use of 
information and communications technologies (ICT) as a catalyst for development in 
the economy. The rapid fall in price and the vast increases in computing power have 
allowed the creation of networked systems -  including cloud computing and big 
data - which are able to store, analyse and handle vast knowledge and information 
flows. This represents a 'soft discontinuity' from the past (David & Foray, 2002), and 
not a 'new economy' operating to a new set of economic laws as initially suggested 
(Brinkley, 2006).
Whilst the W ork Foundation definition gives a broad understanding of what the 
knowledge economy is, it is important to find a more specific unit of analysis to 
allow international comparisons of knowledge-driven economies or at least, 
particular facets of these economies. For the purposes of the analysis here it is 
more useful to use the OECD (2005)/W ork Foundation (2006) definition of what 
constitutes knowledge intensive industries within a knowledge eco n o m y-th ese  are
regarded as; High to medium tech manufacturing, finance, telecommunications, 
business services (all OECD) and education and health (added by Work Foundation).
Applying these (broad) measures to Ireland in 2005 reveals that it appears to be the 
most knowledge - based economy in the OECD. The industries described above 
account for 48 per cent of Irish GDP followed by the US (43 per cent), Germany (43 
per cent) and Sweden (42 per cent). 41 per cent of its workforce in 2004 was 
regarded as knowledge workers, up from 30 per cent in 1995 (ILO, 2004). Yet 
Ireland is only regarded as 'M iddle tier' when judged by its 'investment in 
knowledge' (a composite index developed by the OECD), decreasing from 2.6 per 
cent in 1994 to 2.4 per cent in 2002 (OECD, 2006; Brinkley, 2006).This is consistent 
with Ireland's ranking on the European Innovation Scoreboard as an 'Innovation 
Follower' (Europa.eu, 2009). O'Malley et al.'s (2008) also note that Ireland, whilst 
experiencing high growth and innovation scores to 2008, achieved this paradoxically 
with low R&D spend. Eurostat (2007) defines knowledge-based industries even 
more broadly than OECD/Work Foundation (by including more traditional 
industries). On this measure Ireland is ranked lower at ninth of fifteen in Europe 
with 39.9 per cent of the workforce in knowledge-based industries. This fall in 
ranking on the wider Eurostat metric can be attributed to the inclusion of 
indigenous firms who dominate in the more traditional industrial sectors. This 
measure thus gives a more accurate view of the overall economy. These indices 
should be treated with caution given the conflicting definitions, methodologies and 
data collection techniques used. However they collectively show that Ireland's 
performance on the 'knowledge investment' and 'knowledge output' scores are 
below par for an aspiring knowledge-led economy.
As a small, open, trade dependent economy then, Ireland's performance on the 
knowledge-based indices ultimately manifests itself in its export performance. This 
occurs due to the close relationship between GDP, GNP and exports (Marin, 1992). 
In 2006 exports constituted 64 per cent of GDP (CSO, 2006; Enterprise Ireland,
2006). It is suggested - given the distortive impact of FDI on Ireland's GDP figures - 
that GNP or GNI is a more reliable indicator of the states ultimate economic 
performance. When this is done overall performance is less impressive (O'Flearn, 
2000) but still comparatively strong (Smith, 2005).
An indication of the importance of exports to the Irish economy is its proportionally 
greater reliance on them compared to other countries such as Japan, one of the 
world's most successful trading nations and the US, the world's richest or even 
Sweden, the world's most knowledge intensive economy (WorldBank KAM, 2012). 
Ireland's export intensity expressed as a percentage of GDP is roughly 4.5 times the 
figure for Japan and 8.5 times that of the US and over 1.5 times that of Denmark 
(GlobalEDGE, 2007). Indeed Ireland places such heavy reliance on exports, 
compared to its EU partners that at 64 per cent it has one of the higher export to 
GDP ratios (Forfas, 2006). A summary economic profile of Ireland from IDA Ireland 
(2008) using the KAM framework (Worldbank, 2012) is provided in Appendix 1 to  
this chapter.
3.2 The direct contribution of FDI to Ireland's economic growth.
Closer analysis however of the growth in Ireland's exports reveals that much of it is 
accounted for by the subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms. Read (2004) notes that 
the determinants of FDI inflows to small states has received scant attention in the
literature. However, in Ireland's case, the consensus amongst policymakers and 
academics alike is that these inflows are a mix of efficiency-seeking and market- 
seeking FDI. These firms are drawn to Ireland for the low corporation tax rates 
(12.5%), access to the EU market, the availability of skilled labour and the 
supportive business environment (Breznitz,2007, 2012). (See: Appendix 1 to this 
chapter also for further details).
Not surprisingly, FDI has also been primarily responsible for Ireland's elevated 
position on the 'knowledge economy' measures cited above and on globalisation 
indices such as the AT Kearney Globalisation Index (AT Kearney, 2009) which 
measures levels of international trade and investment intensity. Ireland was ranked 
as the 5th most globalised economy in the world in 2007. Indeed one notable 
feature of this performance relates directly to the size of the state. Seven out of the 
top ten most globalised nations have populations of less than 8 million, with AT 
Kearney asking why small countries rank so high, and noting in response that to be 
globally competitive countries like Denmark and Ireland '.... have no choice but to  
open up and attract trade and foreign investment.'
Indeed O' Connor (2001:50) was moved to exclaim that in Ireland's case:
All com m entators agree that Ireland's success in attracting Foreign Direct Investm ent
is the key factor that has led to the m ajor economic success in the last decade (p.50).
Smith (2005) cautions however, that Ireland's case cannot be used as a blueprint for 
other nations to follow - given the unique combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors that helped create it. That it is no exemplar economy nor is it a 
showpiece for globalisation (despite its high ranking on AT Kearney index -  author
added). Krugman (1997) however notes that the image of Ireland as the 'Celtic 
Tiger' may well have of itself contributed to growth. He points to the tendency of 
FDI to agglomerate in specific locations. A herd mentality tends to take hold once a 
location establishes with the 'early movers'.
In their review of the performance of small business, the Oireachtas (Houses of 
Parliament) Joint Committee on Enterprise and Small Business (2007) noted in 
consequence that:
The role of Foreign Direct Investm ent (FDI) in the success o f the Irish export sector 
can hardly be overstated. Foreign-owned firms exhibit a greater propensity to export 
and have outperform ed indigenously-owned firms on export markets (p .10)
These exports from FDI, according to the Enterprise Strategy Group (2004) in their 
review of industrial policy, account for most of Ireland's exports (89 per cent) by 
value. For the most part, they are goods and services which were designed 
elsewhere, to satisfy market requirements that were specified elsewhere, and sold 
by other people to customers with which the Irish operation has little contact, and 
over whom it had little influence. Ireland is merely the country of production.
Porter (1990: 679) cited in Doyle & Fanning, (2007) perceptively identified, even in 
1990 (on the eve of the so called 'Celtic Tiger' boom) the issues facing Ireland in 
developing a balanced economic strategy between FDI and indigenous industry, 
when he wrote that:
A developm ent strategy based solely on foreign multinationals may doom a nation to  
remaining a factor -d riven  economy. If reliance on foreign multinationals is too
com plete, the nation will not be the home base for any industry  the results of
not developing more advanced forms of com petitive advantage is a cap on economic
development: rapid progress can be made, but it only goes so fa r ... In Singapore and 
Ireland, my view is that the shift has been too little and too late. Neither nation has 
truly committed to the slow process of developing a broad base of indigenous 
industry (p.679).
FDI has been attracted to Ireland since the 1960s following a radical change of 
policy from a protectionist agenda (for almost 30 years), to an export-led approach 
(Kennedy, 1998; Donnelly, 2012). The first wave of foreign manufacturers arrived in 
Ireland in the late 1950s after systematic cultivation by the Irish state with 
attractive capital investment grants and tax breaks. The first major investors were 
UK and German followed later by US corporations. O'Connor (2001) lists the 
reasons for Ireland's FDI success. These were a mixture of exogenous and 
endogenous factors coming together to create an opportunity which the Irish state 
was well placed to take advantage of. Endogenous factors were - Good industrial 
development policy, the success of the IDA itself, targeting of the electronics, 
chemicals and pharmaceutical industries, membership of the EU since 1973, 
expansion and enhancement of the education system, improved infrastructural 
communications systems, investment in infrastructure and other projects through 
the EU Structural Funds (Barry ,1999), fiscal reform especially after the financial 
crises in 1987, structural revolution in the economy, demographic dividend, 
national wage and salary agreements, commitment to technological development, 
revival of indigenous industry since 1980's and an English speaking workforce. 
Exogenous factors were -  The sustained growth in the US economy from 1991 to 
2001, changes in the underlying geography of the world economy, cultural similarity 
with the US and lasting peace in Northern Ireland (Peace dividend).
Finally Smith (2005) contends, in line with O'Connor (2001) that the Irish state 
through its policies and agencies has played the major role in Ireland's economic 
success by targeting and successfully attracting technology-driven FDI from sunrise 
industries. Ireland has therefore benefited greatly from the state's foresight in 
creating an attractive environment for FDI (See: IDA, 2012). From an employment 
viewpoint with over 150,000 employees in above average (industrial wage) 
employment (Forfas, 2005), the Irish state can point to real achievement in growing 
employment. However Ruane and Gorg (1999) note that whilst employment 
creation is the main yardstick by which FDI policy is measured, spillover effects and 
direct linkages to the wider internationally trading sectors of the economy must 
also be considered. Policymakers have attempted over the years to try and address 
the latter tw o issues (particularly linkages) with limited success (Crowley, 1996; 
Garhart et al. 1997; Barry, Bradley & O'Malley, 1999; Ruane & Ugur, 2005; Gorg, 
2007). The increasing foreign-owned presence and sectoral agglomerations in 
Ireland has managed to dwarf the indigenous exports sector since the 1990s 
(Oireachtas Joint Committee on Enterprise & Small Business, 2007).
Total merchandise exports in 2006 were dominated by chemicals (49 per cent) and 
machinery and transport equipment (25 per cent) -  both sectors dominated almost 
entirely by multinationals (CSO, 2007). Indeed Foreign owned firms accounted for 
87 per cent of total value of merchandise exports in 2005.
Table 3.1 -  Comparison of the direct* contribution of Irish owned v foreign owned
Firms to the Irish economy (2006)
Details Irish owned (Internationally 
traded) -  Agency supported 
(www.enterDrise-lreland.com)
Foreign owned -  Agency 
supported 
(www.idalreland.com)
Employment 2006 151,710 153, 352+




Exports € 9.6bn 79bn
Merchandise 7.6bn 55bn
Services 2.0bn 24bn
Export Intensity % 38.5 94
% of total exports 11 89
% Export growth 2000 -  2005 1.2 4.6
Expenditure in economy € - 16.8bn 17.3bn
Payroll, Raw materials and
local services
As % of sales 67 20
Purchases outside Ireland € 4.039bn 33.55bn
% of sales 16 40
Value Added 8.9bn 5.45bn
Primary destination of exports UK/EU EU/US
Notes to  Table: * Only the direct economic contribution of each sector is considered as reliable comparative
figures are not available for wider linkage and spillover effects from each sector. A Whilst the value of service 
exports have significantly increased it is unclear what the actual value generated from the Irish economy due to 
transfer pricing/intellectual property policies and aggressive tax avoidance schemes employed by the 
multinational sector see: http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article 1024185.shtml.
+The figures shown here are for 2005 and provide a baseline for analysis but the overall trends from 2000 -  2011 
are tracked at: http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article 1025535.shtml. Conflicting employment figures 
are provided by Forfas (2013:6). Overall the employment figures quoted above are circa 5% below those from the 
2013 figures. (Source: Forfas, 2005 -  Annual survey of Economic im pact, CSO, 2007 - adapted by author)
Foreign-owned agency-supported enterprises accounted for 66 per cent of 
employment and 93 per cent of exports in internationally traded services (Forfas
2006). Table 3.1 compares and contrasts the direct contribution of both the Irish 
owned (indigenous) internationally traded sector and the foreign owned sectors to  
the Irish economy.
Ireland's Industrial Development Authority (IDA), as a deliberate policy, is 
attempting to increase the 'stickiness' of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects by
trying to encourage these multinational companies to locate more value added 
functions like Research and Development (R&D), customer service and 
marketing/sales functions and/or other key corporate functions in Ireland so that 
they cannot be as easily uprooted as more basic operations and moved to lower 
cost locations.
FDI has performed well for Ireland over the last twenty years in terms of 
employment creation and inward investment and in helping diversify the  
geographic spread of Irish exports and lessening the states traditional dependence 
on the UK market (Breznitz, 2012). Flowever the erosion of Ireland's cost 
competitiveness during the boom period 1993-2007 was a cause of concern. The 
effect of this loss of competitiveness has been exacerbated by the global slowdown 
in trade, recession and financial crises which began manifesting itself in earnest in 
2008. Consequently unemployment in Ireland has increased from 4.6 per cent in 
2007 to over 16 per cent in 2012 (CSO, 2012). In addition to the loss of cost 
competitiveness, Ireland's infrastructural, ICT and R&D deficits has also attracted  
most comment especially when compared to leading knowledge economy 
performers (NCC, 2006; Forfas, 2007; Aylward & O'Toole, 2007; ESRI, 2007; World 
Bank (KAM), 2007).
3.3 The direct contribution of indigenous industry
The contribution of indigenous industry to overall export performance appears 
disappointing for Ireland from a top line perspective (See: Table 3.1). The share of 
indigenous exports fell from 26 per cent of the total in 1991 to 12 per cent by 1998. 
In 2004 the share was virtually the same at 12.4 per cent (Oireachtas Joint
Committee on Enterprise & Small Business, 2007). Indeed indigenous exports grew  
in value terms just 1.2 per cent over the period 2000-2005 -  an acknowledged 
boom period for the economy (Forfas, 2005). Entrepreneurship contributed 
significantly to domestic market growth before and during the period but not to  
export growth (Acs et al. 2007; Anyadike-Danes et al. 2011).
In 2005 indigenous exports were approximately 11 per cent of overall export value, 
falling to a low of 9 per cent in 2007. These figures however must be interpreted 
with caution due to the transfer pricing/intellectual property and aggressive tax 
avoidance practices of the multinationals based in Ireland (Hennigan, 2012; Palan et 
al. 2013). Despite its apparently declining contribution to overall exports sales 
values, the indigenous firms collective spend in the economy is just three per cent 
short of the contribution of the Foreign-owned sector located in Ireland in 2005 
(Table 3.1). This suggests in effect that the internationally-trading indigenous sector 
spends 67 per cent of every euro of total sales generated in the Irish economy 
compared to 20.5 per cent for the multinational sector. The foreign-owned sector, 
in addition, spent 40 per cent of every euro of reported export sales on imports 
compared to an indigenous spend of 16 per cent. These figures serve to illustrate 
the potential that exists for improvement in indigenous industry's contribution to 
economic development through innovative entrepreneurship and scaling of export 
activities.
There are two further exogenous factors that could impact negatively on Ireland's 
future success in the FDI area. Firstly there are moves from core states such as 
Germany and France towards EU corporate tax harmonisation (Irish Taxation
Institute & the Institute of European Affairs, 2007), and secondly changes have been 
mooted in US corporate tax legislation which could restrict future FDI opportunities 
(Hennigan, 2012). This exposure to potential exogenous shocks is in line with the  
increased levels of vulnerability experienced by smaller states (Read, 2003) and 
should give further impetus to efforts to develop internationally-focused indigenous 
firms. Given the increasing global competition for FDI from lower cost countries, 
Cooney (2007) rightly questions what will happen if Ireland can no longer entice as 
many MNCs to locate in Ireland. He concludes that:
 it is im perative that Ireland develops its indigenous industry by engendering a
greater num ber of [innovative] business start-ups and encouraging existing firms to 
grow through exports. But how can this be achieved when no entrepreneurship  
policy [enterprise policy] currently exists within governm ent strategy? (Foreword)
The implications of the foregoing analysis is that -  firstly Ireland has developed into 
a 'knowledge economy' (See World Bank definition in Appendix 1 to this chapter) 
on the back of FDI. However the MNC stock has not driven the country's 
'investment in knowledge' (OECD, 2007) to the same extent, and therefore Ireland 
lags behind in some key aspects of knowledge investment (O'Malley et al. 2008).
This can clearly be seen on the indices from the Knowledge Assessment Monitor 
(Worldbank KAM, 2012) where Ireland ranks 11th in the world as a knowledge 
economy across 148 variables. Peer European competitors like Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden all rank consistently in the top five in the world. Leaving 
methodological and data considerations aside, this must be a cause of concern to 
Irish policymakers for the future.
3.4 Direct linkage and indirect linkages (Spillover Effects) and the 
Absorptive capacity of indigenous industry
A further aspect of FDI requiring consideration for the host country is the issue of 
direct linkages, which are expected to emanate from the creation of vertical 
linkages in the host economy. The scope for the creation of these linkages however, 
can be constrained by the shallowness of the economic structures in the small state 
(Read, 2004).
'Spillover effects' or indirect linkage effects from FDI (Ruane & Gorg, 1999) are also 
expected to be another beneficial spin-off from FDI. This relates to the 
technological, knowledge and business processes introduced into the host economy 
by FDI and the extent to which these proprietary knowledge assets 'spillover' into 
the indigenous base thereby increasing their international competitiveness 
(Kennedy, 1991; Crowley, 1996). Read (2004) notes that the magnitude of beneficial 
linkage effects are likely to be constrained by the absorptive capacity of their 
economies.
The empirical evidence to date in Ireland is mixed and suggests that expectations 
have not been met. It appears that linkages (direct and indirect) are at the lower 
end of the value chain (Garhart et al. 1997). Similarly Gorg (2007) concludes that 
the few  studies (Kennedy, 1991; Barry, Bradley & O'Malley, 1999; Ruane & Ugur, 
2005) using traditional approaches to measure spillover effects do not come up 
with overwhelming and unambiguous support for positive effects. Gorg and Strobl 
(2003) using different measurement methods, found that only firms in hi-tech 
industries benefit from MNCs in terms of having higher probabilities of survival.
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They suggest that firms are more likely to benefit from technology spillovers if they 
have the necessary absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al, 
2002). Indeed Arnold et al. (2004) and subsequently (Forfas, 2005:30) specifically 
recognised the importance of developing this capacity in the case of Ireland when 
they found that:
Nurturing absorptive capacity is a key policy need in many countries, but is especially 
urgent in a place like Ireland w here the uneven developm ent o f the economy means 
that many sectors need to catch up, and w here there is a rich supply o f MNCs 
providing opportunities for others to reap externalities, (p .30)
This linkage between MNCs and local indigenous entrepreneurs requires further 
empirical analysis and research before more definitive conclusions can be drawn. 
However, from a policy perspective, the Irish data is in line with international data 
which suggests that policy should focus on the absorptive capacity of the 
indigenous entrepreneurs, and the encouragement of vertical linkages in the 
economy (Gorg, 2007). However Lane et al's (2002:M 4) cited in Forfas (2005:11) 
contend that 'Absorptive capacity is a complex construct which is difficult to 
operationalise ...'
The view taken here of the absorptive capacity construct in this study is consistent 
with Bessant et al.'s (2005) suggestion that the growth crises or 'tipping points' 
experienced by SMEs across the economy (which may need external knowledge to 
transverse) are generally of a commercial rather than of a technical nature. Thus it 
can be knowledge from potentially any source which helps remove or transverse 
the barriers to growth. Forfas (2005:28) concludes that:
An im portant aspect o f absorptive capacity is the ability to identify and value external 
knowledge. W ithout this, the firm is forever lost in the 'learning paradox' of knowing 
too little to allow it learn (p.28).
Thus Smallbone et al. (1995) noted that the major differentiating factor between 
growth and non-growth firms was the leadership team's ability to develop and 
execute on their product/m arket strategies. O'Gorman (2006) adds that the 
strategy process is not the issue perse ; it is the outcome of the process that is most 
important - the creation of sustainable competitive advantage. Building capabilities 
and skills to engender the ability to diagnose opportunities and develop competitive 
advantage is therefore the major challenge at firm and policy level (O'Gorman, 
2012). Absorptive capacity levels within the leadership team underpin these 
dynamic capabilities.
3.5 Entrepreneurship capital and its importance for knowledge 
diffusion
Absorptive capacity then is a firm level construct which is connected to the wider 
economy through the 'knowledge filter' in the economy (Acs et al., 2004; Acs et al., 
2012). The shorter the knowledge filter the quicker knowledge is diffused 
throughout the economy (Audretsch, 2007). The key to shortening the knowledge 
filter is the stock of entrepreneurship capital in the economy that is available to  
commercialise the created knowledge (Audretsch, 2008). High growth regions are 
distinguished by their relatively high investment in knowledge, low knowledge filter 
and high levels of entrepreneurship capital (Acs et al. 2004; Audretsch & Lehmann, 
2005). The 'European paradox' of high investment in knowledge but low growth
rates is explained by the absence of high levels of entrepreneurship capital to  
shorten the knowledge filter(Audretsch, 2007).
The focus on FDI in Ireland, despite the well documented employment and 
investment benefits and attendant high rankings on 'knowledge economy' 
measures, has not acted as a catalyst to increasing the country's overall 'investment 
in knowledge' (OECD, 2007) to the extent desired as the knowledge created tends 
to remain proprietary to the MNC creating it.
Even so, Ireland has effectively 'bought-in' its high knowledge economy ranking 
through its FDI policy (M ilner and Westway, 1993). Consequently Ireland lags 
behind in some key aspects of knowledge investment -  particularly in relation to 
indigenous industry (O 'Malley et al. 2008; Hennigan, 2012). In recognition of these 
knowledge investment gaps, public investment in higher education R&D has 
increased rapidly since 2000. This increased knowledge investment has been 
supported by policy innovations such as the introduction of the Programme for 
Research in Third Level Institutions (PRTLI) and Science Foundation Ireland (SFI). 
Efforts to boost levels of business R&D and connectivity have also been intensified, 
with a particular focus on indigenously-owned and smaller firms (Edquist & 
Hommen, 2008). Despite this increased emphasis on knowledge creation - in-house 
R&D, new technology adoption and human capital development in indigenous 
firms, these developments come from a historically low base at state and firm level 
and will require tim e to develop (O'Malley et al. 2008). Initial emphasis appears to  
have been placed on the technology-driven sectors by policy makers. Audretsch and 
Keilbach (2004) caution that:
In a region with high level of R&D and low level o f unem ploym ent this objective
should rather be targeted towards knowledge-based entrepreneurship. There, 
entrepreneurship plays an important role in the creation of new products or 
technologies from publicly available technological knowledge. In regions with a high 
level of unemployment and low R&D intensity, policy should rather focus on "low- 
tech" entrepreneurship; a policy that aims to foster knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship to strengthen the economic basis in such a region can be 
expected to fail its objectives (p: 422)
Unfortunately Audretsch and Keilbach do not distinguish between exogenously and 
endogenously sourced entrepreneurship capital. If these are analysed separately-  
as in Irelands case (See: Table 3.1) -  it is clear that science and technology policy 
choices for indigenous industry were made which were probably too narrowly 
defined and which did not pay sufficient attention to the inadequate linkages 
between FDI and indigenous firms and/or indigenous firms and the 3rd level sector 
(Hennigan, 2012). In addition the structure and performance of the indigenous 
sector exports were not given sufficient consideration. Whilst ICT, Pharma and 
internationally traded services are the best performing export sectors from FDI, the 
more traditional agri-food sector remains the consistently largest indigenous 
exporting sector by employment and value despite the growth in technology­
intensive indigenous firms (CSO, 2012).
Audretsch eta l. (2008) conclude:
Our results suggest that to focus policy solely on knowledge generation may not be 
sufficient to generate stronger economic performance. By putting more emphasis on 
entrepreneurship policy, [knowledge diffusion and commercialisation] policy-makers 
can facilitate the transformation of new knowledge into new products and 
technology that ultimately fosters regional economic performance (p.688).
Brinkley (2006) also reminds us that the knowledge economy is not just about 
knowledge- intensive industries but it is also about diffusing knowledge through 
innovation to more traditional industries also. There would appear therefore to be 
an opportunity for policy makers in Ireland to proactively facilitate and strengthen 
the links between indigenous entrepreneurship capital and MNC subsidiaries and 
the 3rd level sector to maximise the value of the new knowledge generated in the 
state. Acs et al. (2012) do show, using GEM data, that Ireland does have linkages 
between FDI and knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship which can be developed 
further. Indeed Robson and Gallagher (1993), Rugman and Verbanke (1993) and 
Rugman & D'Cruz (1993) also show the benefits that can accrue to SMEs from the 
presence of large multinational firms located in the state. However these potential 
linkages must be proactively pursued and developed.
3.6 Industrial Policy and indigenous firm development
Whilst the future industrial development of the state depends on knowledge 
creation, diffusion and commercialisation, the state has historically faced high levels 
of unemployment, emigration and economic crises on its economic development 
trajectory. It is therefore not surprising to find that 'job creation' has been elevated, 
from a policy perspective, to the de facto  national objective (Breznitz, 2012). This 
has certainly been the case since the state embraced export -oriented  industrial 
policy and free-trade principles in the late 1950's (Stationary Office, 1958a, b). 
However the development of Irish industrial policy appears to have been heavily 
influenced from this period by the inherently contradictory ideology of 'neoliberal 
developmentalism' in pursuit of the loosely-defined national objective (Breznitz, 
2012). This ideology is contradictory in the sense of a professed belief in free-
market principles, but with a strong developmentalist ethos. The Irish state 
consequently is often referred to as a 'mixed' economy.
The states' economic development organisations tasked with trying to achieve 'job 
creation' are consequently vested with immense power, influence and resources by 
the state. The MNC policy promises and delivers on substantial numbers of jobs and 
inward investment although spillover effects and direct linkages into the wider 
economy have been more limited than anticipated (Ruane & Ugur, 2005; Gorg,
2007). Indigenous industry, in contrast, promises not only smaller numbers of jobs 
per project but high failure rates and they remain problematic for policymakers to 
deal with.
MNCs thus gained policy priority whilst indigenous industry faced institutional 
discrimination with regards to tax rates, financial support and land allocation 
(O'Riain, 2004; Sterne, 2005). Whereas the Irish state sees its role as 'facilitating' 
the activities of MNCs in Ireland through its economic development agency - IDA 
Ireland, it takes a more direct 'developmentalist' approach with indigenous 
industry, through its development agency Enterprise Ireland (El). Both agencies 
reporting since 1994 to Forfas, the national policy advisory board for enterprise, 
trade, science, technology and innovation in Ireland which in turn reports to the  
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
Indigenous industry, having grown under protectionist policies in the 1930s was 
then neglected through the 40's and 50's to the 1980's and only began to receive 
state attention and support long after national policy became outward looking and 
export-led (Breznitz, 2007). The 1973 oil crises, and the subsequent fall off in
indigenous exports, closures and the huge losses in employment in indigenous 
industry finally galvanised policy makers to question the states dependence on FDI. 
Flowever it took the Telesis review of industrial policy in 1982 to finally bring 
indigenous industry's growth possibilities to policy makers' attention, and for 
subsequent state support to be forthcoming. However the criticism of the disparity 
in the levels of support available to FDI and indigenous industry continued until the 
late 1980's (Porter, 1990; Breznitz, 2012). In both policy makers and Irish investors 
eyes (Hennigan, 2007), indigenous SMEs were seen as the 'poor relation' and 
traditionally have been treated with lower priority than FDI by policymakers. This 
prioritisation in terms of 'job creation' has held since the radical change in 
economic policy in 1958.
The state did begin to adopt a more positive attitude to indigenous industry after 
firms from the emergent software sector began to achieve global success in the 
early 1990s, without significant state support (Sterne, 2004). Whilst the policy for 
attracting MNCs to Ireland is a deliberate and well developed one, the enterprise 
policy for indigenous industry remains emergent and fluid, fifty years on. This 
largely explains the plethora of micro-level policy instruments available to 
indigenous firms in Ireland and the lack of policy coherence at the state/indigenous 
firm interface (O'Gorman & Cooney, 2007) (See: Appendix 2 to this chapter on 
Enterprise Ireland supports for Irish firms scaling up -  which included information 
on the tailored expansion packages which are structured as repayable equity grants 
or public venture capital).
To put this in context - from 2001 to 2006 - in the second phase of the so-called 
'Celtic Tiger' boom - Irish investors had invested over €41bn in overseas 
commercial property whilst just €250m has been invested by Enterprise Ireland (on 
behalf of the state), in export development projects in the same period (Hennigan,
2007). Using GEM data for Ireland from 2001 to 2004, O'Gorman and Fitzsimmons 
(2007:48) were able to demonstrate that - in relative terms - informal investment in 
Irish SMEs is relatively low compared with other states. It appeared that long term  
indigenous export investment was being squeezed out of the economy by 
consumption, construction and property development (Hennigan, 2007). Worse, 
there appears to be no long-term vision of what contribution the state wishes 
indigenous industry to make. Some commentators and analysts have argued for a 
clear, coherent entrepreneurship or enterprise policy to guide enterprise 
development (Small Business Forum, 2006; O'Gorman & Cooney, 2007; O'Gorman 
& Fitzsimmons, 2007).
As a national economy then Ireland is over dependent on FDI for its export growth 
and international performance. Indigenous industry, despite decades of state 
investment and support in export development (but relative R&D under investment 
-  Forfas, 2005; OECD, 2006; O 'Malley et al., 2008), continues collectively to  
underperform from an international trade viewpoint. If Ireland is to build on its 
achievements to date (driven by FDI) then indigenous industry will need to make a 
greater contribution then heretofore and a much greater emphasis and effort needs 
to be put into developing this indigenous capability (Enterprise Strategy Group, 
2004; Best et al., 2009). Despite the fact that the state has identified circa three 
thousand five hundred firms with the capacity to grow through internationalisation,
these firms are typically SMEs who are, in many cases under funded, internationally 
inexperienced and saddled with a small domestic and peripheral home market 
(Enterprise Strategy Group, 2004). There would appear to be significant growth 
constraints on these firms, which are reviewed in more detail in Chapter two and 
empirically examined in Chapters six and seven. These firms however are being 
actively encouraged to internationalise, despite the considerable resource and 
human capital related constraints (O' Gorman, 2012), by an institutionally strong 
state support system - driven by a developmentalist ideology (Breznitz, 2012). This 
is precisely what Telesis (1982) and Culliton (1992) warned against - the danger that 
strong agencies and weak firms might develop under a state-directed industrial 
policy regime.
If policy makers took a long term  view (this is proving difficult given the maximum 
five year government election cycle), then it would perhaps be developing, as part 
of a comprehensive 'enterprise policy', a robust national innovation system (to 
support indigenous firms) (O 'Malley et al., 2008). This would ideally be easily 
acsessible to entrepreneurial firms in the state, and would help, along with 
improvement in indigenous firms' absorptive capacities, reduce the knowledge filter 
in the economy and improve international performance. Instead the 'National 
Innovation System' or state support system has been allowed to evolve in an 
emergent fashion in the 'Enterprise policy' vacuum which has existed for over 
tw enty years. This has resulted in the familiar 'patchwork quilt' of policy 
instruments in this area - also evident in other states across Europe (Bennett, 2006; 
O'Gorman and Cooney, 2007). Indeed the Strategy fo r  Science, Technology and
Innovation (2006: 8) stated that 'There are very real challenges ahead. Science,
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Technology and Innovation (STI) in Ireland are still relatively underdeveloped'.
Given the acknowledged low spend of indigenous firms on R&D (O'Malley et al.,
2008), the weak links between the higher education sector and industry and the 
bureaucratic levels within the national innovation system and it is not unreasonable 
to question whether the state's expectations of and aspirations for the international 
expansion of its SME base are well founded. O' Gorman and Fitzsimmons (2007:47) 
conclude:
GEM suggests that there are a num ber of deficiencies in the delivery o f governm ent 
programmes targeted at entrepreneurs. These are a lack o f coordination o f the 
efforts of separate state agencies, a lack o f m arket or sector experience among 
agency executives, and too much agency bureaucracy (p.47).
Brinkley (2006) reminds us that the knowledge economy is not only about 
knowledge intensive industries but it is also about applying knowledge through 
innovation to more traditional industries, to increase productivity and 
competitiveness. Thus a clear, coherent, easily accessible, national innovation 
development system could help in facilitating the development of these more 
traditional industries also (Edquist & Hommen, 2008). Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 
note that market structures are created by the innovation game over time. Indeed, 
were the state fully committed to the development of increased innovation within 
firms it would perhaps take a more active role in making the state system available 
as a 'testing ground and seed market' for these firms (Storey & Greene, 2010). The 
question remains as to whether the implementation structures suggested can help 
deliver on these aspirations at the level of the firm or produce the step change in 
indigenous firm performance in the international marketplace that is required?
3.7 Enterprise policy?
As far back as 1982 The Telesis Consulting Group criticised Ireland's over-reliance on 
FDI and favoured a better policy balance between FDI and indigenous industry. It 
identified deficiencies in marketing, management and technology in indigenous 
firms. Subsequent reports, Culliton (1992); Enterprise Strategy Group (2004) and 
Small business Forum (2006) all identified similar deficiencies in the SME stock. The 
structural changes in the economy, particularly the move in indigenous industry to 
higher value added products and services over the tw enty five years in question, 
has been achieved in an environment without a coherent indigenous enterprise 
policy (O'Gorman & Cooney, 2007). However there has been state agency 
involvement at every stage of the firm development process (Breznitz, 2007, 2012).
The Programme for Government (2007 - 2012) i.e. the implementation document or 
action plan for the National Development Plan -  Transforming Ire la n d -A  Better 
Quality o f Life fo r  All (2007 -  2013) does acknowledge (p.6) that 'The Government 
will continue to invest to enable Ireland to compete seriously as a 'Knowledge 
Economy'. Despite the high rate of indigenous firm formation (GEM, 2007), few  are 
in internationally traded sectors, even fewer will develop into internationally 
competitive companies (Hennigan, 2007). The implementation agencies responsible 
for supporting indigenous exporters have approximately 3,500 -  5,000 clients in 
total, i.e. between 4 to 6 per cent of the indigenous (SME) stock (See: Table 1.1, 
Chapter 1). The OECD (2008, 2010) note that high-growth firms can account for up 
to five per cent of indigenous firm stock. It is these firms - and those that can be 
encouraged to join them in the coming years (new fast growing firms under five
years old -gazelles) - that will determine whether the indigenous sector can help 
address the imbalance in Ireland's export performance and economic development.
Whilst the NDP document (p.5) does mention that one of its key economic policies 
is to 'Develop a growing focus on the SME sector', the document focuses on the key 
inputs of upskilling, R&D and development financing -  all important inputs for the  
competitiveness of SMEs. However nowhere in the document is mention made of 
SME internationalisation, or the need to improve the diagnostic capabilities, 
absorptive capacity or implementation skills of these firms.
In 2008 the Irish Government released its strategy document entitled - Building 
Ireland's Smart Economy - A Framework fo r  Sustainable Economic Renewal (2008) -  
This is its action plan in response to the significantly changed international 
environment and which:
[It] sets out an ambitious set of actions to reorganise the economy over the next five 
years and to secure the prosperity of current and future generations. It sets out a 
framework to address the current economic challenges and to build a "smart 
economy" with a thriving enterprise sector, high-quality employment, secure energy 
supplies, an attractive environment, and first-class infrastructure.
The document is an attem pt to articulate a vision of where the state might be 
heading in terms of its future export-led economic growth. It is intended to be read 
in conjunction with Towards 2016 -  The Ten- year Framework Social Partnership 
Agreement 2006-2015  (2006). The forecasts on which this document is based have 
been invalidated by the global economic crises but at least, in other respects, the 
2008 document reflects the 'new' reality that exists.
From a policy viewpoint, it would seem important that the state makes it a priority to 
facilitate as many of these non-internationally trading firms as possible, to consider growing 
through internationalisation. O'Gorman and Fitzsimmons (2007) point out that Ireland 
requires not just more [innovative] entrepreneurs but more internationally growth- 
orientated ones i.e. innovative entrepreneurs with an ability to develop competitive 
advantage on bases other than scale or price. Indeed the Small Business Forum (2006) also 
recommended that the state needs formally to develop a National Entrepreneurship Policy, 
focusing on maximising the number of start-up businesses -  particularly those aspiring to 
high-growth. It is questionable whether the state should be expending economic 
development capital and resources on any firm that does not have at least the ambition to 
grow and develop through internationalisation. This call is echoed, in an Irish context, by O' 
Gorman and Fitzsimmons (2007) when they state that Ireland needs more entrepreneurial 
firms who might be expected to make an impact on economic growth, and thus the call is 
for more potentially fast and high growth innovative and entrepreneurial firms. As a small 
open, trade dependent, economy the internationally trading sectors must take 
development priority if the returns on scarce resources are to be optimised (O'Gorman & 
Cooney, 2007).
And whilst this researcher would not subscribe to the rather deterministic Porterian view 
on the future of the Irish or Singaporian economies, considering the unforeseen 
transformation that Ireland has gone through since 1990, it would appear that Ireland still 
needs to properly grasp the nettle of becoming 'truly committed to the slow process of the 
development of a broad indigenous base' (Porter, 1990:679). Much progress has been 
made in developing and diversifying indigenous industry (Enterprise Ireland 2007). Whilst 
the sincerity of effort at the implementation agency level is not in question, it would seem 
that a step-change in political will, policy focus and resource commitment is required at this 
stage, if indigenous industry is to make a greater contribution than it has heretofore.
O'Gorman and Cooney (2007:19) in their review of industrial policy from the foundation of 
the Irish state note that:
Certainly in the case of Ireland, where there are different policies for different 
aspects of the entrepreneurial process, enterprise policy is not fully integrated into 
the nation's economic fabric, nor are all the aspects of policy fully comprehensive, 
coherent or compatible with each other (p.19).
The absence of a coherent enterprise policy invariably leads to the smorgasbord of 
micro-policy instruments and interventions, which are continually developed and 
launched but rarely evaluated for impact in the public domain (See: Appendix 2 to 
this chapter on how Enterprise Ireland supports Irish firms scaling up).
Building Irelands Smart Economy (2008) introduces the 'Smart economy' (Ideas 
economy + Enterprise economy + Green economy = sustainable economic growth in 
future) - the so-called triple P of profits, people, planet (Nattrass & Altomare, 1999; 
Kennelly & Bradley, 2005). However this document still does not provide a coherent 
and comprehensive 'Enterprise policy'. There was reportedly one in development in 
response to the recommendations from the Small business Forum (2006). Indeed 
Forfas (2007) produced a report on the development of Entrepreneurship policy 
and on the supports available to Entrepreneurs. Calls for a formal stated policy were 
re-iterated also by O'Gorman and Cooney (2007) and O'Gorman and Fitzsimmons 
(2007). Finally in May 2013 a public consultation document was released on A 
National Entrepreneurship Policy Statement fo r  Ireland (www.D iei.ie). The policy 
statement is due for publication in quarter four 2013. This may help re-focus policy­
makers attention onto the increasingly important contribution that innovative
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entrepreneurship and indigenous growth-oriented firms can make to the future 
prosperity of the state.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
Whilst Ireland's economic growth to date has certainly been shaped by exogenous 
factors such as the rise in foreign direct investment, the Irish state has played - and 
continues to play -  a central role in the economy. This is not least in the provision of 
a highly skilled and technologically adept work force and in the highly proactive and 
targeted industrial strategy since the late 1980s.
Deliberate state policy has played a vital role in Ireland's ability to attract 
international firms. This policy change occurred in the late 1950s following nearly 
thirty years of protectionism. Ireland deliberately targeted MNCs in technologically 
sophisticated sectors such as Electronics, pharmaceuticals and software and these 
have in turn made the major contribution towards the States rapid economic 
progress in the 1990s and early part of the new century. FDI has been the major 
contributor in Ireland's classification as a 'Knowledge economy'. However this is not 
reflected in the wider economy as the state is regarded as middle tier in the 
'investment in knowledge' (OECD) index and it is also regarded as an innovation 
follower in Europe (CIS).
Far from representing a model of neo-liberal free-m arket capitalism then, the Irish 
case highlights how state activism through its economic development agencies 
might contribute to economic growth. Whereas the Irish state sees its role as 
facilitating the activities of MNC's in Ireland, it appears to see its role as one of 
'developing' indigenous industry development. However policies underpinned by
this contradictory 'neoliberal interventionalist' or 'neoliberal developmentalist' 
ideology may be sub-optimal (Breznitz, 2007:2012).
FDI policy has been successful so far for Ireland on an employment level, however 
the state is constantly seeking ways to 'embed' this mobile investment more deeply 
into the economy (See: Table 3.1). Results on the benefits of direct linkage and 
indirect 'spillover' linkage effects of FDI have so far been below expectation -  
reflecting both the size of the domestic economy and the international experience 
to date. Approximately ninety per cent of Irelands' exports by value are accounted 
for by FDI, demonstrating once again the host country's overdependence on it.
International development of indigenous industry has proved to be more 
problematic for the state, despite the states active role in SME development since 
the 1980s. It is clear that enterprise policy has lagged behind FDI policy -  indeed the 
country does not yet have a stated enterprise or entrepreneurship policy. Aspects 
of enterprise policy appear in other policy documents, but this policy area lacks a 
clear vision and coherence.
In the next phase of economic development it would seem imperative that 
indigenous industry is assisted through enlightened 'enterprise policy' to fulfil its 
potential as a major growth driver for the economy, to complement to a greater 
degree in the future the gains made by FDI policy to date.
To develop this enlightened enterprise policy requires more in-depth knowledge of 
the influencers, determinants (and barriers) of economic growth in small states, of 
indigenous firm growth in those states, of the internationalisation of those firms 
and of the role and impact of the state in assisting SME's grow-through-
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internationalisation. A public consultation document on a national Enterprise policy 
statement was released in May 2013 for publication in quarter four which may re­
focus policy makers on the merits of indigenous industry.
Appendix 1 
Economic Profile of Ireland  
(Source: IDA Ireland, 2008)
Ireland can now convincingly claim to be a knowledge economy. Its claim to be Knowledge-based Economy is reinforced by 
satisfying the World Bank Group's four key pillars of knowledge Economy:-
1) An Economic &  Institutional Framework that ensures a stable macroeconomic environment, competition, flexible labour 
markets and adequate social protection. The 2007 Index of Economic Freedom, compiled by the Wall Street Journal and The 
Heritage Foundation, categorises Ireland as a 'Free' economy, and ranks Ireland 7th out of 157 countries worldwide. It also 
states that 'Ireland has one of the world's most pro-business environments, especially for foreign businesses and foreign 
investment' and that 'Ireland's policy framework promotes an open and competitive business environment'.
2) A Quality Education System that ensures that citizens are equipped to acquire, use, and share knowledge. The IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2007 ranks Ireland's education system 5th from 60 countries surveyed for meeting the needs of a 
competitive economy. They also rank Ireland 4th for level of university education attained.
3) A Dynamic Inform ation Infrastructure that can facilitate the effective communication, dissemination, and processing of 
information. Ireland has significant international connectivity capacity to support current and future enterprise activity. High 
levels of capacity and diversity have resulted in strong competition and very competitive prices. Ireland currently offers the 
lowest international leased line costs in the OECD. Ireland also has an extensive national fibre network.
4) Innovation Systems that bring together researchers and businesses in commercial applications of science and technology. 
Science Foundation Ireland
(SFI) invests in academic researchers and research teams who are most likely to generate new knowledge and leading edge 
technologies and also advances cooperative efforts among education, government, and industry.
General




Ulster (part of) 207,204
State 4,239,848
r 2000, CSO July 2000.
+ 9.0%  
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/ . a r c / e . s f  t'.Ufic.s and Town* 
To to I Population (including
City/To wit Population City/Tow.i Population
Greater 
Dublin Area" 1,187,176 Tralee 22,744
Cor k City 190,384 Kilkenny 22,179
Limerick City 90,757 Sligo 19,402
Galway City 72,729 Navan 24,851
Waterford
City 49,2 13 Carlow 20,724
Dundalk 35,085 Naas 20,044
Drogheda 35,090 Wexford 18,163
Bray 31,901 Clonmel 17,008
Swords 33,998 Newbridge 18,520
Ennis 24,253 Longford 8,836
*Th<s G/eo>r«?r Dublin /iraj includes Dublin City 
Bath down, Flnsjal and .’South Dublin.
Source: Census 2006, CSO July 2006.
Econ om y
Irish output growth re turned in 2007 to rates 
consistent with the economy growing along its 
potential trend. The .strong performance of the 
economy is best exemplified by employment growth 
of 3 .3°/o last year, or 53,000 net Job increases, with 
an average rate of unemployment of 4 .5a7o. Output 
growth in 2007 was -4.09/o in real OOP terms, driven 
in significant part by growth in construction 
investment and by a positive net trade contribution 
as the international economy performed strongly 
over much of the year. Inflation in consumer prices 
averaged 2 .0%  in 2007. The prediction for Irish 
output growth in 2000 and 2000 is not guite as 
favourable against the backdrop o f a contraction in
the economy in 2003. Irish living standards, a s  
measured by a metric like output per capita in 
purchasing power terms, is ranked 3th place among 






Ire land 5 .7 % 4 .0 % 1 .5 % 3 .3 %
UK 2.9% 3.0% 1.8% 1.4%
France 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5%
Germany 3.1% 2.6% 1.9% 1.1%
Netherlands 3.0% 3.5% 2.3% 1.8%
Spain 3.9% 3.8% 1.6% 1.1%
Portugal 1.3% 1.9% 1.6% 1.8%
Switzerland 3.2% 3.1% 2.0% 1.4%
LISA 2.9% 2.2% 1.2% 1.1%
Japan 2.4% 2.1% 1.7% 1.5%
Euro Area 2.9% 2.6% 1.7% 1.4%
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 33, unc 2000.
Inflation (Uli.P)
Country 2006 2007 2008(f) 2009(f)
Ire land 2 .7 % 2 .9 % 3 .4 % 2 .1 %
UK 1.3% 1.6% 1.7% 2.2%
France 1.5% 1.6% 2.1% 2.3%
Germany 0.7% 1.9% 1.6% 2.0%
Netherlands 1.7% 1.6% 2.4% 3.0%
Spain 3.6% 2.8% 4.6%» 3.0 %
Portugal 3.0% 2.4% 3.0% 2.2%
Switzer land ~ 1. 1% 0.7% 2.2% 1.5%
USA 3.2% 2.9% 3.9% 2.2%
Japan 0.2% 0.1% 0.9% 0.4%
Euro Area 2.2% 2.1% 3.4% 2.4%
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 33, June 2003. (~CPI)
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Imports Exports Surplus
Ireland 5.2 Sept. 2006 €5,094m €7,297m €2,202m
Spain 3.2 Oct. 2006 €5,142 m €9,913m €2,771m
USA 2.4 Nov. 2006 €5,224m €7,lSOm Cl ,926m
U.K 2.3 Dec. 2006 €5,3QOm €7,380m €2,080m
Franee 1.5 £> tamai Trad Central St at sties Officer, Ftb. 2007.
Belgium 1.4
Denmark 1.4
Netherlands 1.2 Mohi Po//»fs — l~c.ononi\t
Italy 0.6
Germany 0.6 • Between 1999 and 2004 GDP growth rates in
So»<rc«; 0«EC the OECD
countries.




















Rest of World 11.4%
2007CC/ Trad*. C&rrtra/ Statistics Offic*. c&b.
"The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. '2007 
ranks Ireland fourth for GDP per capita at 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), ahead of 
Switzerland (7th) and the UK (lGth).
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit 
Business Environment Rankings, Ireland will 
remain one of the most attractive business 
locations in the world throughout the period 
2007-2011. Ireland is ranked LO“‘ globally out of 
82 countries.
Ireland is ranked 14th by the IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2007 in terms of 
exports of goods as a percentage of GDP, ahead 
of Switzerland (20th) and the UK (47th).
Ireland's unemployment rate of 4.4*7© is the fifth 
lowest within the EU 25 and compares to a euro­
zone average of 7.9*7b.
Current official forecasts are for 5.4% GDP growth 
in 2007, well above the expected euro-zone 
average of 2.2%.
Ireland's budgetary balance is in a healthier state 
than most of its euro-zone partners with a debt to 
GDP ratio currently at 25%, the second lowest in 
the European Union. The Euro zone average is 
70.5%.
Appendix 2
Enterprise Ireland financial supports for indigenous firms including repayable equity
grants (Public Venture Capital)*
Established SME Funding
This section sets out the main funding supports and programmes for established small and medium sized enterprises in the 
manufacturing and internationally traded services sectors. An Established SME client is a company that is not a HPSU (High 
Potential Start-ups) client, has an established trading record, the company (or its group of companies) employs between 10 
and 250 employees, has either an annual turnover of less than €50m or an annual balance sheet of less than €43m. Previous 
funding approved by Enterprise Ireland may impact on the firm's eligibility for the following supports. Firms are encouraged to 
consult with their Enterprise Ireland Adviser to discuss their requirements.
Financial supports (Grant and share investments) are grouped under the following headings:
•  Market research and internationalisation supports
•  In-company and collaborative research and development supports
•  Supports to enhance and develop the management team
•  Productivity and business process improvement supports
•  Company expansion packages
The supports most relevant to this dissertation are:
Enterprise Ireland Tailored Expansion Packages
If an indigenous firm is undertaking or planning to undertake an ambitious expansion that will create employment and grow 
its sales in international markets, Enterprise Ireland can discuss a financial support package. Funding will typically be by way of 
grant and/or redeemable preference shares. However Enterprise Ireland also invests in ordinary shares and/or a combination 
of ordinary and preference. See: Enterprise Ireland annual reports 1999 -  2005.
W ho is eligible for support?
Tailored Company Expansion Packages are considered on a case-by-case basis. SME and large companies are eligible to apply 
for this funding if the firm is an existing manufacturing or eligible internationally traded services company employing ten or 
more people. Funding for firms with less than ten is available from the County and City Enterprise Boards which now also fall 
under Enterprise Irelands remit.
Typically companies are existing clients of Enterprise Ireland -  circa 3,500 firms. http://w ww.enterprise-
ireland.com/en/Events/OurEvents/lnternational-Markets-Week-2011/Financial-Support-for-Business-Start-ups-and-Growth-
Companies.pdf.
However, if the firm is not currently a client, it is advised to contact its local Enterprise Ireland regional office to discuss its 
expansion plans.
What expenditures can be supported and what is the maximum funding?
Enterprise Ireland Tailored Expansion Packages can support new or incremental investment in:





The amount of Enterprise Ireland funding will be determined by the;
Need for financial support for the project,
Anticipated growth targets,
Potential employment, and 
Regional location of the firm in Ireland.
Typically funding for job creation and capital is in the form of redeemable preference shares*. Funding for recruitment of a 
key managers and training/m anagem ent development is in the form of grant and funding for R&D is in the form of 
grant/preference shares*.
*  Enterprise Ireland's Preference shares, unlike ordinary shares, have no ownership or voting rights. Enterprise Ireland's 
Preference Shares typically take the following form, Enterprise Ireland is entitled to receive dividends (based on an annual % 
coupon/interest rate) and seek repayment (redemption) of its investments at a specified tim e (Enterprise Ireland generally 
seeks redemption on the fifth anniversary of the investment). The dividend and redemption payments can only be paid out of 
distributable funds. In certain cases Enterprise Ireland will take equity shares in addition or in preference to preference shares 
if it deems it appropriate. The firm's stage of development will determine the type of share investment. It can also take 
cumulative convertible redeemable preference (CCRP) shares which can be converted to equity shares depending on firm  
performance. These apply primarily to HPSUs but the same principles are common to all stage investments.
See: http://www.slideshare.net/keithbohanna/enterprise-ireland-investment-process-the-legal-element and 
http://www.mirc.ie/mwep/docum ents/EIFinancialSupport.pdf for further information.
*  Sourced and adapted from: http://www.enterprise-ireland.com /EI Corporate/en/funding-supports/Companv/Esetablish-
SME-Funding/
Chapter 4 
Research methodology and Data Collection
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role and contribution of 
public venture capital to the subsequent performance of growth-orientated  
indigenous Irish firms over the period 1997- 2010. In addition this study will attem pt 
to identify those factors -  other than public venture capital - that are the driving 
and restraining forces on indigenous firm growth. This chapter explains the 
research methodology employed to reach the objectives set for the study.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 explains the research philosophy 
and strategy adopted in the study. The research design and process is outlined in 
Section 4.2. It also outlines the variables employed to investigate the performance 
of the firms in the study. Data sources are also discussed here. Section 4.3 explains 
the data generation and collection process whilst section 4.4 describes the choice of 
case-study methodology and provides an overview of the case-study design and 
cross-case analysis approach. Section 4.5 is a brief summary of the chapter.
4.1 Research philosophy and strategy
Johnson et al. (2004) suggest that there are two opposing research philosophies 
residing at either end of the research philosophy continuum. These are the 
positivist and interpretivist approaches. Positivist is the classic science based 
hypothetical- deductive approach - primarily associated with quantitative data 
analysis techniques. The diametrically opposed approach is the interpretive or 
inductive view which is traditionally associated with qualitative data analysis 
techniques. Much debate has taken place over the years amongst the research
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community on the relative merits and de-merits of both qualitative and quantitative
approaches (Hammersley, 2002). The emphasis in these 'paradigm wars' (Johnson &
Turner, 2003) is misplaced. The issue to be addressed is -  what is the most
appropriate research strategy and design to answer the research question(s) posed
by the researcher (Domegan & Fleming, 2009). In some cases quantitative
approaches may suffice, in others qualitative approaches alone may be most
appropriate. It is argued that both approaches can be integrated within one study if
the research problem requires methodological triangulation to increase the validity
and reliability of the study (Patton, 2002). This can then maximise the 'knowledge
yield' of the research study (McCall & Bobko, 1990). This methodologically
combined approach has increased in popularity in recent years and is now termed
'Mixed methods' research (Johnson & Onwvegbozie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie,
2007; Plano Clark & Creswell, 2011). In sum, Johnson and Turner (2003) define the
principles of this approach as follows:
Methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non 
overlapping weaknesses.... It involves the recognition that all methods have their 
limitations as well as their strengths. The fundamental principle is followed for at 
least three reasons: (a) to obtain convergence or corroboration of findings, (b) to 
eliminate or minimize key plausible alternative explanations for conclusions drawn 
from the research data, and (c) to elucidate the divergent aspects of a phenomenon. 
The fundamental principle can be applied to all stages or components of the research 
process' (Pg. 297).
This study therefore adopts a mixed methods approach as the most appropriate 
approach to answer the research questions posed and the research objectives set. 
The approach taken in the study is best described as a sequential explanatory 
research design (Saunders et a!., 2012:167). Quantitative analysis techniques will
be used in combination with qualitative semi-structured interviews and archival 
data (combined in case studies, cross-case analysis and contribution analysis) to 
provide the necessary methodological and data triangulation (Patton, 2002). This 
combining of the opposing positivist and interpretivist research approaches into 
one study serves to highlight the overall research philosophy of the researcher - 
which can best be described in research philosophic terms as pragmatic (Shields, 
2004; Feilzer, 2010). Saunders et al. (2012) note that:
For pragmatists, the nature of the research question, the research context and likely 
research consequences are driving forces determining the most appropriate 
methodological choice (Nastasi etal., 2010). Both quantitative and qualitative 
research are valued by pragmatists and the exact choice will be contingent on the 
particular nature of the research (p.164).
Qualitative data is used to corroborate quantitative findings or vice versa in mixed 
methods studies (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Flence quantitative 
and qualitative approaches can be viewed as complementary methods in the sense 
that they use multiple measures to uncover variances or patterns in the data which 
a single methodological approach may not have identified (Creswell, 2009). In this 
study qualitative data is used to complement the quantitative study results. The 
aggregate quantitative results and analysis will be presented in Chapter five and the 
cross-case analyses (incorporating semi-structured interviews with CEO's of the 
individual case firms) will be presented in Chapters six and seven. Chapter eight 
concludes the empirical section of the study with a 'Contribution analysis' which 
combines all the empirical findings into a structured meta-analysis of the findings in 
the entire study. The analyses in Chapters six, seven and eight are underpinned by
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ten descriptive case studies which are included as Volume two of this study. For 
confidentiality reasons these case studies will only be available to examiners.
4.2 The research design and process
The research design can be exploratory and/or descriptive and/or causal (Saunders 
et a i ,  2012). The design of this study is causal or explanatory. It employs 
quantitative data analytic techniques (Quasi-experimental), confirmatory qualitative 
techniques (case studies, cross-case analysis) and contribution analysis (Structured 
M eta -  analysis), in addition to a proprietary dataset to answer the research 
questions posed and reach the research objectives set.
4.2.1 Design rationale
The first empirical Chapter in the study -  chapter five, employs quantitative 
methods to model the geo-demographic variables identified in the literature as 
most likely to be the key observable determinants or key influences on firm growth 
performance (Delmar et a i,  2006). In particular this thesis investigates the role and 
contribution of public venture capital investment on firm performance -  using the 
geo-demographic variables as control variables. The empirical literature indicates 
that, so far, the firm growth phenomenon appears to be 'almost random' (Coad,
2009), idiosyncratic (Dobbs & Flamilton, 2006) and measurement dependent 
(Delmar et a i ,  2006). Attempting to evaluate the effects of state investment 
programmes on such an unstable dependent variable (Davidsson, 2004) is complex 
and difficult as there are myriad influences on and determinants of the 
performance of an SME - other than that of programme participation. These factors 
include the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the characteristics of the firm itself,
the strategies of the owner/senior management (Storey, 1994; Storey & Greene,
2010) and the sector and location of the business and the wider macro-economic 
conditions (Smallbone & Wyer, 2006). These external factors include the role of 
chance (Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1990), state support (Bennett, 2006) and industry 
sector (Jovanovich, 1982; Jovanovich & McDonald, 1994; McGahan, 2004). Dobbs & 
Hamilton (2007) therefore recommend longitudinal research designs as the only 
designs that offer the appropriate insights into the growth change process. The 
research design will, by necessity, require a number of trade-offs to ensure that the 
salient determinants -  as identified in the literature -are included. The trade-offs in 
evaluation design are shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure: 4.1 T ra d e -O ffs  in E va lu a tio n  D esign
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(Source: OECD, 2004)
4.2.2 Quasi-experimental design options
The researcher would ideally opt for a true experimental design as the best way to 
establish the counterfactual (White, 2009). However, in reality, this is not always 
possible as random assignment between treatment and control groups cannot be
achieved to a satisfactory degree (randomisation is an essential requirement for 
true experimental designs) (Malhotra & Birks, 2009). In the absence of 
randomisation, the pragmatic researcher must be contented with quasi- 
experimental designs (non-random assignment) with statistical controls (Morton, 
2009) (Figure 4.1). Quasi-experimental designs for evaluation purposes are broadly 
of two types -  those based around comparison across tim e and these include the 
traditional 'before-after design' and 'time series' designs - in particular the 
'interrupted tim e series' design. The second group of designs are those centered on 
comparisons across different participants and include Non-equivalent group designs 
(NEGD) and the 'Regression-discontinuity' design (Reichardt & Mark, 2004). The 
inherent deficiencies in the four prototypical designs mentioned above can be 
offset to differing degrees by adding design features such as treatm ent 
interventions, comparison groups, increased measurement occasions and /o r  
different outcome variables. The addition of differing design features can blur the 
distinction between the two broad groups of quasi-experimental designs and add to  
the robustness of the results from quasi-experimentation. Indeed the four designs 
coupled to the four broad types of design features provide myriad design 
possibilities (Table 4.1).
Careful consideration of appropriate combinations of designs and features can 
reduce the internal validity threats (i.e. History, maturation, seasonality, testing, 
instrumentation, attrition and statistical regression) inherent in quasi­
experimentation (ibid: pg. 128-129).
Morton (2009) concludes that:
Because q u as i-expe rim en ta l designs canno t estab lish a co u n te rfa c tu a l s itu a tio n  w ith  
th e  same level o f  con fidence  as random isa tion , th e  cha llenge is to  id e n tify  and, as fa r 
as possib le to  m in im ise  the  e ffe c t o f  observab le  con found ing  o r spurious variab les. 
L ittle  can be done a b o u t the  e ffe c t o f  unobservab le  variab les (Pg. 7).
Table 4.1 - Quasi-experimental evaluation design options and features for
increasing internal validity
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The approach therefore adopted by the researcher is contingent on the scale and 
nature of the programme or policy instrument for evaluation. 'Hard7 (Financial) 
support programmes require 'hard7 evaluative methods whilst smaller and 'softer7 
(e.g. training and development programmes) use softer evaluative methodologies 
(OECD, 2008). The methodological problems are compounded by issues around 
sample framing and response errors and selection bias. Valid comparison between
assisted firms and other firms (if available) can be affected by administrative 
selection, self-selection or moral hazard (Storey, 1988; Bennett, 1997). Curran 
(2000) therefore proposes the use of a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation methodologies to offset the limitations of quantitative 
evaluation alone.
Thus quantitative analysis methods are often supplemented with qualitative 
approaches which add richness and depth to the outcomes of evaluation studies. 
They can also provide insights to organizational or behavioural change which are 
due to the intervention under evaluation. Qualitative methods can also help - if 
rigorously conducted - in reducing bias (Mays & Pope, 1995; Patton 2002). Used in 
combination in this study qualitative and quantitative (mixed) method designs 
provide a degree of triangulation not available through the application of a single 
research methodology (Bryman, 2009).
4.2.3 Quasi-experimental design choice
To solve the 'contribution7 problem of what would have happened in the absence of 
state investment it is necessary to look at the firm performance (the dependent 
variable) before the state investment (pre-test measure) and after the state 
investment (post-test measure). Taking the mean performance post investment 
from the mean performance pre investment gives a 'Before and after7 measure 
(Table 4.1) of any difference in performance possibly due to state investment (the 
treatm ent intervention). However there are other possibilities for the change in 
performance and these must to be controlled for. These include the demographic 
profile of the firm (Delmar et a i,  2006) and the firm's geographic location (Aoyama
et a i ,  2011). Using logistic regression it is possible to access the relative influence (if 
any) of state investment on subsequent firm performance. The alternate approach 
is to use a control group or 'matched sample' - which did not obtain state support - 
but match the profile of the firms under study in other respects - to compare it with 
the treatm ent group. In theory this appears to be more robust. Storey (1998) 
however does acknowledge the difficulty of 'matching' firms, given the myriad 
factors to consider in relation to the characteristics of the firm, the characteristics 
of the Entrepreneur/Managem ent/ownership, the nature of the business strategy 
and the external environmental factors facing the firm (See also: Smallbone & Wyer, 
2006, 2012). Even firms in the same sector and locality may serve very different 
markets (Curran & Blackburn, 1994). Indeed Lenihan, Hart & Roper (2003) remark 
that this matching is even more difficult in Ireland due to size constraints and the 
fact that most growth-oriented firms have received state support of one form or 
another. Kinsella et a i ,  (1994) did undertake a matched control study on fast 
growth firms on the island of Ireland but the control group was from Northern 
Ireland (UK). Due consideration was not therefore given to the sectoral and wider 
host sovereign-state environmental influences on firm performance (Evans & 
Jovanovich, 1987; Porter, 1990; McGahan, 2004; Smallbone & Wyer, 2006; Hill & 
Jones, 2008).
The design choice then is between research designs across tim e or research design 
across groups (Table 4.1). This study chooses to apply the research-across-time 
methodology in the quantitative part of the study in Chapter five. This is the most 
applicable approach as it takes account of the recommendations in the firm growth
literature, the limitations on data availability and the research context in Ireland. Of 
the research-across -tim e  options, the 'Before -  After' design (with controls) is 
therefore the most appropriate approach for this particular empirical study given 
the firm population size, measurement occasions available and geo-demographic 
information available on each population unit (Table 4.1).
4.2.4 Firm performance measure
Using the before and after design (with controls) - this study takes as its key 
performance variable (the dependant variable), the creation or destruction of 
shareholder value (Arnold, 2009). Increased shareholder value is created by 
focusing on the Return on Invested capital (ROIC), profit growth over time and high 
profitability levels (margin) (Baldwin, 2002). (See: Appendix 1: Chapter 2 for details). 
These variables are recognized in publically quoted companies over many decades 
as the appropriate measures of shareholder value creation. The same measures can 
and should be applied to small and growing firms -  notwithstanding the difficulties 
of accessing, using and interpreting accounting measures of profit in measuring 
shareholder value creation (Rappaport, 1998). This can be especially problematic in 
new technology-based firms (NTBF's) (Audretsch & Link, 2011, 2012).
This need for focus on profitable growth and ROIC has only recently been 
acknowledged in the entrepreneurship/small firm growth literature as a priority in 
value measurement (Davidsson 2005; Davidsson et a i,  2009; Steffans et at., 2009; 
Davidsson et a i,  2010). These authors recent empirical research results suggests 
that the pursuit of early profitability followed by 'profitable growth' rather than the 
pursuit of growth perse  (which hopefully will lead to future profit -  'bad growth')
appears to be a more robust strategy for longer term survival of young, small, 
growth-orientated firms. Thus profit/invested capital related growth measures are 
important measures to track over tim e when researching growth patterns in small, 
growth orientated firms if shareholder or firm value creation is the focus.
Given the wide acceptance and understanding of the relationship between 
profitability levels, profit growth, capital invested and firm value in the strategic 
management literature (Hill & Jones, 2009; Johnson & Scholes, 2009) and the 
corporate finance literature (Rappaport, 1998, Baldwin, 2006; Arnold, 2009), it is 
appropriate that future growth performance measures in the firm growth literature 
have the:
'Explicit inclusion of company value in future work, as this is arguably a more
terminal goal than either growth or profitability' (Davidsson et al. (2009:19).
4.3 Data Generation, Collection and Analysis
4.3.1 Data sources
A proprietary dataset was initially developed in Microsoft Excel and then 
transferred to SPSS20 for quantitative analysis. The dataset contains performance 
variables constructed from eight years financial information for all firms in the 
cohort. Both profitability and share value information was gathered for the two  
years preceding state investment to establish a base line or pre-investment 
performance measure. The year of the state investment was treated as year zero 
(the treatm ent intervention year). This was necessary to create a break between 
the 'before and after' performance measures and so develop an 'interrupted tim e -  
series logic' (Yin, 2009). Five years post investment data was also collected from the
annual accounts (the  post -  test m easure ) -  i.e. The value o f  th e  sh areho ld er funds  
on th e  balance sheet at year  end and also th e  a f te r  tax  pro fit  fo r  th e  year was  
e x tracted  fro m  th e  p ro fit  and loss accounts. The d a tase t also contains th e  salient  
g e o -d e m o g ra p h ic  variables fo r  all 51  firm s in th e  study (See: C hap ter  5 fo r  details). 
In fo rm a tio n  on each o f  th e  proposed exp lanato ry  variables was ga th ered  fro m  
various sources such as th e  FAME database , C om panies  Registration Office (CRO), 
V is ionnet, w o r ld w id e  w e b , Enterprise Ire land Annual Reports (1 9 9 8 -2 0 1 1 )  and th e  
individual f irm  w ebsites . Overall th e  period u n d er  investigation was 1 9 9 7  -  2 0 1 0  
w h e n  th e  'b e fo re  and a fte r '  m easu re  fo r  each firm  is included. All f irms in th e  
d a taset w e r e  clients o f  Enterprise Ireland and had received at least € 6 3 5 ,0 0 0  
( IR £ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 )  o f  public v e n tu re  capital in ves tm ent in one  o f  th e  years 199 9  -  200 5  
(Enterprise  Ire land annual reports: 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 5 ) .
Table 4.2 - Firm sector breakdown
In d u s tr ia l S ec to r N o . o f % o f %  o f V a lu e
Firm s to ta l in v e s tm e n t
€'000
Consum er products -  Furn itu re /ceram ic /carpet
3 6 9
4591
Food and natural resources -  Agriproducts/consum er 7 15 20 10089
fo od s /na tura l resources
Cleantech, m edical devices and industrial products
25 “ “ “
S oftw are, ICT and in ternationally  traded services 29 54 45 22652
.............. ................................_  ' ‘ V
Total 51 100% 100% 50376
(Source: Enterprise Ireland, Fame database, Visionet, CRO, Firm websites)
4.3.2 Data analysis techniques
Binom ial Logistic regression
The logistic function (the dependent variable) is particularly useful as it can take as 
input any value from negative infinity to positive infinity whilst outputting values 
between zero and one (Garson,2012). This is the most appropriate model here - 
once the desired outcome is an estimation of whether shareholder value creation in 
preferable to shareholder value destruction (Arnold, 2007). The study is also 
interested in whether the states venture capital will be repaid and so this will also 
be of interest as an alternate dependent variable. The outcome categories can then 
be expressed as a dichotomous variable -  was value created over the five years post 
state investment period (1) or was value destroyed (0). Whilst return on invested 
capital could in some circumstances be modelled as a discrete or continuous 
variable, it needs to be modelled in binary fashion in this case as some of the firms 
in the study had returned negative profit figures year on year which further 
exacerbated the shareholder value decrease over time. This meant that it was not 
possible to obtain meaningful Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) figures and thus a 
dichotomous variable is the only suitable choice in capturing the value 
creation/decrease construct in the cohort of firms in the study.
The outcome variable in binary Logistic regression differs from OLS regression in 
that is expressed in probabilistic rather than numeric terms and its outcomes needs 
to be interpreted differently (Garson, 2012). Since the probability of an event must 
lie between zero and one, it is impractical to model probabilities with linear 
regression techniques because the linear regression model allows the dependent 
variable to take values greater than one or less than zero (Collett, 2003).
Cross-case analysis
Case analysis is one of the most popular research designs in the social sciences (Yin, 
2009) and the international business and management fields (Piekkari & Welch, 
2011). Whilst case study design has traditionally been associated with qualitative 
research it has much wider application and can incorporate both qualitative and 
quantitative elements within an overall design.
Chapter six and seven in this study are cross-case analyses. Quantitative and 
qualitative data was collected on ten firms from the cohort of firms in the study. 
The resultant analyses were then written-up as descriptive case studies using 
Storey's (1994) and Smallbone & Wyer's (2006) framework. (See: Chapter 2: 
Literature review). The purpose was to identify possible determinants of and 
influences on the growth trajectories and growth experience of each firm. Data 
from these cases was then utilised in the cross-case analyses in Chapter six and 
seven and also as input to the contribution analysis in chapter eight. Since there  
were only fifty one firms in the study, it was appropriate to use a case study 
approach. The case study analysis also provides corroborative material for the 
quantitative findings in Chapter five. The primary data used in the case studies was 
collected through semi-structured depth interviews with current or ex-CEO's of the 
case firms -  the key informant's (Marshall, 1996; Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki,
2011).This data was supplemented with archival information, information from the 
firm's literature and digital assets and reported information in the media. These 
provide the multiple sources of evidence suggested by Yin (2009; Chap. 4).
Contribution analysis
Chapter eight completes the empirical analysis in the overall study by conducting a 
contribution analysis (Mayne, 2001). This is a theory based impact evaluation 
methodology (TBIE) (W hite, 2010). It is a structured iterative analytic technique 
which looks at the 'theory of change' proposed by the policy instrument under 
analysis. It take the evidence assembled in chapters five, six and seven and conducts 
a meta-analysis to answer -  as definitively as possible - the research questions 
posed and objectives set at the outset of the study. Blaney and McKenzie (2007) 
make a distinction in TBIE between those approaches which are 'realist evaluations' 
(Pawson & Tiley, 1997) and those approaches that develop an explicit programme 
theory of change -  (Chen, 1990; Weiss, 2000; Mayne, 2001). The approach which 
has gained in popularity since it was first proposed is Mayne's 'Contribution 
Analysis' which developed from his work on results monitoring systems. It was 
developed whilst he was considering what could be said about causality of an 
intervention when only monitoring (weak) data was available (Mayne, 2012). W hat 
distinguishes Contribution Analysis from other theory-based approaches in 
evaluation is its more systematic approach to arriving at creditable causal claims. 
Mayne (2012) notes:
From an evaluation perspective, the issue was what could be done to make credible 
causal claims in the absence of experimental approaches. Many evaluations seemed 
either to be silent on causality or, perhaps worse, made causal claims based solely on 
the views of interviewees (p.271).
The objectives articulated by Mayne agree in principal with both Storey's (2000) and 
the OECD's (2008) approach on impact assessment. However Mayne is more
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pragmatic in recognizing the limitation s on data availability and the difficulties in 
creating creditable counterfactuals and thus estimating 'additionality' - particularly 
when myriad influencing and determining factors are considered. The aim of the 
analysis is to reduce uncertainty about the 'contribution' that the intervention is 
making to observed results through an increased understanding of why results did 
or did not occur and the roles played by the intervention and other influencing 
factors. In sum the analysis either confirms the postulated 'theory of change' or 
suggests revisions to the theory where results prove otherwise. Mayne (2012) notes 
that a 'contribution analysis' will rarely provide definitive proof. Causality is 
provided in probalistic terms. The six stage process is an iterative process which 
builds a chain of evidence and argument to get to a conclusive situation where 
'plausible association' does or does not exist (Hendricks, 1996). CA's six stage 
process which can be tailored for specific policies or programmes in differing fields 
(Delahais &Toulem onde, 2012; Wimbush et a i,  2012; Lemire eto i., 2012). The 
generic six stage process is as follows:
Step 1: Set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed
Step 2: Develop the postulated theory of change and risks to it including rival
explanations
Step 3: Gather the existing evidence on the theory of change
Step 4: Assemble and assess the contribution story, and challenges to it
Step 5: Seek out additional evidence
Step 6: Revise and strengthen the contribution story (Feedback loop to stage 4)
(Source: Mayne, 2001, 2008, 2012)
For 'Contribution Analysis' scholars then contribution is defined as:
In light of the multiple factors influencing a result, has the intervention made a 
noticeable contribution to an observed result and in what way? (Mayne, 2012: p.273)
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Thus the contribution to firm performance by policy instruments can be evaluated -  
taking account of the myriad influencing and determining factors present -  
irrespective of the quality of data and access afforded the researcher.
4.4 Firm case studies
This section describes the case study methodology employed in this study. Case 
study methodology is appropriate in this study for the following reasons: Firstly it 
provides a useful tool for investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context as the boundaries between the two are not clearly defined (Yin, 2009).
In addition multiple sources of evidence are used to compile the study including 
interviews, databases, firm records and media reports. This diversity of sources 
brings multiple perspectives to the same phenomenon and is appropriate in 
triangulating data (Patton, 2002). Secondly Case studies offer a richness and depth 
of information unavailable for example in survey data (Saunders et a i, 2009). It 
offers both quantitative and qualitative contributions to the overall study 
complementing the empirical work of Chapter 5. By including interview data it also 
allows the firm's founding entrepreneur's perspective on the drivers of the financial 
performance measures thereby offering rich insight and further data triangulation 
opportunities. Finally from an inductive research perspective, case study 
methodology allows examination of whether the case observations (individually, 
collectively or sectorally) are in line with existing theory or whether they raise some 
new theoretical possibilities.
The case study design
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Researchers go about the process of selecting case study designs in a myriad of 
ways however the design must in the first instance be driven by the research 
question and research objectives of the study in question (Burton, 2000). The data 
in the case studies in this dissertation came primarily from quantitative and 
qualitative sources. Quantitative data was collected from the published financial 
records of the firm, from the FAME database, Visionet, CRO, firm websites and 
business media sources. The qualitative information came from interviews with the 
CEO's or ex-CEO/Founders of the firm under study. Interviews were conducted in 
2010/2011 and were semi-structured in nature. This allowed the respondents to 
provide a broader range of information/opinions/views than a fully structured 
instrument (Domegan & Fleming, 2009). Although the overall structure of the topic 
list presented to the interviewee was guided by the literature and the overall 
research objectives, the respondents elaborated on the topics under discussion and 
this provided some unexpected additional information and insights on the research 
topics.
The questionnaire/topic list (See Appendix B) was designed to collect both 
qualitative and quantitative data focused on the explanatory factors for the firm's 
performance in the eight year period under review.
Selection o f the case study firms
Case study information came from the proprietary dataset generated for this study. 
Ten in-depth interviews were conducted with the CEO or ex-CEO/founder of the 
firms under study. These firms were chosen by 'theoretical sampling methods' for 
their representativeness of the overall sectoral breakdown of the cohort of firms in 
the study (Pettigrew 1988; Eisennhardt, 1989). Whilst there is no ideal number of
cases, E isenhardt (1 9 8 9 )  re c o m m en d s  b e tw e e n  fo u r  and ten  noting  th a t:  'w ith  
m o re  th an  te n  cases, it quickly becom es diff icult to  cope w ith  th e  com plex ity  and  
v o lu m e  o f  th e  d a ta '  (P. 545 ).  Thus this study utilizes th e  m a x im u m  n u m b e r  o f  
re c o m m e n d e d  cases.
Table 4.3 - Firm sector breakdown and case selection
In d u s tr ia l S ec to r N o . o f  %  o f  f irm s  Case % o f  
Firm s in in s tu d y  s e le c tio n  cases  
s tu d y
Consum er products -  
Fu rn itu re /ceram ic /carp et m anufacturing 1 10
Food and natural resources -  
Agriproducts/consum er fo od s/natura l 
resources
7 14 1 10
Cleantech, m edical devices and industrial 
products m anufacture
12 23 2 20
. . . '
S oftw are, ICT and in ternationally  traded  
services
29 57 6 60
Total 51 100 10 100
D ata  collection and case study im plem entation
P rim ary  data  collection in this study was based on tw o  periods o f  f ie ld w o rk  -  
S p r in g /S u m m e r  2 0 1 0  (Four in terv iew s including pilot) and S p r in g /S u m m er 2 0 1 1  (Six 
in terv iew s). This p r im ary  research was preceded  w ith  a secondary data  collection  
period (2 0 0 9 -2 0 1 0 )  w h e re  th e  da tase t fo r  th e  study was constructed and th e  
p otent ia l case in te rv ie w  candidates w e re  researched and ta rge ted . The history o f  
each case f irm  was researched and th e  fo u n d e rs /e n tre p re n e u rs  w e re  identif ied . A 
m a jo r ity  o f  th e  en tre p re n e u rs  (6) w e re  still w o rk ing  w ith  th e  firm s th e y  had 
fo u n d e d  but a n u m b e r  (3) had m oved  on - but agreed to  be in te rv iew ed  ab o u t th e  
period u n d er  study. Only one  CEO in te rv iew ed  was n ot th e  fou nd ing  e n tre p re n e u r  
or part o f  th e  fo und ing  en trep ren eu r ia l te a m . This f irm  was one o f  only tw o  PLCs in 
th e  study and th e  in te rv iew ee  was th e  curren t CEO. The p r im ary  research period
was then succeeded with a secondary research period in Summer/Autumn 2011 on 
the ten firms - to complete the data collection on each case firm.
A contemporary approach was adopted in making contact with the targeted cases. 
Firstly the relevant firm founder or current CEO was identified and then approached 
through the researcher's professional network on LinkedIN (2012) -  the business 
professional network site. This eventually led to three interviews. Those executives 
not on LinkedIN were sent a letter (See: Appendix A) requesting an interview.
Letters were then followed up by telephone if there was no response. This process 
eventually yielded the further seven interviews required. Each interviewee was then 
sent the topic list (See: Appendix B) in advance of the scheduled interview time and 
a consent form. All interviewee's signed the consent form and agreed to have the 
interviews digitally recorded. The interview meetings were conducted in all but 
three cases at the firms premises, two were conducted in hotels and one was 
conducted at the interviewee's private residence. Typically the interviews lasted 
between fifty to seventy minutes and consisted of forty two questions divided up 
into five sections as follows.
Table 4.4 Questionnaire Structure*
Topic area Number of questions
Characteristics o f Entrepreneur 10
Characteristics o f firm 4
Management strategies 9
External environment influences 11
Growth experience 6
Final questions 2
*  Ten interviews were conducted -  6 in the Dublin region, 3 in the Leinster region and lin  the Munster region. A topic list 
(Questionnaire) is included in Appendix B.
The  questions w e r e  deve lo p ed  fro m  th e  l i te ra ture  and th e  study's research  
questions and objectives (See: L iterature  rev iew  in C h ap ter  2). The in terv iew s w e re  
th e n  transcr ib ed  and ed ited . A copy o f  th e  transcrip t was sent to  each in te rv ie w e e  
fo r  c o m m e n t  in due course. All in te rv iew ee 's  agreed to  cont in ue  partic ipating  in th e  
study. The  d ata  f ro m  th e  in terv iew s was th en  used in conjunction w ith  th e  financial 
in fo rm a tio n  and o th e r  secondary sources (f irm websites, n ew s p a p e r  reports, state  
agency in fo rm a tio n  etc.) to  construct th e  ten  case studies und erp inn ing  th e  cross­
case analyses in Chapters six and seven and th e  contr ibu tion  analysis in C hap ter  
eight. The  coding used in th e  case study analysis is out l ined  in Table  4 .5 .
Table 4.5: Selected Cases and Case coding







4.5 Summary and Conclusions
This ch a p te r  highlights th e  research m etho d o lo gy  used in th e  fo u r  empir ical 
chapters; five, six, seven and eight. It also covers th e  justification fo r  em ploy ing  a 
m ixed m eth o d s  research design. This design is ap prop ria te  for answering  th e  
research questions and reaching th e  research objectives in this study. The  
m e th o d o lo g y  e m p lo yed  also a llow ed fo r  data  and m ethodologica l tr iangu la tion  
possibilities which a m o n o  m e th o d  could not provide. In addition th e  ch apter
explains the selection process for the firm case-studies, the case study data 
collection process, the implementation of the case study data analysis strategy and 
the use of a 'contribution analysis' framework to synthesise the empirical findings 
and also to bring the study to a close.
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Chapter 5 
The contribution of public venture capital to indigenous firm  
performance in the small late developing state -  a quantitative 
analysis
The contribution that small and medium sized enterprises make to economic 
growth in developed and late developing economies has been well documented in 
the literature (Bolton, 1971; Birch, 1979, 1981; Storey & Johnson, 1987; Storey, 
1994; Storey & Greene, 2010; Huggins & Williams, 2012). These studies have 
highlighted an important role for the state in fostering and stimulating growth in 
this sector (Lerner, 2009, Storey & Greene, 2010; Bennett, 2012). The argument 
runs that if enterprise is an important engine of growth in the economy and 
government policy helps shape this enterprise environment for entrepreneurs, ergo 
government policy is important for entrepreneurship and small firm growth. Policies 
which help stimulate entrepreneurial growth -  both in terms of assisting new 
entrants and for accelerating the growth of existing incumbents -  are therefore 
important (Minniti, 2008:779). The importance of effective enterprise policy is 
magnified when the case of the small open state is considered. This is because of 
the greater economic importance attaching to the SME sector in small states 
(Greene & Mole, 2006). The open question remains as to how to devise, implement 
and evaluate these effective policy measures? The objective of this chapter then is 
to evaluate the contribution of a policy instrument -  Public Venture Capital (PVC) - 
to the shareholder value creating performance of established growth-oriented 
indigenous firms. Start-up firms and policy instruments such as seed funding, aimed 
at these firms are outside the scope of the study.
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In their zeal to encourage entrepreneurial activity and stimulate export-led firm 
growth governments design micro-level programmes and policy instruments based 
primarily on perceived 'market gap' or 'market failure' arguments (Bennett, 2006; 
Storey & Greene, 2010; Murray et ol. 2012). By attempting then to 'pick or make 
winners' (Carr, 2000a), policy-makers attem pt to 'beat the market'. Murray et a i  
(2012) observe that:
In order to correct for perceived supply-side failures in domestic VC markets, several 
countries have set-up governmental VC organisations to invest either directly in 
nascent and young ventures or indirectly as a limited partner in specialist VC funds 
focused on young entrepreneurial ventures. Yet, state controlled investment 
programmes with civil servants identifying and supporting national champions via 
direct and preferential investment activities is now viewed with considerable 
circumspection (p.3).
Enterprise Ireland (El)1, on behalf of the Irish state, undertakes both types of 
investment referred to by Murray et a i  with its 'Seed and Venture Fund' and its 
direct share investments in internationally growth-oriented firms. El also directly 
invests in or has invested in over six hundred firms to 2005. It manages these 
investments directly on behalf of the State - although the state is not represented 
on the boards of the firms (Enterprise Ireland Annual Reports, 1998 -  2010). This 
chapter investigates the public venture capital investments in a cohort of these 
firms.
1 Enterprise Ireland is the Government funded agency for indigenous industry support. It was formed out of the amalgamation 
of a number of development agencies .It is legally a subsidiary of Forfas: w w w .forfas.ie, the Government policy advisory 
agency, but reports to the Department of Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation, h ttp ://w w w .d ie i.ie /. It is essentially an 
implementation agency for government 'enterprise policy'. Its major remit is to help develop the internationally trading 
indigenous sector to grow its business by stimulating indigenous firms to become more innovative and competitive. See: 
www.enterprise-ireland.com.
127 | Page
This s tudy will n o t be considering th e  'seed and ve n tu re  fun d ' in its analysis as it is 
outs ide  th e  scope o f  this study but will include selected c o m p ara t ive  in fo rm atio n  
w h e r e  a p pro p r ia te .
5.1 The External Environment and Export Performance of Indigenous 
Firms
All o f  th e  f irm s in th e  datase t constructed fo r  this study are located in th e  Republic  
o f  Ire land and are clients o f  Enterprise Ire land (El). The  m acroeco n om ic  situation  
which  existed at th e  t im e  o f  th e  study is show n in Table 5 .1 . (See also: A ppendix  1 in 
C h a p te r  3 fo r  a profile  o f  th e  Irish econom y).
Each o f  th e  f i fty  one firm s in th e  dataset has received a m in im u m  o f  
£ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 ( € 6 3 5 ,0 0 0 )  in ves tm en t in share capital (e i th e r  equity , p re fe rence  share or  
a co m b in a t ion  o f  th e  tw o )  f ro m  Enterprise Ireland on beha lf  o f  th e  Irish sta te  to  
help acce le ra te  th e ir  in te rna t ion a l g row th  and d e v e lo p m e n t  (Enterprise Ireland, 
2011).
Table 5.1 Ireland: GDP & GNI, 1997-2006
Y e a r GDPCbn GNICbn GNI as %  GNI (at 





1 1997 6 8 . 1  6 0 . 8  8 9 . 3  2 4 . 1
1998 7 8 . 7  6 9 . 8  8 8 . 7  2 5 . 5
|  1999 9 0 . 7  7 8  8 6  2 7 . 4
2000 1 0 4 . 6  9 0 . 1  8 6 . 1  2 9 . 5
2001 1 1 6 . 9  9 8 . 9  8 4 . 6  3 0 . 2
2002 1 3 0 . 2  1 0 8  8 2 . 9  3 0 . 6
2003 1 3 9 . 4  1 1 9 . 1  8 5 . 4  3 1 . 8
2004 1 4 8 . 5  1 2 6 . 8  8 5 . 4  3 2 . 4
2005 1 6 1 . 5  1 3 7 . 5  8 5 . 1  3 3 . 3
2006 1 7 4 . 7  1 5 0 . 5  8 6 . 1  3 4 . 5
Note on table: In 2006, the GNI figure for Ireland was 86.1% of the GDP
figure, which was broadly comparable with that observed in previous years 
(See Table 5.1). In 2006, the Irish GNI per capita figure was over 40% higher 
than the 1997 figure when measured in constant 2005 prices i.e. an 
average annual growth rate of just over 4% per annum (see Table 5.1)
(Source: CSO National Accounts, 2011- adapted by author)
Having gone through a rigorous selection process (See: Chapter 3: Appendix2), each 
of the firms can be regarded as internationally 'growth oriented' or having an 
'entrepreneurial orientation' (Delmar, 2003). These are the potential high-growth -  
firms targeted by policy makers (Storey & Greene, 2010; OECD, 2010). These firms 
are prime examples of the Irish state's attempts at picking or more accurately 
making winners (Carr, 2005a). The years covered by the investment period are 
1999 -  2005. This is important, since these years coincide with the so-called 'Celtic 
Tiger' boom years (Donnelly, 2012, Breznitz, 2012).
During the period of the study, the Irish domestic economy was growing at healthy 
rates on the back of strong international growth (Table 5.1). Each firm included in 
the study was identified from the Enterprise Ireland Annual Reports 1998 -  2005 
(See: Appendix 1 in the annual reports). In each of the years under review (1999- 
2005) the maximum number of firms obtaining (€635,000) or more never exceeded 
ten firms nor fell below four (Enterprise Ireland annual reports, 1998-2006). The 
evaluation of the performance of these 'selected firms' - subsequent to the state 
investment- can also provide insights into the success or otherwise of the states 
selection process and the quality or otherwise of the pool of indigenous projects 
available for investment.
El initially identified all firms obtaining over IR£100,000 (€127,000) in share 
investment in the 1998 to 2001 Annual Reports. From 2001 to 2008 however only 
those firms obtaining £500,000(€635,000) or over were identified. Aggregate 
information on shareholdings is only available in the annual reports until 2009 and 
individual firm allocations are not provided. There has been a progressive move
since the first annual report in 1998 to providing less and less information on 
individual firms. No reason has been provided for this move.
Having identified a cohort of firms obtaining €635,000 or over, the company's 
registration number was inputted into the FAME database (Bureu de Djik, 2011) and 
financial information (profitability and shareholder investment value) was gathered 
for eight years on each firm, I.e., two years pre-state investment, the year of the  
state investment and for 5 years post-investment. This allows a pre (before) - and 
post (after) - investment performance measure to be calculated for each firm. 
Missing data was obtained from the Companies Registration Office (CRO, 2011) and 
Visionnet database (Visionet.ie, 2011).
5.1.1 Indigenous firm Export performance
Table 5.2 shows the performance of export-oriented indigenous Irish industry over 
the period 1999-2005 against the positive macroeconomic backdrop of just over 
four per cent annual average GNI growth from 1997 -  2006 (Table 5.1). Figures for 
2006-2010 are included as 2010 was the last year that financial data was collected 
for firms in the study i.e., firms receiving the state investment in 2005. These figures 
represent the performance of Irish firms who are clients of El and thus are in the 
vanguard of the country's export-led growth strategy. The total turnover (Domestic 
and export) of all El's client firms decreased by 1.3 per cent on average per anum 
from 1999 to 2005. Data for 2006 -  2010 was not provided by El in their annual 
reports. When the export proportion of the total turnover figure is considered, 
export performance actually declined by 1.8 per cent on average per anum over the
same period while employment grew by less than one per cent to 2005. From 2006- 
2010 indigenous exports increased by eighteen per cent in value or 3.6 per cent on 
average annually. Employment decreased by 3 per cent over the same period. 
Despite the increase in indigenous exports, the employment decrease indicates the 
difficulties that firms were experiencing on the domestic market particularly after 
the global financial crises in 2008.
Total exports (FDI & indigenous industry) increased by 29.5 per cent from 1999 to  
2005 or 4.6 per cent (9.7 per cent for the five years from 2006 -  2010 or 2 per cent 
on average per anum) showing the divergence in performance between indigenous 
exporters and FDI firms to 2005. From 2006 -  2010 indigenous exports 
outperformed FDI in percentage terms. Indeed, the share of indigenous exporters 
as a percentage of overall exports declined from 17.5 per cent of overall exports in 
1999 to 12.4 per cent in 2005 but recovered to 15.6 per cent of total exports by 
2010. Anyadike - Danes et a i,  (2011) further finds that new business creation or 
'entrepreneurship' did not contribute significantly to economic growth to 2004. 
Economic growth then was driven by FDI, domestic consumption and a 
'Construction bubble' during the so-called 'Celtic Tiger' period'. Indeed economic 
growth ceased to be export-led from 2001 signalling the growing domestic bubble 
forming. Pro-cyclical policy measures contributed to the already overheating 
economy (CSO, 2011).
The only sector to actually grow its exports during the period (1999 -  2005) under 
analysis was the software and international services area - albeit from a relatively
small base. Food and natural resources, consumer and industrial products all 
declined or remained static (See: Table 5.2).
5.1.2 Public venture capital investment for indigenous firms
In the investment period under study (1999 -  2005), El invested €153,074,000 in 
direct share investments in Irish indigenous growth-orientated firms to stimulate 
increased growth. Thirty three per cent of the overall investment was invested in 
the fifty one firms in this study. These fifty one firms each received a minimum of 
€635,000 (IR£500,000) in share investment. On average this works out at €987,000  
per firm. Over the period, Enterprise Ireland's annual budget increased from 1999 
to 2001 and then declined to 2005. (See: Table 5.3).
The positive macroeconomic situation (summarised in Tables 5.1) raises questions 
about the justification for state investment in individual firms - when the financial 
system was benefiting from a low interest rate regime in the eurozone.
It also raises questions about the 'market failure' or 'finance gap' argument 
forwarded by policymakers as justification for intervention in the marketplace 
(Mulcahy, 2005a; Bennett, 2006, 2012). This unique economic situation also creates 
an opportunity to analyse the possible contribution of public venture capital. It 
effectively creates the temporal conditions for the conduct of a 'natural 
experiment' on the firms obtaining public venture capital (See: Chapter 4 -  
Research Methodology for detailed explanation of the research methodology 
employed). The study then looks at the financial performance of these fifty one 
recipient firms for two years pre-state investment to establish a baseline and then 
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This gives eight year's financial performance - which is a longer period than most 
studies cited in this area (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2006; Shepard & Wiklund, 2009). This is 
in line with Davidsson's (2004) and Dobbs and Hamilton's (2007) recommendation 
that 'longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional' approachs is the required approach 
when studying the firm growth phenomenon.
Table 5.3: Performance of Enterprise Ireland (El)* 1999 - 2005






Enterprise Ireland  
Budget** € '0 00  
El Share 
Investm ent in 
indigenous firm s  
at cost/(N BV  in 
brackets) 
A dditional annual 
investm ent in 
firm s (a t cost) 
over previous 
year € '0 0 0  
Firms in this  
study - annual 
value of 
investm ent € '0 0 0  
- % o f to ta l 
annual increase 
in funding  
(5 0 3 7 6 /1 5 3 0 7 4 )  
i.e. 33%  o f all 
investm ents
Seed and venture  
fund (Outside  
scope of study)+ 








: ' ' . * '  ^ - , 
21 25 41 29 30 29 53
32343 45389 85985 1063"" —12050805
(76950) (77493)(31030) (44601) (86454) (89114) (84677)
Notes on Table 5.4: The mission of Enterprise Ireland is stated to be: 'To accelerate [bolding author added] the development of 
world-class Irish companies to achieve strong positions in global markets resulting in increased national and regional 
prosperity' (El annual report, 2008:1).
*ln addition to providing funding for scaling indigenous firms, El also provides grant assistance to firms for R&D investments. 
The focus in this study is on the possible impact of public venture capital provision only. See for example, El annual report 
2010: Page 21 for a breakdown of expenditure. www.enterDrise-ireland.com/publications **Enterprise Irelands' budget is a 
grant-in aid from the Irish government, supplemented over the years by grants from the European Social fund (ESF) for 
development in peripheral and disadvantaged regions.
+ The seed and venture fund is targeted at High potential start-up in technology and life sciences sectors. El invest in consortia 
of venture funds managed by private sector venture capital firms. Figures are included here for comparative purposes. The 
firms and funding investigated in this study relates to the 'scaling' funding activities of El and the impact of its efforts however 
at least one firm included in the study had previously received seed funding under this scheme. In general individual firms 
funded under the scheme are not identified due to the commercially sensitive nature of the information.
# Includes EU funding which significantly increases the 2000 El budget and accounted for the jump in investment value from  
2000 to 2001
X From El annual reports — notes 16 or 17 to the Balance sheets 1999-2005.
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5.2. Characteristics of the Dataset
The sectoral breakdown of the firms under study is set out in Table 5.4. Forty five per 
cent of the overall direct share investment is in the ICT sectors, due in the main to 
the belief (amongst policy-makers) that fast growth Firms (FGF) or high-growth firms 
(HGF) would emanate from these sectors. The literature would however point out 
that HGFs can occur in any sector, are not over represented in technology sectors but 
are indeed more prevalent in the service sectors (Henrekson & Johansson, 2010; 
Storey & Greene, 2010; Anyadike -  Danes et al., 20011). Employment grew over 
seventy two per cent in these sectors from 1999 to 2002 albeit from a low base 
(Table 5.2). Food & Natural Resources and Industrial Products (including Cleantech 
and Biotech manufacturing) both providing three times the employment of the ICT 
sectors in 2002 with industrial products declining overall by 6 per cent from 1999 
(due to the demise of some traditional sectors) and Food and natural resource 
sectors growing employment by 9 per cent from 1999 to 2002 -  the last year that 
employment figures, broken out by sector, are available.
Table 5.4 - Firm Sector Breakdown








Consumer products -  Furniture/ceramic/carpet 
manufacturing
3 6 9 4591
Food and natural Resources -  Agri-products/consumer 
foods/natural resources
7 15 20 10089
Cleantech, Medical Devices and industrial products 12 25 18 9161r-' ■ v> *
manufacture ri „,v
Software, ICT and Internationally Traded Services 29 54 45 22652
Total 100 100
' I1' ■*' .» » 1  ^,
50376
The public venture capital investment took place over the six year period 1999 -  
2005 and is broken out over each of the years. Table 5.5 indicates the relative
importance of the 51 firms in the study when the overall investment in indigenous 
industry in the period under study is considered. On average, each firm received 
€987,000 in public venture capital investment, accounted for 33 per cent of total 
direct public venture investment but only represented eight per cent of total firm  
numbers receiving direct venture capital funding. Fifty four per cent of the public 
venture capital funding in the study was allocated to firms in the ICT and high- 
technology manufacturing sector firms (See: Chapter 5: Table 5.4). These technology­
intensive firms represented 69 per cent of the overall number of firms in the study. 
Technology-driven firms receiving €773,000 (35) on average each compared to the 
more traditional firms who received €1,456,000 (16) per firm reflecting the sector, 
age and scale profiles of the respective sub groups.
Table 5.5 -  Breakdown of Direct Public Venture Capital Investment - Scaling of 
________________ Indigenous Firms by Year of Investment____________
No. of firms receiving Year * 
€635,000 or over












OO 7 3664 175251 * . •' - :
2000 4 8 8 5084 20020
2001 10f - < 21 23 11786 28800
2002 5 12 10 4885 16916
2003 9 19 14
: " * » !
6786 22774
2004 9 19 15 7535 25684
2005 10
1 . -1 - i «£ - * wtti {,A V „ *
21 23 11368
iit t i te i
21275
Total 51 100 100 50376 152994
* These 51 firms received 33 per cent of the overall share investment disbursed by El to firms 'scaling up' 
over the 1999 -  2005 period. By the 2005 annual report (2005 figures), El had made share investments in 
577 firms under the €635,000 threshold in addition to 70 firms with investments over €635, 000. These 
investments were valued at cost €112,572,000 and €72, 412, 000 respectively. Average investment per firm  
was €195,098 under the €635,000 threshold and €1,034,457 above it. Mulcahy (2009;2011) also points out 
that El client firms are 'entitled' to apply for grant support from El's Research, Technology & Innovation (RTI) 
and R&D Capability grant schemes in addition to receiving equity investments. This study focuses on share 
investments only as grants are non-repayable and could be considered as a subsidy to the firm whereas 
share investment is expected to be repaid in due course based on performance after the post investment 
period. However the public venture capital has also been referred to as 'repayable equity grants' by El 
(Breznitz, 2007). Appendix 2 in Chapter 3 outlines the El support system for indigenous firms in detail.
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5.2.1 Geographic location of firms
The breakdown of the geographic location o f the firms (Hoogstra & Van Dijk, 2004) 
(Table 5.6) shows the  im portance o f the Dublin Region as an economic 
'agglom eration' region. The m ajority o f the Software and Technology firms reside in 
this area. The Leinster region of which Dublin is the m ajor city is next. W hen this 
eastern region (Dublin and Leinster) is considered, it accounts for seventy tw o  per 
cent of the to ta l num ber of firms in the study and seventy five per cent o f th e  state  
investment. Cork City,
which is the main city in M unster and Cork County account for the bulk o f the  fifteen  
per cent o f firms and tw elve  per cent of total investm ent a ttributab le  to  M unster.
The provinces o f Connaught (6 per cent) in the west o f Ireland and the counties o f 
Cavan and M onaghan in Ulster (4 per cent) in the border region account fo r th e  
remainder o f the  firm s in the study.
Table 5.6 - Geographic location of firms 
Location No. of Firms % of total %oflnv. Value
M  Dublin
r i : • 26 51 S °J||g 25165f
Leinster 11 21 25 12387
. Munster 8 15
Connaught 3 6 5 2571
^Ulster 2 4 00
Total 51 100% 100% 50376
5.2.2 The age profile o f firms
The age profiles o f th e  firm s are displayed in Table 5.7. Fifty eight per cent o f the  
firms in the study w ere  five years or below  in age. The m ajority o f these firms w ere  
from the technology sector. These firms accounted for fifty  one per cent o f the  to ta l
state investment. Older firms are primarily from the more traditional sectors such as
food, consumer and/or industrial products.
Table 5.7: Age of Firms (at tim e of State investment)
Age No. of Firms % of total % oflnv  Value
O ver 10 12 13676
19 22 112135-9 10
53 51 25<S7
>'■ ■ ‘If » . :
51 100 100 50376
5.2.3 Firm size at tim e of public venture capital (PVC) investment
Firm size is another key variable in the proposed model -  it is included because of its 
prominence in the literature. Most studies on firm size however take the number of 
employees as a proxy for size (Davidsson, 2004). In this study, in line with the 
strategic focus on shareholder value creation, it is appropriate that the value of 
shareholder funds on the firm's balance sheet is taken as a true measure of the size 
of the business at that point in time (Baldwin, 2002; Davidsson et a i,  2008; Hill & 
Jones, 2009; Doyle, 2010). The breakdown of the size of the firms in terms of 
shareholder value in the year preceding the state investment shows that sixty three  
per cent of the firms had created shareholder value at that point before the state 
investment. Twenty five per cent or thirteen firms had not reported financial results 
at this point, indicating the young age profile of this cohort. Twelve per cent of the 
firms had negative shareholder value, indicating that the firms were surviving on the 
goodwill or future expectations of their shareholders.
Table 5.8: Size of firms -  Shareholder value -  year preceding state investment 
   1
Shareholder value in € No. of % of Share o f % of
firm s to ta l investm ent Investm ent
shareholders (technically insolvent)
N egative shareholder value -  firm  supported by
0 shareholder value -  firm  just fo rm ed or no reported  
results as y e t * *
13 25 12034 24
Positive shareholder value -  firm  has retaine< 
: . ' ■ 
and received capital injections which increase
shareholder value
Total 51 100 50376 100
*Shareholder value is defined as the reported value of shareholder funds on the balance sheet at year end of the year 
preceding receipt of state investment i.e. Total assets -  current liabilities = Shareholder funds.
* *  Firms have up to 18 months to file financial statements for a financial period.
The age and size spread of the firms in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 indicates the all 
encompassing nature of the funding options available from the State -  be it early 
stage, follow-on or later stage growth funding. Sixty six per cent of the state's 
investment in this study went to firms with positive shareholder value indicating that 
two thirds of the investment went to follow on and later stage growth funding. See 
Table 5.8.
5.2.4 Shareholder numbers in firms (Ownership)
The number of shareholders in the firm is an indicator of the team behind the 
venture (Directors) as most firms in the study are private firms, typically run by the 
investor(s) themselves. These firms are defined in the literature as closely-held 
firms (Audretsch & Link, 2012; 2012). The firms survive with funding support from  
family/friends and/or angel investors and/or venture capital and/or the Irish State. 
Table 5.9 indicates that fifty seven per cent of the firms have between 1-5 investors 
with twenty five per cent of firms having six to ten investors. Essentially eighty six per 
cent of firms have ten or less registered investors at the beginning of the study 
period. New Technology based firms (NTBF's) (Storey & Tether, 1998) typically have
higher shareholder numbers than more traditional businesses as they tend to 
compensate employees with share ownership/options in the early stages (in lieu of 
salary). If they have growth ambitions, they also tend to allow outside shareholders 
in to help fund growth -  be it family/friends and/or angel investors and/or VC's 
(Berger & Udell, 1998, Mulcahy, 2005; Gompers & Lerner, 2010). The entrepreneurs 
cede partial control to try and accelerate shareholder value creation. An analysis of 
movements in the share register of small private or 'closely held' firms over time 
therefore can give possible insights into the financing strategy and growth 
performance of growing firms. The information provided here was accessed on the 
FAME database, (2008 -  12) and on the Visionnet, (2009-11) website. Both FAME and 
Visionnet's source data comes originally from information filed by the registered 
firms with the Irish company's registration office (CRO). Corporate enforcement has 
improved in recent years in Ireland and company information is now filed in a more 
complete and timely fashion primarily due to the focus in the Office of the 
Directorate for Corporate Enforcement on enforcing company law filing 
requirements for limited companies (See: www.odce.ie).
Table 5.9: Ownership of firms -  number of 
Owners' tw o  years before state investment
No. o f shareholders No. of firm s % of to tal
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5.2.6 Firm performance -  dependent variables
Having analysed the characteristics of the dataset in terms of the geo-demographic 
and financial variables, it is also important to consider appropriate performance 
variables over the five year post state investment period of the study. This is the 
tim e-fram e after which the firm - if it has grown successfully - is expected to begin 
paying back the share capital investment to the state. It is essentially the States 'exit 
mechanism' from its share investment in the firm and it also reveals the proposed 
'theory of change' behind the programme. This implies that the state by 'picking and 
making winners' expects to generate a return on a higher percentage than the 
market.
If the firm has not generated sufficient retained earnings to repay the capital, has 
ceased to trade during the five year period or has been acquired, then the State - 
depending on the nature of its holdings - either retains its shareholding if the firm  
cannot redeem the shares - or loses its shareholding if it ceases to trade. In cases 
where the firm was acquired (trade sale), it depends on whether the sale was a 
distressed sale or not and whether the returns to the state were positive or not. In 
many cases, this is not possible to determine as these sales are conducted privately 
and contain confidentiality clauses.
In cases where a firm goes public by IPO, the State has sometimes retained its 
shareholding in the new PLC. Mulcahy (2005) has criticised the lack of transparency 
and discipline in the way the Irish State manages and reports on its portfolio of 
investments in indigenous firms. Indeed, she notes that the State agency responsible 
for managing these investments, Enterprise Ireland accounts for the public venture
capital in a highly unusual way. It does not disclose the values obtained for its share 
divestitures thereby giving no indication of its performance in managing its portfolio 
(per industry practice). In the accounts and notes to the accounts of its annual 
reports, Enterprise Ireland does however report the overall cost of its investments 
from the 1998 annual report on and does give a current book value for its share 
investments. These figures are provided in Table 5.3. In the 2005 Annual Report, 
cumulative shareholdings acquired by Enterprise Ireland were valued under the  
historical cost convention at €184,984,000. The net book values (NBV) of these 
shareholdings were valued at €106,660,000. This is an apparent write-down of 
€78,324,000 on the value of these investments. Breznitz (2007) interviewed the then 
CEO of Enterprise Ireland in 2005, who disclosed that Enterprise Ireland had made 
€250m  for a 'sinfully small investment'. This is not evident from the Annual Reports 
as it is not reported in a transparent manner as an investment gain. Mulcahy (2005) 
and Breznitz (2007) noting that this reluctance to highlight investment gains probably 
reflects a state sponsored body's discomfort at showing 'profitable gains' to its 
paymasters and the public least it effect its subsequent funding and/or public 
perception. Horn (2011) reports that the current CEO of Enterprise Ireland claimed 
at the annual Engineers Ireland Conference (2011) that Enterprise Ireland is the 
largest venture capitalist in Europe - not just Ireland. There is however no clear 
evidence of the quality of the investments or of the investment returns or the impact 
(in terms of value creation within firms) of the States share investment performance. 
It simply is not publicly reported.
Investigating the relative contribution then of state investment to the performance 
of the top fifty one recipient firms is one of the objectives of this dissertation. Table
5.10 shows that forty of the fifty one firms in the dataset had not increased 
shareholder value in the five years post-state investment. This is cross-tabulated with 
'Can the state investment be repaid'. The situation is more nuanced than the top line 
figure above suggests. For example, seven of the firms which reduced shareholder 
value still had the potential to repay the State after the five year post investment 
period as they had raised outside equity from elsewhere and thus had significant 
reserves (and shareholder support) but did not trade profitably in the period under 
study.
Table 5.10:Post - pre investment Performance Positive/negative ROIC * Can 
investment be repaid Cross-tabulation__________________________________





































1 firm or 
multination 
al before 5 
year period




Investm en  
t  be low  0
6 21 4 1 8 40
Positive /negativ  
e ROIC
Return on 
investm en  
t  above 0
7 1 2 0 1 11
Total 13 22 6 1 9 51
Table 5.11 condenses the categories in Table 5.10 into a binary variable to ensure 
that this variable can be incorporated into the developed model. This 
transformation of the variable is necessary due to the small number of cases 
available for analysis in the dataset.
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5.11: Post - pre investment Performance Positive/negative ROIC * State investment 
payback performance Cross tabulation





losses or ceased 
trading
Firm has capacity 




Post - pre investment Return on Investment below 0 25 15 40
Performance Positive/negative Return on investment above 0 3 8 11
ROIC
Total 28 23 51
5.2.7 Firm performance by sector and location
Table 5.13 shows the performance (value creation or value destruction) of the cohort 
of firms in the study by sector and geographic location of the firms. This Table gives 
an overview of the sectoral and geographic spread of the firms. The standout statistic 
is the clustering of the technology firms in the Dublin Region and the poor financial 
returns of this sector judged by the 'shareholder value creation' metric. This is 
explained by the significant human capital and R & D investment required in these 
firms to achieve Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) (Audretsch & Link, 2012). Those firms 
that raised venture capital in particular are seeking to grow sales and/or headcount 
in the shortest possible time with the expectation of a potential trade sale or an IPO. 
This strategy depends on investors retaining confidence in the firm as it continues its 
attem pt to grow in an uncertain market, technological and competitive environment 
(M ohr et a!., 2008). In the study, for example, only three out of the twenty nine firms
from the ICT sector had increased the book value of shareholders funds through 
profitable  trading by the end of the 5 year post state investment period.
Table 5.12 - Post - pre investment Performance Positive/negative ROIC * 
Geographic location of firm * Industrial sector of firm Cross tabulation
Industrial sector of firm Geographic location of firm
Dublin
area Leinster Munster Ulster Connaught Total



















ROIC Return on 
investment 
above 0
0 1 1 1 3
Total 3 4 4 1 12
Food and Post - pre investment Return on Investment
2 1 0 3






0 2 2 4
Total 2 3 2 7
Software and Post - pre investment Return on Investment
19 1 3 1 2 26








2 1 0 0 0 3
Total 21 2 3 1 2 29
Thus the preceding analysis identifies a number of firm performance variables which 
can be tested. Firstly Return on invested capital (ROIC) can be used as a measure of 
the increase or otherwise of shareholder value, secondly profitability 
increase/decrease can measure whether the firm experienced profitable growth
during the analysis period. Thirdly shareholder book value itself can be evaluated to  
see if it increased or decreased post state investment. Finally repayment of the state 
investment can also be utilised as a performance measure of the cohort of firms 
ability to, at least, begin repaying the state investment after the five year post state 
investment period.
5.3 Empirical Model Development
This section will present the statistical models used in the quantitative part of the 
study. It is hypothesised that firm performance (Value creation/destruction - post 
state investm ent/ Repayment of state investment) is a function of the explanatory 
variables described below. The basic descriptive statistical model can take the 
following general functional form:
Response variable = Systematic component + residual component
Statistical models are based on experimental or observational data and are described 
as empirical models (Collett, 2003). The systematic component tries to explain how 
the variability in the response variable is associated with movements in the 
systematic component usually termed the predictor or independent variables. The 
residual component then accounts for the remaining non systematic variation {ibid). 
In a satisfactory model the systematic component will account for all non-random  
variation in the model. The proposed model for this study is as follows:
Yit = / K  sif Oi ,seit /'/,, /,;) (5.1)
W here Yit is the average increase/decrease in the return on shareholder investment 
after the state investment in firm /'. The subscripts / and t  represents a firm i and t
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rep resen ts  t im e  (w hich is 5 years post in vestm ent less 2 years pre  investm ent);  a 
indicates th e  age o f  th e  firm ; s indicates th e  size at t im e  t-1; o signifies ow nersh ip  
s truc ture  at tO; se is th e  sector o f  th e  firm ; e indicates th e  level o f  s tate share  
in v e s tm e n t  th ro u g h  Enterprise Ireland; / is th e  regional location o f  th e  firm ; The  
m o d e l can be m o re  specifically stated  as follows:
V it =  c + Pi (Age) + p2 (Size) + p3(Ownership structure) + p4(Sector) + 
p5(PVC investm ent) + + p6 (Location) + € (5.2)
A descrip tion  o f  each o f  th e  variables and an exp lanation  o f  th e ir  m e a s u re m e n t  is 
given in Table  5 .13 .
Table 5.13: Definition of dependent and explanatory Variables in model
Variable Definitions and measurement
■
Firm There were four possible dependent variables tested in the modelling process based on the
performance literature review and the dataset developed. FY^ Dependent variable per case -> [Post state
(Y,t) investment performance (P|t)/(ICit) -  Pre state investment performance (P|-t)/(IQ.t)].
This gives the difference between the return on invested capital pre and post state investment 
and thus gives a measure of the impact or otherwise of the state investment in terms of return 
on invested capital and thereby value creation or value destruction.
Pj.t = Mean Profit (loss) after tax in 2 years preceding state investment (P) (year of state 
investment excluded).
Pit= Mean profit for 5 years post investment excluding year of investment.
IC|.t invested capital in 2 years preceding the year of state investment (year of state 
investment is excluded)
IC|t= Mean invested capital for 5 years post investment
Dichotomous scale is then applied to results to allow for use in binary logistic regression -  
binary variable where 1 = negative return below 0 i.e. mean decrease in return on capital 
invested between pre and post state investment. This amounts to value destruction in 
shareholder value. 2 = Mean Increase in return on invested capital between post and pre state 
investment.
Three other performance variables are considered in this study. Firstly a dichotomous 
performance variable based on an increase in the mean book value of shareholder funds-from 
pre to post public venture capital investment is developed. 0= Decrease in mean shareholder 
value, 1 = increase in shareholder value post state investment. The second performance 
variable considered is the firm's ability to generate profits -  0= firm generated losses post state 
investment, 1= firm generated profits post state investment when compared to the pre-state 
investment. The third performance variable is the firm's ability to begin repaying the public 
venture capital as required by the investment agreement (Investment payback); 0 = Firm has 
accumulated losses or ceased trading before 5 year period was up; 1 = Firm has the capacity to 
repay the share investment/Firm was acquired in the five year period/ Firm remains trading. 
Model 1 = Return on Invested Capital 
Model 2 = Share Value 
Model 3 = Profitability
Model 4 = Investment Payback Ability _ Sgfl _ " '
Age (Age) = Age of firm in years at the point of state investment. A categorical variable is developed
for the model: 0-5, 6-10 and 10+ years.
Size (Size) = Size of firm in the year before the state investment in terms of capital invested 
(Shareholder funds on Balance sheet) at year end preceding PVC investment year
(Ownership structure) = 1, 2, 3, 4 Number of discrete shareholders at year end before state
investment
(Sector) = Consumer (1), Food and natural resources (2), Industrial products (3) and Software 
r and ICT (4)! , ‘ ' ... ...  .........
(Amount of State Investment) = Actual amount of investment in euro at cost to state -  All 
investment amounts will equal or exceed €635,000(IR£500,000). Categorical variable is 1= 
€636-lm, 2= €lm-2m, 3=€2m+




Location = Province or area firm is located in -  Greater Dublin 1 . Leinster 2 . Munster 3), Location _ ,Connaught(4 , Ulster 5
The relatively small population size (n=51) means that no normality assumptions can 
be made about the underlying distribution of the variables. Hypothesis tests were 
carried out on each independent variable to test for normality in the distribution of 
each variable. In most relevant cases it was found that normal distributional 
assumptions did not hold when the appropriate hypothesis test was carried out 
(Table 5.15).
Table 5.14: Results of Hypothesis testing on the independent variables in dataset
performed by SPSS 20.
Hypothesis Test Summary
Null  H y p o t h e s i s Te s t S ig . D e c i s i o n
1
T h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of A g e  a t t i m e  of 
s ta te  i n v e s t m e n t  o c c u r w i t h  e q u a l  
p r o b a b i l i t ie s .
O n e - S a m p l e
C h i - S q u a r e
Te s t
.0 2 8
R e j e c t  th e  
nul l
h y poth esis .
2
T h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of Indus tr ia l  s e c to r  O n e - S a m p l e  
of f i rm  o c c u r w i t h  e q u a l  C h i - S q u a r e  
p r o b a b i l i t ie s .  T e s t
. 0 0 0




T h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of G e o g r a p h i c  
l o c a t i o n  of f i rm  o c c u r w i t h  e q u a l  
p r o b a b i l i t ie s .
O n e - S a m p l e
C h i - S q u a r e
Te s t
. 0 0 0




T h e  di s t r ib ution  of S iz e  2  y e a i s  
b e fo r e  in v e s t m e n t  is n o r m a l  w i th  
m e a n  2 . 1 2 4 , 9 0 2 . 0 0  a n d  s ta n d a r d  
d e v i a t i o n  3 , 6 0 9 , 8 2 9 . 5 3 .
O n e - S a m p l e  
K o l m o g o r o v -  
S m i r n o v  T e s t
. 0 3 2




T h e  dis t r ib ution  of O w n e r s h ip  y e a r  0 n e . S a m p |e 
b e fo r e  i n v e s t m e n t  is n o r m a l  w i th  K o l m o g o r o v -  
m e a n  5 . 7 3  a n d  s ta n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  g m j rnov J e s t  
4 . 9 0 .
.1 1 7




T h e  dis t r ib ution  of V a l u e  in euros  < ^ n e . s a m ple  
s ta te  inv. is n o r m a l  w i th  m e a n  K o l m o g o r o v -  
9 8 7 . 7 6 4 . 7 1  a n d  s ta n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n ^ m i m o v  T e s t  
5 3 6 , 9 8 2 . 6 3 .
.0 0 1
R e j e c t  th e  
nul l
hy poth esis .
A s y m p t o t i c  s ig n i f ic a n c e s  are d is p la y e d .  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l  is . 0 5 .
5.3.1 Logistic Regression
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is not appropriate as its basic a prion 
assumptions are overly stringent for the empirical data collected here. Its core 
underlying assumption of a linear relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables also requires the variables to have normally distributed data 
(Peng et alw 2002c). A technique which relaxes these stringent assumptions whilst 
providing the requisite statistical power is logistic (logit) regression (Long, 1997; 
Menard, 2000; Garson, 2011). It is a generalised linear model used for binomial 
regression. The explanatory variables can, as in this case, be numerical or categorical 
or indeed combinations of both. Chapter 4 described the research strategy for this 
quantitative study.
Equation 5.2 therefore needs to be transformed into a logistic function to make it 
appropriate for this study. The equation transforms from Y= c+px+e (Equation 5.2) 
into the form:
ln[P /(l-P ] = c+Px +e (5.3)
Where: In is the natural logarithm, P is the probability that the event Y occurs, P(Y=1) 
P /l-P  is the 'odds ratio'. In [P /l-P ] is the log odds ratio, or LOGIT function. All other 
components of the model are the same as the specified model in equations 5.1 and
5.2 above, although it is important to remember that while P performs the same 
function as in OLS regression, its interpretation is more problematic in logistic 
regression (Collett, 2003). Logistic regression is a non-linear transformation of the 
linear regression (Peng et a l,  2002a; Whitehead, 2011). It therefore calculates
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changes in the log odds of the dependent variable, not changes in the dependent 
variable itself as OLS regression does (Garson, 2011).
When considering the overall explanatory power of the model, Whitehead (2011) 
recommends three suitable statistical tests. No one test can be relied upon on its 
own but a combination of the three gives a clearer indication of the explanatory 
power of the approach. These are:
1. The model likelihood ratio (LR), or chi-square statistic- it is:
LR(i) = [-2 log Likelihood (of beginning model with no predictor variables 
included)] -  [-2 log likelihood (of ending model)] where the model LR statistic 
is the distributed chi-square with the appropriate degrees of freedom in 
relation to the number of independent variables. The model in question's ch i- 
square statistic can be used to determine if the overall model is statistically 
significant.
2. A second test of overall significance is available from the outputted  
classification table from the statistical package used. If the estimate is above 
.5 - the cut-off point, then the event is expected to occur. Below the cut-off 
point, it is not expected to occur. The overall percentage that the model 
predicts as correct, against the actual observed data, the better the model fit 
to the data. A more stringent test than the cut -  off point is the proportional 
reduction in error measure (PRE) and this will be applied in this study 
(Garson, 2011).
3. The third test for significance is the (R2) which is familiar to researchers using 
OLS regression. There are fundamental differences between this measure in 
OLS and logistic regression and so this test should not be relied upon on its
own. Firstly, these tests are regarded as 'pseudo' R2 tests since the statistic 
depends on the beginning and end log likelihood functions. It does not 
explain the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable by the 
specific predictor variable as in OLS regression. It is also not possible to 
maximise the R2 as is done in OLS regression. R2 in logistic regression, for the 
reasons cited above, tend to have a much lower value between zero and one 
than true R2 in OLS regression.
Peng et al. (2002a), Peng et al.(2002b), Peng et ol. (2002c) and Whitehead (2011) 
recommend reporting the results of the logistic regression analysis in tabular form. 
The model assessment procedure is as follows: Firstly an overall evaluation of the 
logistic model is undertaken which is then followed by the measures of effect size 
findings.
A number of final issues in model building revolve around the relationship between  
the observations and explanatory variables -  the event per predictor variable ratio 
(EPV). There is no universally-agreed figure however Long (1997) and Garson (2011) 
for example, recommend a ratio of 10:1 for categorical data modelling between the 
number of cases and the explanatory variables. Peng et a l/s  (2002b) review of fifty 
two logistic regression studies, finds wide variations in the ratios applying and they 
also note that low ratios may lead to instability in the parameter estimates. However 
Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2006) question this 'rule of thumb' and note that in their 
analysis of empirical studies that there is no significant deterioration in accuracy 
when moving to a 5:1 event per predictor variable (EPV) ratio.
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Finally as the model in this case is developed to test levels of association between 
Public venture capital and firm performance, the modelling procedure enters the 
independent variables in two blocks. The variable of prime interest is entered first.
The other variable -  the control variables -  are then entered as a block. The results 




Table 5.16 outlines the descriptive statistics on the dataset. The variables are 
measured categorically and metrically depending on the variable in question. Table 
5.14 provides a description of how the variables are measured. The mean age of the 
firms in the cohort at the tim e of entering the analysis period was 7.33 years with SD 
of 7.83 years and a range of 38 years - indicating the age variety of the firms in the 
cohort receiving Enterprise Ireland support. Size is measured in Euros. The mean size 
- in Shareholder funds -  is €2,124,902 with a range from - €3,291,000 to €17,
004,000 also indicating the varying financial strengths of the selected firms. The 
median ownership is four shareholders with a wide range from zero (Firm was not 
yet formed) to tw enty one. The value of the state investment in the selected firms 
had a mean of €987,764 - with a minimum of €635,000 and a maximum amount of 
€3,263,000. €635,000 equates to IR£500,000 -  the minimum amount received by any 
firm in the study. The categorically measured variables are also included for 
completeness however the descriptive statistics as less meaningful than the
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metrically measured variables. For a normal distribution, the value of the kurtosis 
statistic is zero. Positive kurtosis indicates that, relative to a normal distribution, the 
observations are more clustered about the centre of the distribution and have 
thinner tails until the extreme values of the distribution. Negative kurtosis indicates 
that, relative to a normal distribution, the observations cluster less and have thicker 
tails until the extreme values of the distribution. Skewness is a measure of the 
asymmetry of a distribution. The normal distribution is symmetric and has a 
skewness value of 0. A distribution with a significant positive skewness has a long 
right tail. A distribution with a significant negative skewness has a long left tail. As a 
guideline, a skewness value more than twice its standard error is taken to indicate a 
departure from symmetry (SPSS 20). The skewness and kurtosis measures in Table 
5.16, confirming the results in the hypothesis tests in Table 5.15 that the key 
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5.4.2: Logistic Regression analysis results
The independent variables were inputted into the logistic regression model specified
earlier (See: Equations 5.1; 5.2 & 5.3). The data analysis package used to analyse the
data was SPSS20. Four models were tested with different dichotomous dependent
variables related to the objectives of the study. Table 5.14 explains the measures
used for each variable. The models are coded as follows -  note that the predicted
category of outcome is first (1), the reference category is second (0):
Model 1: ROIC -  increase in mean ROIC post state investment =1, decrease = 0 
Model 2: Shareholder Value -  increase in mean shareholder post state investment 
value =1, decrease = 0
Model 3: Profit -  increase in mean profitability post state investment = 1, decrease = 
0
Model 4: PVC Payback -  does firm have the potential to payback state investment 
after five years/firm acquired = 1, does not/persistent loss makers = 0
Overall model significance
Based on the likelihood Chi-square statistic, only one model with all six predictor 
variables is significant; This is Model 2 (Shareholder Value) with p-value=0.031 < 
0.05. This implies that at least one of the predictors in the model is linearly related to  
the log odds of the dependent variable. The model's Chi-square measures the 
improvement in fit that the predictor variables make compared to the null, or 
constant only, model (Table 5.17).
For small samples the likelihood ratio test is considered as a more reliable 
significance measure than the Wald statistic (Agresti, 1996) and is therefore more 
appropriate for this study.
The remainder of the analysis will therefore focus on Model 2.
Table 5.16: Omnibus Test for the overall logistic regression model(s) fit
Model* Chi-Square DF Significance
Model 1 - ROIC 17.774 11 .087
Model 2 -  Share 
Value
21.224 11 .031
Model 3 - 
Profitability
8.756 11 .644
Model 4 -  State 
Investment Payback
15.951 11 .143
*M o d e l 1: ROIC -  increase in mean ROIC post state investment =1, decrease = 0: M o del 2: Shareholder 
Value -  increase in mean shareholder post state investment value =1, decrease = 0: M o del 3: Profit -  
increase in mean profitability post state investment = 1, decrease = 0 :M o d el 4: PVC Payback -  does 
firm have the potential to payback state investment after five years/firm acquired = 1, does not/ 
persistent loss makers = 0. Independent variables for all models are: FIRM AGE, FIRM SIZE,
STATE INVESTMENT, SECTOR, LOCATION and OWNERSHIP.
Significance tests
The Hosmer & Lemeshow Chi-square test of goodness-of-fit is an alternative to the 
omnibus test as an overall test of the significance of a logistic regression model 
(Menard, 2001). A well fitting model is non-significant by this test (Garson, 2011). 
This model with p-value=0.0.457> 0.05 is greater than the level of significance and 
therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. It further indicates that model prediction is 
not significantly different than from the observed values. The model fits the data 
(Table 5.18). This does not mean that the model explains much of the variance in the 
dependent variable, only that whatever variance it explains is significant.
Table 5.17: Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 7.764 8 .457
This test is generally preferred over classification tables when assessing model fit 
particularly where the sample size is small (Agresti, 1996). However a classification 
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a. The cut value is .500. The values in parentheses are extracted from the classification table for the null model 
(Constant only). The chance hit rate calculated by the proportional reduction in error (PRE) and is 48%. The 
model developed improves on the PRE by 30.4%., 5.4% above the recommended 25% improvement over the 
base vale suggested for well fitting models.
In sum, the results in Tables 5.18 and 5.19 taken together confirm that the model 
developed for this study fits the data well.
Measures o f Effect Size
There is no direct comparison to the OLS R2 in logistic regression and therefore the 
'pseudo R2' developed for logistic regression model needs to be interpreted 
cautiously -  it cannot be relied upon on its own (Peng et a i,  2002a). It must be 
considered in tandem with the other measures of significance.
Table 5.19: Model Summary3
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2
1 49.300a .340 .454
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum 
iterations have been reached.
The R2 in this model is between .340 and .454. This broadly indicates that between  
34 and 45.4 per cent of the likelihood of the increase in shareholder value over the 
five year post-state investment period is explained by the predictors in the model. 
This leaves large unexplained variation in the model but this is consistent with 
findings from other deterministic model studies in the firm growth area (Dobbs & 
Hamilton, 2007).
Using Maxim um  Likelihood Estimation
The predictor variable of prime interest in the study is state share investment 
(INVvalue). This is entered into the model in Block 2. The remaining five variables are 
entered in the first block (Block 1) as these are the control variables for state share 
investment. This sequential approach is recommended for control variables by 
Garson (2011). This 'before and after' quasi-experimental approach is explained in 
detail in the research design section in Chapter 4 - Research methodology.
It was found that the independent variable - Firm Age (AGE) - has a significant effect 
on the dependant variable in the model, p-value=0.043 < 0.05 (Table 5.21). That is; 
increasing the value of age will increase the log odds of the dependent variable in the 
study -  shareholder value. This variable is a categorical variable which is categorised 
as follows: Age (1) = 0-5 years; Age (2) = 5 -1 0  years. Age (3) = 10 years+. Categorical 
variables must be interpreted in terms of the left-out reference category-as  in OLS 
(Whitehead, 2011). Age (3) is not shown in the analysis as this is the reference 
category (SPSS20). Therefore the results for Age (1) (p-value=0.024<0.05) and AGE 
(2) (p-value=0.042<0.05) shows that the odds of increasing the log odds of 
shareholder value are reduced (EXP (B)< 1) by a factor of .095 and .075 respectively
for firms in the 0-5 and 5-10 year categories when compared to firms over 10 years+, 
all other variables controlled (Table 5.21). Thus the age of the firm when entering the 
public venture capital scheme is positively associated with the ultimate shareholder 
value creation outcome. Older firms are clearly a less risky bet. State investment 
(INVvalue) and the other control variables -  SIZE, OWNERSHIP, SECTOR and 
LOCATION whilst contributing to the overall significance of the model were not 
statistically significant as individual predictors.
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5.4.3 Stepwise procedure -  Model validation
As data-driven methods, stepwise procedures are considered useful for exploratory 
or confirmatory purposes. Selecting model variables on a theoretical basis and using 
ENTER - is preferred to stepwise procedures which use algorithms and therefore can 
model noise in the data (Garson, 2011: 12). Stepwise procedures can help in 
validating the results of the ENTER procedure if they produce broadly the same 
result. Using a stepwise procedure (Backward Stepwise -  LR), it was found that the 
model was statistically significant, p value=0.011<0.05(Table 5.22).
Table 5.21: Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 22.087 11 .024
Step 1 Block 22.087 11 .024
Model 22.087 11 .024
Step -.741 1 .389
Step 2a Block 21.345 10 .019
Model 21.345 9 .011
Step -1.418 1 .234
Step 3a Block 19.928 9 .018
Model 19.928 8 .011
a. A negative Chi-squares value indicates that the Chi-squares 
value has decreased from the previous step.
Variable exclusion
In addition, stepwise procedures can help in clarifying the effects of the individual 
predictors on the model. Table 5.23 illustrates the change in the model log 
likelihood of excluding variables through the stepwise procedure. The lesser 
performing variables can thus be identified and removed. This allows the 
development of a more parsimonious model.
Table 5.22I: Model if independent varia jle removed*
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood
Df Sig. of the 
Change
SECTOR -24.590 .741 1 .389
Location -27.657 6.877 4 .143
Ownership -24.892 1.347 1 .246
Step 1
SIZE -26.463 4.489 1 .034
INVvalue -26.351 4.263 2 .119
Age -27.611 6.784 2 .034
Location -28.407 7.635 4 .106
Ownership -25.298 1.418 1 .234
Step 2 SIZE -26.575 3.970 1 .046
INVvalue -26.770 4.360 2 .113
Age -27.958 6.737 2 .034
Location -30.231 9.866 4 .043
SIZE -26.891 3.185 1 .074
Step 3
INVvalue -28.068 5.539 2 .063
Age -28.998 7.398 2 .025
*  Variables with the highest change in significance will be removed in the stepwise procedure.
Table 5.24 highlights the predictor variables having the least impact on the log 
likelihood of the dependent variable and these are thus removed from the final 
equation in the stepwise procedure. The variables removed are SECTOR and 
OWNERSHIP.
5.23: Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
Step 2a
Variables SECTOR .735 1 .391




Step 3b Ownership 1.405 1 .236
Overall Statistics 2.016 2 .365
a. Variable(s) removed on step 2: SECTOR.
b. Variable(s) removed on step 3: Ownership.
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The four remaining independent variables; INVvalue, AGE, SIZE and LOCATION are 
all retained in the final reduced model after SECTOR and OWNERSHIP are removed. 
The final step in the model development process is to re-run the reduced model 
using the ENTER procedure and the Backward stepwise procedure (LR) to validate 
that this model is indeed the most parsimonious iteration of the developed model. 
Both ENTER and Backward stepwise (LR) procedures produce similar results in the 
overall significance and goodness-of-fit tests. The correlation matrix included in the 
summary tables in Table 5.25 shows the strength of the linear relationship between 
the independent variables in the model. Logistic regression like OLS can have 
multicollinearity present. Whitehead (2011) suggests that if two variables are 
correlated at a rate > 0.6 then the least theoretically important of the two can be 
dropped. None of the variables in the model have correlation coefficients > 0.572.
Table5.24: Summary Tables for the reduced final model (SPSS20).






Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2
.323 .432
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 
because maximum iterations has been reached.
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 2.432 7 .932
Classification Table3
Observed Predicted




= Decrease in 
shareholder 
value
= Increase in 
shareholder 
value
= Decrease in shareholder 17 7 70.8
Ave post - pre state value
Step 1 investment binary = Increase in shareholder 7 20 74.1
value
Overall Percentage 72.5
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5.4.4 Overall findings from the empirical model and proprietary dataset.
The public venture capital variable (INVvalue), in itself, was not a statistically 
significant factor in determining the log odds of the firm performance (Irrespective of 
how performance was measured in this study). However, the age of the firms at the 
tim e of state investment was associated with the firms' ability to create shareholder 
value over time. Older firms of 10+ years (12 firms) had a more positive association 
with shareholder value creation than those categorised in the 0-5 years (29 firms) 
and 5-10 year (10 firms) categories.
Shareholder value creation in this case -  and therefore the potential ability to repay 
the state investment from retained earnings - can only occur in two ways. Either the 
firm has survived and has sufficient reserves (from profitable trading and/or further 
shareholder injections of capital) to begin repaying the state equity injection, or it 
has been acquired by another firm (usually foreign-owned) which bought-out the 
existing shareholders (at a profit or a loss - including the state). If the firm has 
accumulated losses at the time of the state investment, and/or ceased trading during 
the analysis period, then it is clearly not in a position to begin repaying the state 
investment. From a multivariate perspective, the logistic regression model developed 
in the study is statistically significant. However the individual independent control 
variables of OWNERSHIP, LOCATION, SECTOR, SIZE and the variable of prime interest, 
STATE INVESTMENT all proved not to be statistically significant as individual 
predictors. In the final reduced model both the SECTOR and OWNERSHIP variables 
were dropped leaving AGE, SIZE, LOCATION and STATE INVESTMENT in the model. 
Thus the state investment variable had at best a marginal effect on firm  
performance.
Eighty percent of the cohort of firms in the study were in loss making situations after 
five years (41 firms) with twenty percent profitable (10 firms) - post state 
investment. The aggregate returns from the cohort — not-adjusted for tim e - were 
minus 11.86 per cent, indicating that in spite of the €50m+ injection of capital by the 
State into the 51 firms in this cohort, the overall return from the collective firm  
performance was negative. It further indicates that only larger (and older) firms (or 
firms taken over) were in a position to begin repaying the state investment. This 
suggests that in the absence of a windfall gains from share disposals, the state would 
not get a positive return on its investment in the expected time frame. It was also 
not possible to  ascertain what returns El made on the disposal of shares in the ten 
firms acquired during the period under study. Mulcahy (2005), Breznitz (2007) and 
Horn (2011) all question the lack of available information on this investment 
performance and they also question the unusual way El reports on its shareholdings 
in its Annual Reports. Thus, a note of caution must be struck in making evaluations of 
the performance of the states share investment portfolio performance. The state 
might argue that despite the poor overall financial performance of the firms -  which 
reflects the management teams inability in the majority of selected firms to create 
competitive advantage — that 88 per cent (45 firms) of the cohort survived the 
analysis period as independent businesses (35 firms) with 10 firms taken over (9 by 
international firms). However the sustainability of jobs in persistently loss-making 
indigenous firms or in loss-making subsidiaries of larger international firms is 
debatable.
El does report on the cost and book value of its investments. Based on this it appears 
that it had already written off over €78m from the value of its share portfolio by
2005 (Enterprise Ireland, 2006; Table 5.3). There is no visibility of the quality of the 
returns or indeed of the success or otherwise of the investment strategy undertaken. 
There is also no history of El seeking repayment of its shareholding to the determ ent 
of a firm's survival. It can be surmised therefore that if the firm makes it through the 
El selection process, it acquires a benign shareholder. Indeed it acquires an investor 
whose primary strategic interest is in 'job creation' or, at the very least job 
maintenance, but also one who is seeking positive returns on its investment. For the 
firm this is akin to acquiring 'soft' rather than the 'smart' money as the state investor 
does not bring the venture capitalists insights or discipline to the firm. The risk 
capital industry itself puts much emphasis on the 'added value' that its 'smart 
money' brings to the firm in terms of sectoral insight and investor/customer access 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Mulcahy, 2005; Lerner, 2010; IVCA, 2012; EVCA, 2012).
5.5. Summary and Conclusions
This Chapter examines the geo-demographic and public venture capital variables that 
may be expected to influence or contribute to the creation of shareholder value in 
growth- oriented indigenous Irish SMEs. In particular it investigates the role and 
contribution of public venture capital investments to the performance of selected 
Irish SMEs over the period 1999 -  2010.
Ireland, as a small open state, reaped the benefits of the sustained growth and 
expansion of world trade which began in 1994 and lasted until the world financial 
crisis in 2008. Interest rates were at an all time low and capital availability for 
investment projects was high due to the benefits of euro membership during this
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period. This created an ideal window for analysing the effects of public venture 
capital investment in indigenous growth-orientated firms through quasi- 
experimental research methods.
The descriptive analysis in this Chapter is based on the financial data of fifty one 
firms which received share injections of €635,000(IR£500,000) or more in one of the 
calendar years 1999 -  2005 from the State through its economic development 
agency for indigenous industry - Enterprise Ireland. Eight years financial data was 
gathered on each firm and post-pre state investment performance measures were 
developed as dependent variables. This indicated whether the firm had increased or 
decreased shareholder value in the period after the state capital injection. On this 
'going concern' measure, forty firms had decreased shareholder value and eleven 
had increased shareholder value. The aggregate ROIC post -  pre state investment 
return across all firms in the study was minus 11.86 per cent.
Logistic regression models were developed to test the association between firm 
performance (ROIC, Profitability growth, shareholder value growth and PVC payback 
ability) and public venture capital investment (with geo demographic control 
variables). Three models (ROIC, Profitability growth and PVC Payback) were shown 
not to be statistically significant. One model (Shareholder Value) was statistically 
significant indicating a relationship between the independent variables included in 
the model and the firms' performance as measured in this study. The overall model 
chi-square statistic showed a p-value of 0.031<0.05. The model also had a pseudo R2 
of between 33% and 45.4% percent. The only statistically significant predictor 
variable related to shareholder value creation was its initial age at the time of the
states investment (p-value = 0.043< 0.05). This result occurs in two ways -  either the 
firm has survived and has sufficient reserves or new capital injections from other 
shareholders to begin repaying the state capital injection or it has been acquired by 
another firm (usually US).
The individual predictor variables of: public venture capital value (the primary 
variable of interest in this study) and the control variables of Ownership, Location, 
Sector and Age - were not found to be statistically significant as individual predictor 
variables. Backward Stepwise procedures were used to test for possible variable 
exclusion and to confirm the findings of the developed model. A reduced model, p- 
value=0.018<0.05 eliminated the independent variables of Sector and Ownership 
whilst retaining Location, Age, Size and INVvalue. Investment value having a marginal 
effect at best on firm performance.
Sixty seven per cent of firms in the study are from the ICT/Biotech/Pharma sectors, 
reflecting the policy bias towards the technology-driven sectors in the national 
Innovation system. Of the forty firms decreasing shareholder value in the study, 
eighty per cent were from technology sectors indicating not only the emphasis on 
technology firms but also the higher 'risk profile' and younger age of the technology- 
driven business model.
The dominant presence of El (on behalf of the State) in the risk capital provision 
market (Supply side) creates inefficiency in the market's operation within a small 
state. This illustrates a tendency in a small state towards oligopoly or monopoly in 
sectoral markets - owing to the small domestic market size. It is suggested that the 
role of the state in future might be to 'seed' or 'correct market failure (where
indicated by empirical research) -  but then to step back and let private sector 
competition drive the market development. Thus the findings in this chapter suggest 
that the venture funding of the international development of indigenous SME's - as 
an im portant part of the 'wider setting' of the national innovation system - might be 
more effectively provided through the financial market system and not directly by 
the state.
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Chapter 6 
The influences on indigenous firm performance in the small late 
developing state -  a cross-case analysis
The cross-case analysis in this chapter complements the quantitative approach 
undertaken in chapter five. It also acts as a precursor for the cross-case analyses in 
Chapter seven and the Contribution analysis in Chapter eight. The objective of this 
chapter is to identify the factors, other than public venture capital, which 
differentiates between those firms creating shareholder value and those decreasing 
it during the analysis period. Using a smaller, representative number of cases drawn 
from the overall cohort in the study allows for in-depth analysis of the factors 
influencing indigenous firm performance.
6.1 The framework for the analysis: Cross -  Case analysis
Researchers go about the process of selecting case study designs in a myriad of ways, 
however the design must in the first instance be driven by the research question and 
research objectives of the study in question (Burton, 2000). The relevant objective 
here is the second objective in the study which seeks to identify the influences on 
and the determinants of shareholder value creation in indigenous growth-oriented  
firms.
Ten in-depth interviews were conducted with the CEO or ex-CEO/founder of the 
firms under study. These firms were chosen by 'theoretical sampling methods' for 
their representativeness of the overall cohort of firms in the study (Pettigrew, 1988; 
Eisennhardt, 1989). Whilst there is no ideal number of cases, Eisenhardt (1989) 
recommends between four and ten noting that: 'With more than ten cases for cross 
-  case analysis, it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and volume
of the data' (P. 545). Thus this study utilizes the maximum number of recommended 
cases. The cases selected for interview broadly mirrors the breakdown of the sectors 
featured in the overall study (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 - Firm sector breakdown and case selection
Industrial Sector No. of Firms in % of firms in 






Consumer products -  
;/ceramic/carpet manufacturing 3
6 1 10
Food and natural resources -  Agri­
foods/consumer foods/natural resources
7 14 1 10
Cleantech, medical devices and industrial 
products manufacture
12 23 2 20
i
Software, ICT and internationally traded 
services




Yin (2009:156) terms the approach adopted in this study as 'Cross Case syntheses'. 
The individual cases in this study are analysed using a uniform framework, which was 
developed by Smallbone & Wyer (2006, 2012). This framework is based on the 
pioneering work of Storey (1994). The topic list developed for the embedded depth 
interviews in the individual case studies is outlined in Table 4.4 in Chapter 4. These 
are the variable groups, broadly agreed upon in the literature, as determining and 
influencing firm growth performance. See Chapter 2 - literature review, in particular: 
Kinsella et al. (1994); Barkham et al. (1996); Smallbone & Wyer (2006, 2012); Dobbs 
& Hamilton (2006); Davidsson et al.(2006); Coad (2007, 2009); Davidsson et al.
(2009); Steffens eta l. (2009); Richard et al., (2009); Brannbach eta l., 2010; Storey & 
Greene (2010).
Firm growth performance - as the dependent variable - is defined in this study as the 
creation of shareholder value (Begley, 1995, Rappaport, 1998; Baldwin, 2002; Hill & 
Jones, 2009; Arnold, 2009, Doyle, 2010). Each case then has a rich set of 'uniformly' 
analysed data which can be cross analysed for patterns, themes, commonalities or 
contradictions. The case analysis will then provide insight into the most salient 
determinants of and influences on firm performance in the selected cases and this 
can be contrasted with the aggregate findings in Chapter five. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the approach adopted in this chapter to the analysis of the cases in this study.
Figure 6.1: Cross Case approach
Define and Design Prepare, Collect, and Analyze Analyze and Conclude
























(Source: Cosmos C orporation , 2009)
The structure in the chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 analyses the ten cases across 
the dependent variable — Firm Performance. Section 6.3 — 6.6 analyses the firms 
across each of the groups of possible explanatory variable groups — Characteristics of 
the entrepreneur, Characteristics of the firm, Management strategies and External 
environmental variables.
The ten cases in this study will be coded by broad industry sector to preserve the 
anonymity of the interview respondents and the identity of the individual firms. 
Volume 2 of this dissertation -  the individual descriptive cases identifying the firms 
and the Key informants - is available to examiners only:
Table 6.2: Case coding
Case number Code Case number Code
1 ,cn
2 Biotechl 7 ICT3
3 Biotech 2 8 ICT4
4 Consumerl 9 ICT5
5 ICT 1 10 ICT6
6.2. Firm performance measurement
6.2.1 The shareholder value creators (3 firms)
Three firms in the cases analysed created shareholder value over the eight year 
period under consideration through profitable trading. One firm came from the agri­
food sector (Foodl), one from the 'modern' manufacturing sector (Biotechl) and 
one came from the ICT sector (ICT1).
Sections 6.4-6.6 will evaluate the possible determinants and influences on this 
growth and will differentiate between those firms creating shareholder value as 
defined in this study and those firms experiencing decreases in shareholder value.
The three cases act across the growth dimensions — ROIC, Profit growth, Shareholder 
funds and sales growth as exemplars of how business growth can be managed for 
the creation of long term value creation -  both customer and shareholder (Doyle, 
2010).
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Foodl
Figure 6.2: Case Firms adding shareholder value
Biotechl
ICT1
(Source:CRO; Firm accounts; Fame; Visionnet)
The growth trajectory of the three are not entirely smooth (Figure 6.2) but even in 
periods of downturn -  year seven in Biotechl and Foodl and year 6 in ICT1 these 
firms still managed to maintain or return to profitability and return to a growth 
trajectory. The performance of each firm, along a number of salient dimensions, is
set out in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Shareholder value creators over eight year pefiod.
Case Firm Age* ROIC Cumulative Cumulative







Foodl 12 10 77671 7923 11730
'§ I
68
w s a s i
Biotech 1 7  20 24350 4943 NA 25
ICT 1 6 8.7 71440 6250 25639 238
Notes to table: * Age is estimated at the start of the analysis period -  two years before the public venture capital investment -  
this gives a base line for both the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 and the cross-case analyses in Chapter 6 & 7.





The positive firm performance demonstrates the robustness of managements 
strategies for creating sustainable competitive advantage.Not only did the 
management team  demonstrate their ability to accumulate resources for their 
growth plans but the subsequent performance also illustrated their ability to 
leverage these resources to create distinctive competences and build dynamic 
capabilities in their firms - ultimately creating sustainable competitive advantage and 
superior levels of profitability (O'Gorman, 2001; Hill & Jones, 2009).
Sector
Sectoral diiferences are important (Tybejee, 1994) as well as market focus (De Burca 
et o i, 2005) -  the agri-food product is targeted at buoyant global consumer markets 
for the product category. Foodl also has a significant business-to-business 
relationship with a multinational corporation where its product is a key input into an 
iconic Irish product -  owned by the MNC and also available on global markets. The 
biotech firm, on the other hand, is strictly business-to-business. It therefore has 
lower marketing intensity when compared to business-to-consumer businesses 
(Carroll, 1985). Its products are supplied into the pharma and viniculture sectors and 
are used in the test and measurement areas of these businesses. ICT 1 is the only ICT 
firm in the cohort of cases to achieve early profitability and to arrive in the analysis 
period in profit. It did experience a severe downturn in its fortunes in year six (See: 
Figure 6.2: ICT1) but subsequently returned on its profitable growth trajectory by 
winning profitable business on international markets. The business has been 
managed for profitable growth from the beginning (Davidsson, et al. (2009); Steffens 
et al. (2009). This firm is the most successful of all the firms in the cohort in terms of 
employment growth with 238 employees. However in terms of the EU categorisation
of firms, it would still be classified as a medium-sized firm with employment of less 
than 250 people.
Innovation and internationalisation
Innovation, in all three firms, is best described as incrememtal rather than 
breakthrough or disruptive (M ohr et ai., 2010). In internationalisation terms all 
businesses have followed the 'incremental internationalisation'(or stages of 
development) models proposed by the Uppsala (U) and Winsconsin (I) schools (Ibeh, 
2012). This is the approach used to describe the internationalisation behaviour of 
more 'traditional'exporting firms -  usually manufacturing (as in two cases here). It is 
noticeable here also that none of these firms has (or ever had) a significant domestic 
business and the growth strategy has always been internationally focused. The 
internationalisation process is therefore an accelerated form of incremental 
internationalisation.
6.2.2 Shareholder value decreasing cohort (7 Firms)
Figure 6.3 illustrares the growth trajectories of those firms who decreased 
shareholder value over the period under analysis. The factors behind this 
performance will be explored in sections 6.3-6.6 however it is appropriate, at this 
point, to consider contrasts in the performance here and performance with the three 
firms increasing shareholder value -  figure 6.2. The seven firms profiled in Figure 6.2 
come from three broad sectors — Biotech (one firm), Consumer (one firm) and ICT 
(five firms).
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To allow for consistent time frame analysis, only the first eight years will be 
considered in each firm. However in cases ICT 1, 3, 5, 6 and Consumer 1 - subsequent 
years are included - to indicate the longer term trends in the key growth metrics 
(Figure 6.2 & 6.3).
Sectors
ICT 2-6 are all firms active on the international information and communications 
markets. ICT 2, 3, 5 and 6 are all involved in the software sector and ICT 4 is in the 
telecommunications hardware design business. O'Riain (2004:56/77) noting the 
preference that the software industry has been given in Irish industrial policy when 
compared to hardware due to its high employment, knowledge content and 
relatively low capital investment.
The profiles of the firms are as follows:
ICT 2 is a communications software firm founded by an immigrant entrepreneur after 
his success at co-founding and selling on of a previous venture in Ireland. This firm 
was successful in raising two significant tranches of VC funding - year three and year 
six (Figure6.3: ICT2) but the firm never reached profitability and at year eight the firm  
had a ROIC of minus 33 per cent. It was subsequently acquired for an undisclosed 









































ICT 3 is another software house, but of a much older vintage than the other software 
firms and was twelve years of age when it entered the analysis period. The firm was 
founded in 1985 by a UK national and was taken public in 2000 by the founder. It is 
one of only tw o PLC's in the case analysis. The firm thus raised significant funds on 
the stock market and proceeded to invest heavily in R&D and expanding rapidly in 
international markets. This resulted in immediate shareholder value destruction, 
catastrophic losses and the eventual departure of the founding entrepreneur by year 
five of the analysis period (Figure 6.3: ICT3). By the end of year eight the firm had a 
ROIC of minus 44 per cent and was employing 203 staff worldwide.
ICT4 is a telecoms hardware design firm which spun out of one of Ireland's leading 
universities. Figure 6.3:ICT4 shows the trajectory of the firm over the eight years of 
the analysis. Table 6.6 shows the key performance metrics of the firm -  despite 
raising three tranches of venture funding the firm has managed to decrease 
shareholder funds to €233,000 on the balance sheet whilst accumulating losses of 
€16,250,000 after eight years in existence. In the eleventh year of its existence it was 
acquired by an Asian investment group within its industry for an undisclosed sum.
ICT5 is yet another software house that was just 4 years old entering the analysis 
period. The entrepreneur behind the business already had a successful consulting 
business and he used the funds from this, as well as raising outside funding, to seed 
development of a software 'product' (Figure 6.3:ICT5). With a high cash burn , 
significant accumulated losses and slower than expected sales, the founding 
entrepreneur eventually stepped down as
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CEO, only to be re-instated by the board a year later with the brief to find a suitable 
buyer for the firm. This was accomplished in year four and the firm was acquired by a 
US corporation from within the same sector (for an undisclosed sum). This US firm  
was subsequently acquired by another US corporation from within the sector. At its 
zenith in year two of its existence the firm employed 33. By year eight of the analysis 
period it employed twelve and had an accumulated return on invested capital of 
minus 184 per cent. Turnover peaked in year two at €1,159,261.
ICT6 is regarded as one of the great success stories of the Irish software industry. The 
firm was formed by two researchers from a leading Irish university -  the technology 
was based on the researchers work within the university -  which had originally been 
funded by EU research funds (Breznitz, 2007). The firm was ultimately sold in year 
seven of the analysis period for €110m to a major global player in the wider ICT 
industry. This is a multiple of over ten times turnover at the time and constitutes a 
healthy valuation. It employed fifty five by year eight. The two original founders had 
exited the business by year five and had no part in the subsequent sale. The graph in 
Figure 6.3:ICT6 shows the progress of the firm from a typical loss making start-up in 
years one to three to profitability from year four of the analysis period. The 
shareholder fund trajectory must be interpreted cautiously as the 'apparent' loss in 
shareholder value from year five to year seven in Figure 6.3:1 CT6 is due to a change 
in accounting regulations and does not reflect the true value. All outstanding shares 
were acquired by the purchaser during year seven.
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6.2.3 Cross case growth performance in context
Given the acknowledged idiosyncratic nature of the growth process in the firm  
growth literature (Smallbone e to i ,  1995; Dobbs & Hamilton, 2006; Coad, 2009; 
Storey & Greene, 2010) -  this observation holding irrespective of the growth 
measure applied (Absolute, relative, Log). It is not surprising then that there appears 
to be little pattern to the performance trajectories of the cases firms. Dobbs and 
Hamilton (2006) noting from their literature review, that it is 'Idiosyncratic 
configurations of context specific variables that determine the growth prospects of 
small firms'. Storey & Greene (2010) adding the un-quantified but critically important 
influence of luck/chance/serendipity. However it is important to investigate - as in 
Chapter five - the potential determinants of and the influences on the shareholder 
value. One outcome of this analysis is that, in all cases, the management teams were 
successful in raising external finance (including state finance) to help fund their 
ventures (Brush et a i ,  2009). This then must to be followed up with robust 
product/m arket strategies to create and capture value for the firm (Smallbone et a i, 
1995; Brannback eta !., 2010). O'Gorman (2001; 2006; 2012) highlighting that 
subsequent profitability performance provides a measure of 'management's 
competence' in value capture through the creation of competitive advantage. If the 
firm does not gain (sales) traction in the marketplace as in the cases; Biotech 2, ICT 2, 
3, 4 and 5 - then the venture cannot generate adequate returns and thus generate 
internal finance to fund growth. External funding is therefore required to continue to 
fund the growth strategy — increasing external shareholder influence and power over 
the direction of the growth strategy. Figure 6.3 shows clearly the external funding 
spikes' in shareholder funds in cases; ICT2, ICT4 and ICT5.
Over tim e then the firm should ideally be moving towards 'self sustainability' -  from  
a funding viewpoint. As turnover increases (Value creation), net profits after tax can 
increase, the firm becomes EBIDTA positive (Cash flow positive) and ultimately 
sustainably profitable (Drucker, 1985). To create shareholder value from this 
scenario, these profits must be re-invested and not disbursed.
Those firms experiencing persistent losses (See: Table 6.3-Biotech 2, ICT2, ICT3, ICT4 
and ICT5) are thus dependent for their survival on the forbearance of their external 
investors - who are required to continue funding the venture in the hope or 
expectation of a future profitable trade sale. A trade sale is the most likely exit 
strategy as the value propositions of all of the case firms above can be described as 
niche. Given the scale of the ventures, the levels of finance raised and the economic 
size of the home market, this is to be expected (Armstrong & Read, 2003).
Smallbone et al. (1995:59) note in particular, in their study of high growth firms, that:
While it is the case that to survive over ten years all firms needed to pay some 
attention to products and markets, the best performing companies were those which 
were the most [Pro -  added by author] active in developing new products and 
services for existing customers, developing new markets, broadening their customer 
base, taking steps to make their products more competitive and in managing their 
product portfolio (P.59)
Storey et al's. (1987) findings are consistent with the above findings and so those 
determinants of and influences on firm shareholder value creation will be analysed in 
sections 6.3-6.6 of this chapter.
As noted earlier, the management teams in all cases were successful in raising 
resources from outside investors for their growth strategies — three case firms 
created shareholder value over the eight year time period under analysis (Foodl,
ICT1 & Biotechl), one case firm did so after the eight year analysis period (ICT6) and 
six firms decreased shareholder value in the analysis period with the financial metrics 
continuing to  trend downward after the period -  see Figure 6.3 (Cases: 1012,3,4,5 
Consumer 1 & Biotech 2). It is now appropriate to look at the background variables of 
the characteristics of the entrepreneurial/management team (Section 6.3), the 
characteristics of the firm - once founded (Section 6.4) and the characteristics of the 
external environment (Section 6.6), mediated through the strategies adopted by the 
leadership teams (Section 6.5) (Storey, 1994; Smallbone & Wyer, 2006). The growth 
inhibitors or barriers to growth (Arnold et a!., 2004; Forfas, 2004; Bessant et al.,
2005; Forfas, 2005) as perceived by the 'key informant' (Marshall, 1996) in each case 
will be investigated in Chapter seven. By differentiating 'shareholder value creators' 
from those 'decreasing value' along the above dimensions, it is possible to highlight 
the key differentiators of value creation in this cohort of firms -  both for customer 
value creation and shareholder value creation (Doyle, 2010).
6.3. Characteristics of the Entrepreneur(s)
In small firms, growing or otherwise, the fortunes of the firm are intimately
interlinked with the characteristics of the founding entrepreneur(s) (Delmar, 2006).
Prior experience and embedded knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) in the founder
and key staff (Coff, 2002) are therefore important factors when analyzing firm
growth performance. Polanyi (1966) observes that firm KSAs can also be tacit as well
as codified in nature and are therefore difficult to articulate and evaluate (Polanyi,
1966). Evaluating the contribution of human capital to firm performance becomes
even more complex when the entrepreneurs and management teams ability to
absorb new knowledge is factored in (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In small states, this
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intimate relationship between the entrepreneur and the firm takes on even greater 
significance given the small states dependence on indigenous firms for export growth 
performance.
This section therefore profiles the entrepreneur(s) behind the case firms along a 
number of recognized human capital indicators to see if the profiles differ across the 
key entrepreneurial dimensions. The analysis will attempt to differentiate between  
those firms creating shareholder value and those who decreased value over the 
analysis period. Table 6.5 therefore highlights the human capital indicators which 
the literature suggests influence entrepreneurial performance. Unger eta l. (2011) 
finding that knowledge/skills and task-related human indicators as more important 
than general human capital indicators and thus should be the focus of researchers 
attention in the future.
Table 6.5: Human capital and entrepreneurial performance______________________
Human Capital investment Outcome of Human Capital
(Education & Experience) investment (Knowledge,
Skills & Abilities)
Low task relatedness General education General education qualifications
General work experience Low task related knowledge and
Family background (Parental skills
education) KSAs in recreational pursuits
_________  Recreational pursuits ________________________________________
Note to table: Current knowledge (the outcome of human capital investment) is more directly related to entrepreneurial 
performance than measures o f pure past experience (Davidsson, 2004). Unless the learnings from past experience (Acquisition 
and transfer of knowledge) results in superior performance (related to the task at hand) then knowledge may be redundant or 
need to be unlearned. Future research should address the learning processes at play in entrepreneurial learning, their 
evaluation and improvement. 'A firm's willingness, effort and capability to learn fast and continuously are likely to be a key to 
sustained competitive advantage' (Unger et at., 2011: 353). (Source: Unger et al., 2011; Crook et ai, 2011, Wright et al., 2012 - 
adapted by author).
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Table 6.6 provides a comparative analysis of the case firms across the key dimensions 
of the characteristics of the entrepreneur, as identified by Storey (1994), Smallbone 
& Wyer (2006, 2012) and Storey & Greene (2010). (See: Table 2.1 - Chapter 2). These 
characteristics are subdivided firstly into the KSAs of the entrepreneurs; i.e. the 
outcome of human capital investments for business growth and, secondly, by human 
capital investment to identify the entrepreneurial factors which help differentiate 
between the performing and non-performing firms.
6.3.1 Entrepreneurial factors differentiating between performing and non­
performing firms
The factors outlined in Table 6.5 can be utilised to compare and contrast those 
characteristics of the entrepreneur that might distinguish between those creating 
shareholder value over the analysis period and those that did not. A major problem 
in entrepreneurial research is trying to link entrepreneurial behavior to business 
performance (Delmar, 2006; Delmar & Witte, 2012). Trait approaches (distal 
factors)(Kets de Vries,1977; Chell et al, 1991; Ennew & Binks, 1998) are not 
sophisticated enough to explain the complexity of entrepreneurial behavior and thus 
cognitive approaches (proximal) in the form of cognitive motivation models have 
become de rigueur (Delmar, 2006). Research has thus moved from studying the 
personality of the entrepreneur to studying the situations which might lead to 
entrepreneurship — as theorized, for example, by (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; 
Shane, 2003; Casson, 2003; Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) in their individual/opportunity 
nexus frameworks. However little research has been conducted on cognitive models
based on cognitive theory (Delmar, 2006) - much work therefore remains to be done 
and so any differences highlighted in this study must remain tentative.
Storey's emphasis on personal characteristics which influence access to resources 
helps in differentiating performance. Thus the growth opportunity as perceived by 
the entrepreneur(s) -  contextualized by their particular situation may help in 
distinguishing between creators and decreasers of shareholder value in this study. 
Smallbone et al. (1995) adding that growth orientation perse does not lead to 
growth performance -  it's the commitment of the entrepreneur(s) to expand the 
firm that is important. All of the firms in this study have a growth orientation - having 
raised outside capital (and diluted ownership) to help fund growth (Enterprise 
Ireland annual reports 1999-2005) but not all can be regarded as having achieved 
success as defined in this study. Shane (2003) dissects the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur relevant to uncertain growth opportunity exploitation into two broad 
factor groups of: psychological and non-psychological. Psychological factors are: 
Motivation, core evaluation and cognition ability and non-Psychological are: 
Education, career experience, Age, Social position and opportunity cost. These 
factors and other potentially relevant factors like portfolio entrepreneurship (Scott & 
Rossa, 1997) are analysed in Table 6.6.
6.3.2 Motivation of Entrepreneur for growth
The motivation of the entrepreneur is regarded in the literature as a potentially 
important antecedent of growth behavior (Shane, 2003; Storey & Greene, 2010). The 
'pull' of market opportunity is regarded as having a superior outcome to 
entrepreneurship derived from 'push' factors such as unemployment (Shane, 2008:
123). The case studies analysed here all came to seek external funding for their 
growth strategy for 'pull' reasons. It therefore does not, of itself, help to distinguish 
between those who increased shareholder value and those who did not. It does 
highlight however the apparent disconnect between the desire for growth - all case 
firms display growth intentions by successfully raising funding for non-balance sheet 
assets (R&D -  market & marketing assets, human capital) - and the actuality of 
achieving the desired growth (Smallbone et a i, 1995). Management strategy in the 
small firm is therefore of 'prime interest' in this respect (Storey, 1994; 
O'Gorman,2006, 2012).This will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.5 of this 
study on management strategies in terms of 'management's competence' in 
conceiving and executing the Product/market strategy for competitive advantage 
(O'Gorman, 2001; Merson, 2011).
6.3.3 Leadership style
Entrepreneurial leadership style is closely related to the approach taken by the 
entrepreneur. Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1973) identify a number of leadership 
styles classified on a continuum from production-orientation to people-orientation -  
styles along the continuum are classified as autocratic, persuasive, 
consultative/participative and democratic. Kirby (2006) notes that it is generally 
accepted that the most effective leaders are 'open, candid and employee-centered' -  
however the style adopted depended on a number of situational factors. The key 
informant's (Marshal, 1996; Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2011) in each case were asked 
about their leadership style and Table 6.6 - Section 8 summarises the response of the 
Kl's and classifies it along the continuum described here. The entrepreneurial leaders 
in Foodl and Biotechl and ICT1 -  as the clear value creators -  were all strong,
forceful personalities with clear visions for their businesses. In that sense their 
leadership styles appeared to be quite directive and therefore tended towards the 
production end of the continuum and is best classified as persuasive. Given the 
strength of the personalities and their influence on the strategic direction of the 
business it would seem that succession planning may well have a significant bearing 
on the future growth trajectories of these businesses.
The other cases exhibited varying degrees of classification along the continuum but 
most tended towards the mean of the scale with the technology driven firms 
exhibiting more 'employee centeredness' due to the fact that, in the main, the staff 
were highly educated and embedded with the tacit and systemitised knowledge of 
the firm.
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6.3.3 Financial bootstrapping experience
Finally a factor which was found to differentiate between performing and non­
performing firms was the entrepreneurs7 previous experience at successfully 
bootstrapping this and/or a previous business (See: Table 6.6 -  Section 14). This 
experience allowed the entrepreneur to develop a 'profitable growth imperative' and 
to value the necessity of internal funding if they wished to retain control of strategic 
direction of their business. External funding could then be taken on at a time of their 
choosing. This occurred when their customer value proposition had been crystalised 
and they had established a competitive advantage in their respective niche markets. 
The entrepreneurial process for the performing firms -  as evidenced by 
bootstrapping -  is guided by 'effectuation logic' (Sarasvathy, 2012). This is where the 
entrepreneur grows the business in a controlled, emergent way based on their 
affordable loss rather than pursuing a deliberate 'grand vision'. This contrasts with 
the non-performing firms -  mostly from the ICT sector who took on external funding 
(based on their grand vision) but before they were 'investor ready' or had their 
customer value proposition defined. When the businesses did not perform as 
expected, the external shareholders moved against the founding entrepreneur(s) 
resulting in the founding entrepreneur(s) parting company with the firm -  this 
happened in ICT2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
6.3.4 Entrepreneurship type -  portfolio, serial or novice?
Finally, Table 6.6 shows that only one entrepreneur was a portfolio entrepreneur and 
his firm was a performing firm in the study. The other two performing firms were run 
by serial entrepreneurs, both on their second ventures. Clearly, all three had learned
how to run a profitable business from prior commercial experience. The literature 
suggests that the performance outcomes are generally superior for portfolio 
entrepreneurs than they are for novice entrepreneurs (Wright et al., 2012). Whilst 
this may hold for portfolio entrepreneurs, the evidence so far in relation to the 
performance of other habitual entrepreneurial types, such as serial entrepreneurship 
over a novice, is less convincing (Ucbasaran e ta i ,  2006).
In the non-performing cohort, three of the firms had novice entrepreneurs and four 
had serial entrepreneurs leading the firms. Consumerl and ICT4 had novice 
entrepreneurs who had significant prior board level management experience, whilst 
ICT6's leadership team had no prior commercial experience at all. ICT2, ICT3, ICT5 
and Biotech2 were all run by serial entrepreneurs. However, the entrepreneur in 
ICT5 was the only one with previous experience at running a profitable business 
(High task relatedness/Outcome of human capital investment). The leaders in ICT2, 
ICT3 and Biotech2 all had prior experience in running NTBFs and therefore focused 
on raising outside capital and scaling up (High task relatedness/Capital investment). 
The entrepreneur in ICT5 commenting in hindsight on his performance in leading the 
firm.
 profitability did not come into i t  I should have known and what I did was a
matter of fascination for me coming out of a company that had to make a profit every
year Having built one The value [in the new business] was based on some
speculative model which has never been given a mathematical formula... (P.15)
Thus the findings here are consistent with the literature in confirming that differing 
types of entrepreneurship — habitual (portfolio and serial) or novice can result in 
differing performance outcomes for the firm. This depends to a small, but significant,
degree on how related the prior experience and KSAs of the entrepreneur is to the 
task of growing a profitable business.
6.3.5 In conclusion
Smallbone & Wyer (2006) note that whilst the characteristics of the entrepreneur
profiled above have an influence on business performance, the magnitude of the
effect from any or all of these factors is debatable. They state:
However whilst most of these factors [See: Table 6 .6 -  author added] can be shown to 
contribute to small business growth in one or more empirical studies, none appears to 
make a dominant contribution. Indeed the search for the identikit picture of the 
successful entrepreneur has not proved fruitful and, whilst undoubtedly relevant, the 
characteristics and previous experience of the founder appear to have only a modest 
effect on the success of the business in terms of its growth performance, (p. 105/106).
Storey & Greene (2010: p.265) having reviewed the extensive literature in the area 
also agree that with the exception of education, age, gender and employment status 
of the owner (See: Table 6.5) -  however none of these factors differentiate between 
the performers and non-performers in this cohort (See: Table 6.6). The links between 
pre-start up factors and small business performance are difficult to identify with 
even these four factors providing only a modest insight into performance. Thus this 
study found that the differentiating factors between the leaders of the shareholder 
value creators and shareholder value decreasing firms related primarily to the 
motivation for growth and the leadership skills of the founding entrepreneurs. These 
factors combined with their previous bootstrapping experience allowed the 
entrepreneurs to conceive and deliver on a growth strategy for sustainable 
competitive advantage. These findings must not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with the findings in Section 6.4 — Characteristics of the firm, Section 6.5 — 
Management strategy and Section 6.6 -  The external environment.
6.4 Characteristics of the Firm
The characteristics of the entrepreneur discussed in section 6.3 acts as a backdrop to 
the formation of the firm. The characteristics of the firm are an important group of 
factors which become important once the firm is set-up by the entrepreneur(s). The 
firm is the key vehicle in the economy for transforming economic inputs into added 
value outputs and is thus the core unit of analysis in this study (Coase, 1937;
Penrose, 1959). Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) also remind us that it is firms which 
trade and not nations and so the firm remains the appropriate unit of analysis.
6.4.1 Firm age and firm size
Age and size are regarded as two important and related variables when analyzing 
firm characteristics. This study is primarily focused on the 'growth scaling' of 
indigenous firms and thus age and size of each case firm are significant demographic 
factors for consideration (Delmar et al., 2006).
Age
Younger firms are deemed to grow faster than older firms (Storey, 1994; Storey & 
Greene, 2010) -  if they grow at all -  but growth can be re-ignited in more mature 
firms therefore age per se is not an entirely reliable predictor of growth performance 
(Smallbone et al., 1995; Smallbone & Wyer, 2006, 2012; Mason & Brown, 2011; 
Brown & Mason, 2012). The mean age of the case firms profiled here is five years but 
the ages range from one to twelve years entering the analysis period. Shareholder 
value creators however have a mean age of 8.1 years whilst the value decreasing
firms mean age is 3.5 years. The value decreasing firms are younger NTBF's who 
mostly come from the ICT industries.
Size
Size is generally estimated in the firm growth literature in terms of employee 
numbers (Davidsson, 1994). In this study however, in line with its focus on economic 
value creation and capture, shareholder funds are a more appropriate measure of 
firm size (Hill & Jones, 2009; Doyle, 2010). Foodl, Biotechl, ICT1, 6, Consumerl, 
ICT2, 3, 4 all increased shareholder value (size) from year 1 to 8. Biotech 2 and ICT5 
both decreased shareholder value over the period. Whilst eight firms increased 
shareholder value it is important to recognize (See: Figure 6.3 and Table 6.7) that 
only Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1 increased shareholder value through profitable 
trading -  by not only creating customer value (through increasing sales) but also 
managing to capture value for the firm (through profitability and profit growth).
The other seven firms were dependent on external capital injections to increase the 
shareholder value as they did not create sufficient value through turnover/after-tax 
profits to capture value for the shareholders over the period. It is therefore 
important to explore the circumstances behind the growth/non-growth in each case 
and to identify possible themes or patterns in the firm characteristics data which 
might help differentiate between value creation and value destruction.
ICT3 is a case in point. This is a PLC which floated in 2000 and has cumulatively lost 
€180m over its life so far — yet taking a measure at the beginning and end of the 
analysis period does not reveal the true picture of the firm s trajectory or the 
associated influences on performance. Thus a business model (Zott et al., 2011) may
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be based on commercialising technology, which may not have a clear value 
proposition or where the proposition may not be adequately market tested or 
'm arket—ready' (Merson, 2011:41/42). Indeed where the proposition is under­
capitalised or badly executed it can result in value capture and realisation occurring 
ultimately not only outside the originating firm but also outside the state. Indeed five 
of the ten cases in the analysis were acquired by overseas corporations within the 
eight year analysis period (Table 6.8). ICT2 was acquired by a UK corporation, ICT 5 
and ICT6 were acquired by US Corporations, ICT 4 was acquired by an Asian 
corporation and Consumerl -  a joint venture between and Irish and European 
partner was bought out by the overseas partner.
The remaining firms are either 'closely held'(Biotechl, ICT1) by the entrepreneurs 
themselves (Audretsch & Link, 2012) or the entrepreneur is a major shareholder 
supported by other small (Unquoted PLC) or venture shareholders -  Foodl (Bought 
out after the analysis period) and Biotech2. The final firm is ICT3 which is a listed firm 
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Given the niche orientation, value creation performance and small domestic market, 
it is perhaps not surprising that so many of the cases — sixty per cent - were acquired 
by larger and better resourced international firms. Indeed, whilst the details of most 
acquisitions are not publicly disclosed it can be established through the case analyses 
and an examination of the growth performance of the individual firms (Figure 6.3) 
that ICT2,4,5 and Consumerl were distress sales. From publicly accessible 
information it appears that ICT 6 and Foodl realised significant value for 
shareholders -  both selling for premia of between 7-10 times shareholder book value 
(Details in case analysis in Volume 2). Thus value can be realized through 'profitable7 
growth overtim e or, as in ICT6, in one 'trade sale7 transaction. The founding 
entrepreneurs in ICT1 and B io te c h l-th e  two top performing independently-owned 
businesses (See: Table 6.8; Figure 6.4) both bought out external shareholders and 
now have strategic control of their businesses. The differing trajectories of the case 
firms and the respective outcomes of each demonstrates the dynamic nature of both 
firm and industry evolution — and the unpredictability of that evolution in an 
increasingly globalised world.
Employment change
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the employment performance of both cohorts of firms 
over the analysis period. It is noticeable that only one case firm (ICT1) moved beyond 
the EU definition of SME in terms of employment numbers (250 employees) and this 
took seventeen years to achieve.
Figure 6.4: Employment performance of Shareholder Value
Creators
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Figure 6.5: Employment performance of Shareholder Value
Destroyers
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Notes to Figures 6.4 and 6.5: Employment is a consequence of firm growth and shareholder value creation. Small firms in 
Ireland are not obliged by statute to provide employment numbers in their annual returns and thus the figures above were 
obtained from those firms reporting employment figures voluntarily or the figures were obtained through the interview process 
with key informants. Despite the sparse data available, a number of key observations can be made. Firstly the available figures 
mirror the growth trajectories observed in sales (where available), profits after tax and shareholder funds in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. 
The shareholder value creators -  growing profitably -  managed to also grow employment in a steady, unspectacular fashion. 
ICT1 is clearly the star performer by managing to create 292 jobs over 17 years from start-up. However it is neither a fast or 
high growth firm when viewed against the OECD definitions of both categories of firm -f 20 per cent growth per anum over 
three years. It has added jobs at 6 per cent per year on average since start-up. The other two value creating firms also creating 
jobs at comparable rates — Biotechl at 6 per cent on average over 16 years and Foodl at 4 per cent over 24 years since start-up. 
The value decreasing firms show more volatile employment creation patterns than the value creators. Again Consumer 1 s rapid 
decline between years 9 and 11 is a clear reflection of the downturn in construction in the Irish economy. Demand for this firms 
products are a derived demand from construction activity. The employment performance of the remainder of the firms reflects 
the growth-to-profit strategies employed by these firms. ICT2 is a case in point — it reached employment of 100 in five years but 
had accumulated losses of over €23m. ICT3 provides another example of how misleading employment can be as a performance 
measure when considered in isolation -  it employed 203 employees by year 20 of its existence but had accumulated losses of 
just over €167m at that point. ICT4 had accumulated losses of €16m yet employed just 18 after 10 years. The growth 
performance of these firms can be considered as 'bad growth' and it brings the sustainability of the jobs created into question 
as the firms are keep alive through the largesse of their shareholders -  public and private.
6.4.3 In Conclusion
Thus the characteristics of the firm which differentiated between shareholder value 
creators and shareholder value decreasing firms are twofold. Firstly in the value 
creators — the founder/entrepreneur remained in control of the firm and thus in 
control of firm strategy. Each entrepreneur had previous commercial experience and 
had financially bootstrapped this or other operations. The businesses were managed 
from the outset with a profitable growth imperative. The value decreasing firms on 
the other hand were in the main acquired by better funded overseas firms with value 
realisation occurring outside the state. Secondly both cohorts were distinguished by 
firm age. The value creators were on average older -  eight years and over whereas 
the value decreasers were younger at three and one half years when the public 
venture capital was received.
6.5. Management strategies (Value creation and value capture).
Small, growing firms face 'unknowable, unpredictable and open-ended change' 
(Stacey, 1990). Storey (1994) noting that:
' To some extent 'strategy' in this context can be considered as asking the question - 
given the characteristics of the entrepreneur(s) and the firm — what managerial 
actions, once the firm has started, are likely to be associated with more rapid rates of 
growth? (p. 124/125).
6.5.1 Product/market strategy
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 analyses the various dimensions of firm strategy highlighted in 
Storey's (1994) and Smallbone & Wyer's (2006:59) firm growth framework. The 
firm's strategy is its managements attempt at value identification, creation and
capture from its wider environment. At the core of management's corporate
strategy is its product/market strategy. Smallbone et al. (1995) re-iterating that their
study confirmed previous research in the area and noted that:
Whilst it is the case that to survive over ten years all firms needed to pay some 
attention to products and markets, the best performing companies were those which 
were the most active in developing new products and services for existing customers, 
developing new markets, broadening their customer base, taking steps to make their 
products more competitive and in managing their product portfolio (Smallbone et al., 
1995:59)
6.5.2 The value creators
Thus the value creators in this study Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1, although from 
different sectors - displayed similar characteristics along a number of 
product/market related dimensions (Table 6.8). Firstly their strategies were focused, 
differentiated strategies in that each clearly identified a niche for their market 
offerings internationally. They had clear customer value propositions (CVP) 
established. For Foodl and Biotechl the home market was never a priority and ICT1 
has a small amount of business in it. The growth ambition of the entrepreneurs from 
early in their firms' development was on developing international markets. The 
overall product/market strategy was focused on market development and product 
development (Ansoff, 1957). See also the note to Table 6.8.
These firms placed as much or more emphasis on market development then product 
development and in that sense they were market-focused. Foodl having active 
distributors and their own in-market staff in all key regional markets around the 
world, Biotechl noting that they were active in sixty markets worldwide with fifty per
cent of sales going through their website and sales were ninety nine per cent export. 
The key informant in ICT1 noted that 'What we are doing is we're targeting English 
speaking countries as our priority. The [United] States being [our] number one 
[priority]'.
This clear focus is common to each of the firm in the 'shareholder value creating' 
cohort. It is allied to a focus not just on the 'growth imperative' but more importantly 
on 'profitable growth' (Hill & Jones, 2009). This recognition and appreciation of the 
'Profit imperative' can be attributed to the previous commercial experience of the 
entrepreneurs in these three firms and the fact that each is the controlling 
shareholder in the respective entities.
Growth must be profitable to allow the entrepreneurs re-invest the profits in the 
business to fund future growth, gain credibility with potential funders and/or 
investors and build shareholder value. The dimensions of strategy highlighted in 
Table 6.8 from Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1 suggest that the firms (despite the fact that 
two of the three are from technology sectors) are conservatively managed. This has 
implications for the scale of the businesses with ICT1 having 238 staff, Foodl having 
68 and Biotechl having 25 at the end of the eight year analysis period. See also Table
6.5 and Figure 6.4. for further details. Firm growth has been managed (Merson, 
2011). One of the three key informants in this cohort noting however that:
'We have always had to have a profit -  we were always paying our own way we
don't sell cheap a good margin. I wouldn't be bothered doing it otherwise'
(Pg.15/17).
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All three leaders of the firms had previous experience of having to 'bootstrap' their 
operations and so each understood the necessity of managing the growth of the 
business (with the existing asset base) so that they did not end up 'overtading' in 
expansionary times or carrying excess overhead in downturns. In less buoyant 
situations they focused on 'rightsizing' the operation in a timely fashion to restore 
profitability as soon as possible (See: Figure 6.2). This approach to business growth 
suggests that the growth strategy is underpinned more by effectuation logic 
(Sarasvathy, 2012) than by deliberate grand visioning.
Another of the key informants noting -  after a severe downturn in growth and profits 
(The first recorded annual loss for the firm) that:
So for the years 0 4 /0 5 /0 6 /0 7  we started to achieve (sales) growth levels of 20-25%
which was much more manageable So we are always now looking at risk as well as
grow th And making sure the balance is right (Pg.17).
Hill & Jones (2009) illustrate the tradeoff between profitability and sales growth rates
-  the firm needing to try and maximize long-run shareholder returns by seeking the
right balance between firm revenue growth and profitability and profit growth
(Appendix 1 -  Chapter 2). Diminishing returns set in at high levels of growth as
growth becomes more difficult for management to manage and the Penrosian curve
kicks in (Penrose, 1959).
Growth opportunities were sought out internationally in the product/market space 
and the technology firms focused on marketing/selling directly to large corporates 
(ICT1) and through distributors/ own website (Biotechl).
The marketing intensity (Carroll, 1985) in these business models is relatively low 
(B2B) allowing the SME to develop close relationships with their channels and to 
focus their marketing spend in the most efficient way.
Foodl on the other hand is marketing intensive -  selling ultimately into retail, as the
key informant relates:
Production - we are fabulous, finance I have in order, we can't do any better than that 
- but marketing is killing us big time [italics added] absolutely and a lack of A & P, in 
other words getting it on the shelf is a huge problem and getting it off the shelf is my 
next problem - but how do you fix the first one?' (Foodl:22/23).
For SME's then in a smaller state, a differentiated focused strategy in a business-to- 
business market is appropriate as they will not have the internal resources to invest 
heavily in the marketing of products targeted at end consumers whilst also investing 
in R&D and human capital development. Ultimately successful growth depends on 
the firm leader and management team embracing the 'profitable growth imperative' 
and having a clear vision of what the major shareholder/manager's objectives are.
Bhide (1996) encouraging entrepreneurs to establish clearly what they want 
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In the situation where the major shareholder/manager has directional control of the 
business (with shareholder support) -  as in Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1 then the 
objective is the creation of shareholder value over the longer term. The major 
shareholder/manager wishing to create shareholder value and then realise it at some 
opportune time in the future or use it to fund further expansion and/or 
diversification. Section 10 of Table 6.8 indicates the exit strategy or other ambitions 
of the founding entrepreneurs. Biotechl's (18) key informant noting that:
This was meant to be a business that's going to continue after I am gone. So that's my 
idea'
The founder of ICT1 concludes:
W e missed that opportunity but we thought we'd IPO at the end of 2002, maybe 
2003 ..........
To go IPO you really need to be a business of €60-100 million in terms of scale. And 
we've seen companies in Ireland who IPO'd and who haven't done anything ... So it's 
something we'll keep in our minds probably to go down that route too because what 
I've done in the last 4 or 5 years is I've bought a lot of the shares back off the 
individuals (21)
And the Foodl founder explained his ambitions for starting the business in the first 
place:
I entered the business to see if I could enter the business. I certainly entered the 
business as proof of my strong belief that indigenous entrepreneurs are the way 
forward (22).
Whilst the ambitions of the 'Key informants' in the value creation firms differed in 
how they saw value ultimately realised - they were united in their pursuit of 
profitable growth - through focused, differentiated strategies in their respective
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global product/market spaces. Bhide (1996) confirming that 'successful [growth -  
italics added] strategies provide clear direction, generate sufficient profits and 
growth, serve the enterprise in the longterm and establish the right growth rate' 
[Cited in Merson, 2011:32).
6.5.4 The value decreasing firms
When this cohort is compared to the shareholder value adding firms it is noticeable 
that whilst these firms have similar product/market development strategies per the 
Ansoff (1957) growth matrix (See: Section 1: Table 6.7), they differ from the value 
adding cohort in the focus of these strategies. Whereas the value adding cohort and 
Consumerl were focused on profitable (managed) growth, these technology-based 
firms were focused on 'scaling up' as rapidly as possible with the objective of 
extracting shareholder value ultimately from a single temporal event -  a 'trade sale' 
or an IPO. The founding entrepreneurs demonstrating their growth ambitions and 
horizons by taking on angel and VC (and state investment -  see: Chapter eight for 
further detail) investors and diluting their shareholdings (and their influence over the 
direction of the firm) in the process (Mason, 2006). Barker (2002) however suggests 
that 'bootstrapping' the operation should ideally precede the introduction of 
sophisticated external shareholders as it clears away the clutter and forces the 
entrepreneur to prioritise and focus exclusively on developing the customer value 
proposition (CVP) and the customer base. The rigours of the 'bootstrapping' process 
forces the founder to prioritise selling and marketing to bring cash back into the 
business thus establishing the 'commercial imperative' which is a necessary pre­
cursor to the 'profitable growth' imperative and also gives the entrepreneur 
experience in managing the 'cash—to-cash' cycle (Christopher & Peck, 2003). It also
helps test the proof of concept' before 'scaling up' is attempted in earnest. Barker 
(2002) - cited in Merson (2011) - concludes:
.... a lot of entrepreneurs think they need money to build the business faster when
they actually haven't figured out the business equation yet (Pg. 35)
Thus the ICT and Biotech firms in this cohort were successful in the first requirement 
of trying to build competitive advantage - raising finance to help drive growth 
(O'Gorman, 2006). Figure 6.3 illustrates the spikes in shareholder funds in ICT2, 3, 4, 
5 and 6. Biotech2 showing a different trajectory (Increasing shareholder destruction 
from the start-up on the balance sheet). However the firm has a patent holding 
subsidiary also -  see the details of the Biotech case in Volume 2) and the two firms 
need to be analysed together to see the true situation. Table 6.8: Sections 4-8 shows 
the key aspects of the product/market growth strategies of this cohort of firms. 
These aspects are contrasted with the 'value creating' cohort to identify 
differentiating dimensions.
The dimensions considered are: Formal planning processes, Marketing research 
practice, Patent strategy, Human capital development and internationalisation 
strategy. However these strategy dimensions are best analysed in the context of 
subsequent performance of the implemented strategy. O'Gorman (2006) reminding 
us that the outcome of the strategies pursued reflect on managements competence 
and resource mobilisation abilities. The problem for these firms is not with the 
strategy development process per se. All firms from both cohorts claimed they had 
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product/technology protection and development which was within their control 
(See: Table 6. 10 - Sections 4, 6 and 7).
However the entrepreneurial leaders in the value decreasing ICT and Biotech firms 
do not seem to have been able to develop a clear differentiated, niche 
product/market strategy for creating sustainable competitive advantage for their 
technology [See for example: Table 6.9 -  Section 5 (ICT2), (ICT3), (ICT4); Section 8 
(ICT2); (Biotech2)].
If the firm's objective is the creation of long term shareholder value through 
profitable trading (as in Foodl, Biotechl, ICT1 and Consumerl) then the growth 
strategy must be an active market development strategy (Smallbone et al., 1995) -  
market-pulled rather than technology/product driven. This has implications for 
resource allocation as marketing and market resources must be deployed to develop 
those target markets -  particularly international markets - sometimes at the expense 
of R&D. If on the other hand the growth objective of the firm is clearly a Trade sale' 
or IPO in a short time horizon (3-5 years) then the strategic focus (as articulated in 
Section 3&9 in Table 6.10(b)) is not the creation of long term shareholder value 
through profitable trading but the creation of 'short-term' shareholder value through 
capital appreciation. This is a clear exit strategy. This approach has implications also 
for resource allocation as the drive is for 'scaling-up' the organisation to reach MES 
in readiness for sale. Typically resource allocation is biased in favour of R&D and 
Human Capital development (head count) and tends not to be driven by the 
'profitable growth imperative'. Indeed traction in the marketplace (given the time 
horizon) is achieved in a number of cases by acquisition (from angel or VC capital
raised) rather than 'active market development' or organic growth -  which would
take longer (See: Cases: ICQ, ICT3, ICT5, ICT6). However Davidsson eta l.,{2009);
Steffens et al., (2009) remind us that their empirical work in smaller states -  Sweden
& Australia demonstrates that firms who prioritise profitable development over scale
development derive better long term value outcomes for the founding entrepreneur.
Clues to the strategic thinking underpinning the strategies of the shareholder value
decreasing cohort -  which ultimately led to subsequent shareholder destruction (as
defined in this study) is evident from the comments of the key informants in Section
3: Table 6.8 highlighted here:
ICT6:1 think our (initial) focus on profitability was very im m ature '.... W e were looking 
at building a m arket and sales will come (Pg.15)
Biotech2: -  {The) focus was on developing the concept, commercial considerations 
came later 'build it and they will come' [because it is disruptive technological 
innovation] (Pg.16)
ICT2: W hen we started, I didn't really know what we were really going to do, and I 
often say this to people, that if you really want to start something, the best way is to 
start something and then figure out where you want to get to. In fact, we should have 
been more focused on profitability and we should have been doing far better, but we 
were very sales [scale] focused. That was -  that's a minus. (Pg.18)
ICT4: There was always a hope that the Company would reach a take-off point. Yeah, 
there was never an expectation that we would become a big profitable company. So
the idea was - we bring in a disruptive technology Then it would have made sense
to a lot of people that once we had that proven - that you would sell it to a big semi­
conductor company. (p .17).
From these quotes it is clear that profitability or profitable growth was not a priority 
for these firms. Even the founding entrepreneur in ICT5 - who had previously led a
successful business and had bootstrapped' this operation - seemed to have been
engulfed by the hubris of the times -the 'dot.com' era and the aggressive growth
ambitions of his external shareholders. He reflected ruefully:
... profitability did not come into it  I should have known and what I did {then) was
a matter of fascination for me because coming out of a company that had to make a
profit every year... having built one  The value {in this business) was based on some
speculative model which has never been given a mathematical formula... (p. 15).
6.5.5 Differentiating strategic factors -  Performing v non-performing firms
What seems then to differentiate the shareholder value creators then from the value 
decreasers in this study is the greater clarity in the product/market strategy's of the 
value creators - particularly the differentiated focus of the market-driven value 
propositions. The founding entrepreneurs of the value decreasers -  (ICQ, 4, 5 and 6) 
all came from technical or IT backgrounds and had little or no direct sales/marketing 
functional experience. Having raised funding from experienced external investors 
(See Figure 6.3) - and committed to aggressive growth targets -  despite the fact that 
they appeared not to have crystallised their value propositions nor deployed their 
marketing or market assets.These entrepreneurs found themselves under pressure 
as agreed revenue targets (under-pining the business growth plan) were missed and 
organisation growth needed to be funded from the externally raised capital. It is 
inevitable that when further follow-on funding rounds were required (due to the rate 
of 'cash burn' in the business and probably before it was initially planned) that the 
external shareholders would take the opportunity to force leadership change to try 
and boost or re-energise the firms revenue generation performance.
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The downward employment decreases seen in ICT2,3, 5 and6 (Figure 6.3) during the 
analysis period indicating the extent of the 'scaling' focus in the growth strategy and 
the extent to which the growth strategy deviated from plan — forcing the need for 
the employment correction.
These corrections were made in a number of cases before or in tandem with changes 
in leadership and strategy direction (See: Table 6.9(b) for further details). One of the 
value creating entrepreneurs noting:
 I really wasn't interested in taking any investors until I had some sense what the
company was worth. Taking early investment is not wise unless you really need the 
money (Pg. 11).
Thus the growth strategies for the ICT and Biotech firm were heavily influenced by 
the external shareholders requirements to get above the MES (however quantified) 
as soon as possible. Gompers & Lerner (2001) noting that venture funding is a high- 
risk game but that the risks for the investor are not mitigated at the level of the firm 
(as for the entrepreneur) but at the level of the portfolio -  this allows them to seek 
aggressive scale growth. VC's applying the 4:3:3 rule to spread their risk (Mohr et al., 
2009). These investors therefore have more aggressive growth targets and a shorter 
time horizon than individual entrepreneurs and thus the objectives of the funder and 
funded are not always congruent. When growth targets are not met it is almost 
inevitable that conflict will arise due to the divergent objectives of the entrepreneur 
and the investor (Merson, 2011). Indeed quotes from the key informants on the exit 
strategies of the firms in this cohort give real insight into (in hindsight) the uneasy
relationship between portfolio investors (VC's) and the founding entrepreneurs and
the divergent motivations and objectives of both parties.
ICT6: You re forced to think in those terms when you're dealing with VC's because it's 
always about what exit that you are aiming for.... Particularly in the early days....going 
public... seemed like an option .... And {now) the more likely exit is via some sort of 
trade sale (15)
ICT2:... but I think we should probably have focused a little more on the exit strategy 
because — and that was the learning, the naivety, because if we were taking the 
company public, then this cap structure wouldn't have mattered because it would
have flattened it anyway It only became an issue when an exit was possible
through an acquisition [trade sale], so really, upfront, if we thought that, yes, that is a 
possibility, then we would probably have spent more time worrying about how the 
capital structure might look like (21)
6.5.6 Funding the growth strategy
Mulcahy (2005) observing that in growth orientated NTBF's, fundraising and capital 
structure is a strategic management task that requires the same level of attention as 
growing revenues. Making a small technology firm 'investor ready' requires planning, 
foresight and experience. Unfortunately both the technology sector and the VC 
industry in Ireland are relatively young and the fundraising activities of the case firms 
ICT2,3,4,5, 6 (See: Figure 6.3) show that the combination of 'commercially 
unfocused' entrepreneurs and 'easy or premature' rather than 'smart' money 
provided by a domestic VC industry 'in its infancy' [ibid: 194) - subsidised by the state 
(Enterprise Ireland Seed and Growth fund report, 2010) - is not a robust strategy for 
growth. Cullinan, the Chairperson of the Irish Software Association, in the Foreword 
to Mulcahy (2005b) highlighted the barriers to growth and the requirements for 
successful commercialisation of NTBF's in Ireland when she concluded:
The combination of these factors [Challenges of being based in Ireland and having a 
young VC industry — author added] require world class, execution focused, 
entrepreneurial skills in order to build a successful technology company of scale in 
Ireland (Pg. xiii).
Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) substantiate the above observation when they note that 
successful internationally growing firms are rare in Europe. When the difficulties of 
trading from a smaller state on the periphery of Europe is factored in - then it is the 
truly exceptional or, at least, the serendipitous firm which are likely to grow 
profitably through internationalisation from the smaller state.
The next section 6.6 looks at the environmental influences on case firm growth. This 
is important to investigate as small firms must adapt to their environment as they do 
not have the scale or resources to influence their environment. Increasingly a 
growing firms environment is 'unknowable and unpredictable' with open-ended 
change (Stacey, 1990) and this market, technology and competitive uncertainty 
makes the environment particularly volatile for NTBF's.
6.6. Environmental influences
Smaller firms need to adapt to their environment (Welsh & White, 1984) due to their 
limited resource base and uncertain external environment. In smaller states this 
need is even more acute. NTBF's are cases in point - given the combinations of 
market, technological and competitive uncertainty that they face (Mohr et al., 2010). 
The marketing competence of the entrepreneur or the broader leadership team  
(Lybaert, 1998) can therefore be a key discriminator between survival and failure as 
marketing is the firm's strategy interface with its environment (Stokes, 2000, 2006).
6.6.1 Sector importance
Sectoral variations can be expected to play a role in the growth rates of individual 
firms given the varying competitive and market growth rates in each product/market 
sector and sub-sector. Although Storey & Greene (2010) maintain that the empirical 
evidence of the impact of sector membership on firm growth is, as yet, unclear. 
Smallbone et al. (1995:60) however noting that 'It is the sector which defines the 
factor and technology choices' but they caution that high growth can be achieved by 
firms with a variety of size, sector and age characteristics. In this study growth was 
achieved by firms in the Food, ICT and Biotech sectors. Conversely firms in the ICT, 
Biotech and Consumer sectors decreased shareholder value (Table 6.11). Henrekson 
& Johansson (2009) note that it cannot be assumed that high growth firms will 
necessarily emanate from technology-driven sectors given the dynamic and 
uncertain environment (See also: Mohr et al., 2010). Indeed these authors note that 
high growth firms are not overrepresented in technology sectors but appear to be in 
services. Bessant et al., (2005) also acknowledge that much work remains to be done 
in researching this area but that barriers to firm growth identified in their research 
are more of a 'commercial' than 'technological' nature and thus intervention 
programmes may be predicated on questionable premises. Thus Section one, Table 
6.10 shows that the broad sectoral breakdown that the firm belongs to does not 
distinguish between the shareholder value creators and decreasers in this cross case 
analysis per se.
6.6.2 Competition, M arket and Industry factors
Table 6.10 - Sections 2-6 highlights the specific competitive, market and industry 
situation faced by the each of the case firms. As discussed in Section 6.4 and 6.5 of 
this chapter the cohort of cases firms are, without exception categorized as SMEs per 
the EU categorization. Despite the growth of the shareholder value increasers, none 
of the cohort moved from the SME categorisation by the end of the eight year 
analysis period. The EU categorisation terminates at 250 employees, Balance sheet 
total of €43m or Turnover of €50m (Eurostat, 2012). The highest turnover reached by 
the case firms was by ICT1 at €25m in year eight of the analysis period. Whilst firm 
performance (Section 6.2 of this chapter) is influenced by internal factors, it is also 
influenced by external environmental factors such as the competitive, market and 
industry situations faced (Demand conditions-Table 6.10 (Porter, 1980,1985,1990; 
McGahan, 2004; Johnson & Scholes, 2004) and the supply side factors (Host country 
characteristics -  Table 6.11). In terms of the competitive situation facing the cohort 
of firms it can be seen that, as niche players, they all face varying levels of 
competitive intensity. However seven out of ten acknowledge that they face direct 
multinational (MNC) competition whether it is ICT, Biotech, Food or consumer 
sectors Foodl, Biotechl, ICT 1, (SVC) and ICT3, ICT4, Consumerl and Biotech2 - all 
shareholder value decreasers, indicating that the markets for each of the products 
has formed and is moving, at varying speeds (See: Volume 2 case analyses for details) 
towards maturity. The remaining three firms (ICT6, ICT2 and ICT5) state that their 
competitors are SMEs or larger regional competitors indicating the niche nature of 
the market opportunities.
O'Gorman (2001) notes that firm growth may also emanate from growth in the 
served market itself - the 'all boats rising' effect. The shareholder value creators all
experienced market growth in their targeted markets during the analysis period. The 
three value creators addressable markets all growing for different reasons. Foodl 
for example was due to changing consumer tastes in the US market and the 
attraction of a younger demographic, causing likely supply shortages within the 
industry in the short term. Foodl had invested in laying down stock for maturity and 
this looks like a wise decision, in hindsight — the Key Informant attributing this not to 
strategic foresight but serendipity (Hill & Jones, 2009:104; Storey & Greene, 2010). 
Biotechl's target markets were sectorally diversified but were all in manufacturing 
industries supplying into the global food & drinks markets. The trend is for increasing 
requirements of higher quality food particularly in the developing world -  higher 
quality proteins in particular (Bord Bia, 2012) and demand for the firms test 
equipment is rising on the back of this trend. ICT1 supplies into the global financial 
services industry which is moving increasingly towards an outsource model for IT 
software development. The firm is poised to benefit from this trend and it now has a 
global footprint to take advantage of diverse geographic opportunities.
Thus the market growth opportunities arose in differing ways for the case firms but 
each firm still needs to choose where and how to compete and then implement an 
appropriate strategy to capitalize on the identified opportunities (O'Gorman, 2001).
Table 6.10: Sections 1-6 outline the competitive, market and industry conditions 
faced by each case firm. It is noticeable that the US market is seen as the major 
priority target market of all the shareholder value creators (Foodl, Biotechl & ICT1). 
In the shareholder value decreasing firms, the US market is the primary focus of two 
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with various markets in Europe the focus of ICT5 and Consumer 1. Sixty percent of 
ICT2 s business was in the Rest of the World — but primarily in Asia with forty percent 
in US -  mainly through their acquisition of a US firm (Table 6.10).
6.7. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter investigates growth-orientated firm performance in the ten case firms in 
this study. The performance measure is shareholder value creation - after an eight 
year analysis period. Firms' with a positive return on invested capital (ROIC) after 
that period -  achieved through profitable trading growth - were grouped in the value 
creating cohort. Three firms in the study (Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1 -  See: Figure 6.2 
& Table 6.5) qualified for inclusion in this group. The remaining seven cases all 
decreased - to varying degrees - shareholder value over the eight year analysis period 
through unprofitable trading -  any shareholder growth was due to capital injections 
only. These were (ICT2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Biotech2 and Consumerl -  See: Figure 6.3 & Table 
6.4) and they were grouped into the Shareholder Value decreasing cohort.
This chapter then analyses the possible determinants of and influences on firm 
shareholder value creation/destruction in these case firms (See: Volume 2 of this 
study for individual case firm profiles) utilizing a framework developed by Storey 
(1994) and Smallbone & Wyer (2006, 2012). It highlights those factors which 
differentiate, to some degree, between the shareholder value creators and the 
Shareholder value decreasing firms. Table 6.12 summarises the variables considered 
and highlights those which differentiate between the shareholder value adding firms 
and those who have decreased value. The cross-case analysis thus differentiates 
between the value creating/decreasing firms along a number of dimensions
highlighted in Table 6 .12 . Shareholder value creators w ere  those case firm s w ho  
re turned  a p ro fit on shareholder investm ent by the  end o f th e  eight year analysis 
period th ro ugh  profitable  trad ing  (Table 6.5; Figure 6 .2).
Table 6.12: Summary of differentiating factors -  Shareholder Value Creation
and Value Decreases
VARIABLE Characteristics Characteristics Management Environmental
GROUPS of Entrepreneur of firm strategies influences
Chapter Sections 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Influencing First business, Age, legal form, Strategy for Sector, Industry
variables Gender, Age, Size, Location. growth, sales or evolution,
considered Nationality, profitability focus, Competitive
Motivation, Table: 6.7 Formal planning, situation, Input
Previous business Market research, costs, Geographic
experience, Innovation policy, markets served,
Portfolio, Family Patents held, Domestic market
history, outside Human capital importance,
advisors, development Market or
Business policy, customer
networking, Internationalisation dependence, E-
Education, strategy, Exit business usage,
Number of strategy - Home location,
founders, IPO/Trade sale Table: 6.10, 6.11







Differentiating Growth Legal form (at Growth Strategy: Market growth -
variables motivation & end of analysis differentiated but Shareholder
Leadership style period): focus (Niche)- value Creators
(Linked to independent v Profitable growth proactively
Strategy) Acquired by imperative seized
other firm (Creators) v Scale opportunity to
Financial (Decreasers) create value
Bootstrapping Firm Age: (8.1 through market-











Notes: *ICT 6 had accumulated loses of €4.95m over the 8 year analysis period but was sold in year 7 for €110m to the 
investment fund of a Global corporation for a value of over 10 times turnover in year seven of the analysis period. It had 
destroyed original shareholder value to that point but realised significant value to them by the trade sale.
This profit arose as a consequence of the firms7 successful product/market strategies 
which were differentiated, niche strategies. They combine market development and 
product development strategies - per Ansoff s matrix (1957). These firms also 
executed on their strategy with a 'profitable growth7 or 'commercial7 imperative -  
the entrepreneurs having had previous commercial experience and all having 
'bootstrapped7 previous ventures. Each of the firms had management control of the 
strategy as two were privately owned and one was a non-quoted PLC. Although from 
different sectors, the Shareholder value creating firms operated in markets which 
experienced growth for differing reasons over the analysis period. Thus it was a 
combination of internal factors (Strategic Choice -  where and how to compete) and 
external market and sectoral factors that influenced the firms growth performance.
Shareholder value decreasing case firms on the other hand came primarily from the 
ICT (5), Biotech (1) and Consumer (1) sectors and were younger on average than the 
value decreasing firms above (8.1 years v 3.5 years). The consumer products firm 
decreased shareholder value primarily due to the severe downturn in the 
construction sector. The remaining firms were from technology-driven sectors with 
each receiving early stage external funding. A common feature of these firms is that 
the external funding raised by them appears to have been prematurely taken on 
board - it was provided and accepted before the customer value proposition had 
been fully developed. Thus control of strategy direction was 'ceded7 early in the 
growth process and was being driven increasingly by the external shareholders, once
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projected performance failed to meet expectations (See: Table 6.6; Figure 6.3). Allied 
to this is the apparent lack of international customer-facing and commercial 
experience within the leadership teams. By the end of the eight year analysis period 
only one firm remained independent, two were taken over by US corporations, one 
by a UK corporation, one by a European corporation, one by an Asian corporation 
and one became a PLC. Value realization for shareholders in a majority of these firms 
therefore happened not only outside the original firm ownership structure but in five 
of the seven cases - also outside the state.
This chapter has investigated the determinants of and influences on growth- 
orientated indigenous firms in Ireland. It has highlighted the differentiating factors 
between those firms who increased shareholder value through profitable trading and 
those firms decreasing shareholder value. A combination of Factors -  internal and 
external to the firm were found to be influential in subsequent firm performance 
(See: Table 6.12). Market growth was an important factor as 'all boats can rise' when 
growth occurs. Sector was also important as shareholder value creators came from 
the FOOD/ICT/Biotech sectors whereas bar Consumer (1), the remaining firms came 
from the technology sectors -  ICT (5) and Biotech (1). Government support -  
financial and otherwise -  may also be important and this will be considered 
separately in Chapter eight.
However what appears to be the biggest differentiator to firm performance (as 
defined in this study) is the product/market strategy adopted by the firms founding 
entrepreneur. There are a number of differentiating dimensions to this between the 
two cohorts captured in Table 6.12. The shareholder value creators were led by
234 | P a g e
commercially experienced entrepreneurs, with previous experience of financially' 
bootstrapping operations. These firms were on profitable growth trajectories at the 
outset of the analysis period. The shareholder value decreasing firms -  bar one — had 
no 'bootstrapping' experience and limited frontline 'commercial' experience. The 
shareholder value creators also 'owned' the product/market strategy of the firm 
which was a differentiated, niche/focus strategy. They had all developed a clear 
competitive advantage. The shareholder value creators were not answerable to 
external (VC or Angel or state) shareholders who might unduly influence strategy.
The shareholder value decreasing firms were beholden to such external investor 
forces. The value creators had a 'profitable growth' imperative derived from their 
previous bootstrapping experience - the value decreasing firms were scale-driven 
due to the portfolio agenda of the external shareholders.
It can be concluded therefore that whilst all growth-orientated SMEs, particularly in 
technology- driven sectors, face unknowable, unpredictable and open-ended change 
in their environment, the major internal differentiator between the shareholder 
value creators and shareholder value decreasing firms in this cross-case analysis 
chapter centers on the leadership team's ability to cope with, to predict, to 
comprehend, to deal with diversity in, and to respond quickly to changes in their firm 
environments to create sustainable competitive advantage.
Chapter 7 
The barriers to growth performance in indigenous firms in a small late 
developing state -  a cross-case analysis
This chapter follows on from the previous chapter and investigates the barriers to 
growth performance — real and perceived — in the case firms in the study. Barriers to 
firm growth are broadly subsumed under the two rubrics in the literature — internal 
firm related factors (Entrepreneur/firm/strategy) and external (Environmental) 
factors (Bessant et a i, 2005; Smallbone & Wyer, 2006, 2012; O'Gorman, 2006, 2012).
7.1 The growth experience
Table 7.1 shows that the Shareholder Value Creating firms (Foodl, Biotechl and 
ICT1) have all created, to some degree, shareholder value over the eight year analysis 
period by profitably growing their businesses.
When asked about the performance of their firms, the Key informants (Kl) in the 
shareholder value creating firms -  all attributed the profitable performance of their 
respective firms to a variety of differing factors. This accords with the literature in 
the area which suggests that measuring success is inherently difficult as it depends 
on the personal objectives of the owner(s) and is therefore highly subjective. 
However studies on the strategies of small firms, typically measure success in 
objective terms — using market, competitive or financial metrics (O'Gorman, 
2012:394).
The Kl in Foodl for example, noted that in his view, his growth ambitions for the firm 
have been retarded by a lack of good distributors for his product — the best 
performing having already been taken up by his Multinational competition. It is a
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growth barrier that he cannot -  due to lack of resources -  surmount. He is also a 
director of thirty two other firms and so can be regarded as a 'portfolio 
entrepreneur with a clear profitable growth imperative. Biotechl on the other hand 
is a smaller firm than Foodl and this reflects the growth ambitions of its founder 
who notes that 'he is not a businessman but a scientist in business'. It is, in his view, 
the development of his technology that drives him personally and by extension the 
business. His expectations of growth for his business have, in his estimation, been 
met and he will continue to conservatively grow the business in the incremental 
fashion which he has done to date. Finally the Kl in ICT1 is, like Foodl more 
ambitious for his firm to grow and maximise shareholder value than the Kl in 
Biotechl. He indicates (Table 7.1) that he originally intended to IPO but missed the 
market due to losing two major contracts and incurring losses (for the first time in 
the firms' history). He notes that, in his opinion, if he were to IPO he would need to 
have turnover of between €40-60m. At the end of the analysis period in this study he 
was at just over sixty per cent of the minimum figure but it is important to note that 
the firm is being managed for growth of 20-25 per cent per anum.
Three firms - three different sectors, managed by three very different entrepreneurs 
from very different backgrounds and with differing growth ambitions for their 
businesses. W hat unites them is their collective ability to develop profitable growth 
strategies which created sustainable competitive advantage and profitability 
despite the barriers or constraints — external and internal encountered along the 
way.
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7.1.1 Growth experience of the Shareholder value decreasing firms
The growth aspirations of the entrepreneurs behind the shareholder decreasing 
firms are as varied as the shareholder value creating firms. However in most cases, 
growth - profitable or otherwise was not achieved - particularly in the technology- 
driven sectors. The unfulfilled aspirations are probably best exemplified by the 
following direct quotes or summaries of same from the Kl's and their answers to the 
question as to whether the business had performed as planned;
ICT4: No- Firm is still in start-up mode after ten years -  'It has been a money sink to be 
honest'
ICT5: No -  the firm did not reach its growth objective and was sold to a US corporation 
in year 4.
ICT3: No -  The firm raised significant funds in flotation (IPO) but has not reached 
sustained profitability yet after twelve years.
Biotechl: 'I would have expected maybe to have grown a lot faster'
ICT2: The firm holds the record for raising outside equity funds in one funding round 
for the Irish software industry start-up at €15m but was eventually sold to a UK firm 
after sustained losses for an undisclosed sum
ICT6: The firm scaled as originally expected in its original market space -  by acquisition 
and organically but revenue generation disappointed.
Consumerl: The Firm had to cease manufacturing due to contraction in construction 
sector in the British Isles
Apart from ICT6 - the growth expectations of the case firms above were not met.
Five of the firms are from the ICT, one from Biotech and one from the Consumer 
goods sector. Consumerl's contraction was due to a severe market downturn but 
the group behind the firm is a strong European group and so the firm will survive in 
distribution form until the economy improves when manufacturing may re-
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commence. Production costs, regulatory costs and competitive practices on the 
home market were cited as barriers to growth by the consumer goods firm. Biotech2 
is a medical device firm with patented technology, regarded as disruptive technology 
-  growth has been slower than expected (Table 7.1) but shareholders have been 
patient despite the poor commercial results (See: Chapter 6 - Figure 6.3) so far.
€15m in investment has been raised from three shareholders over the analysis 
period. However the survival of the firm -  as an independent commercial entity - 
depends on continued shareholder support going forward as the entity is not self­
funding.
The remaining firms are all in the ICT sectors and all these firms raised outside 
venture capital to help fund growth. Without exception, the ensuing strategies have 
not generated profitable growth. The Kl in each firm was asked about the perceived 
barriers to growth (Table 7.2). Only one firm ICT5 indicated that they had not raised 
enough external funds to help fund growth. All others raised adequate funding with 
ICT2 raising €15m in one tranche, ICT3 securing €56m in flotation for acquisitions and 
ICT4 raising €9.6m and €5m in two funding rounds. Finally ICT6 obtained early VC 














* o  O  —  , c-rj QJ ro | 03
o  ai > . 5  <u v.
3  g . ro  o  1*  .P
S E DOro
£  .2
£ ro <y c u c
ts ^u 3 c2 2 i= ts





-Q Q. O  £ C  5  C  O  C  O —  7 3  03 u  ro u
U  -S
ro QJ 030.2 E
re r  ~ 5 £ § u 5  ^ 3 ai _
c do O ro.o c 0 <u
a g  ai " - C  3 2 oj gr ft
^  ^  -£J £  a;
E OJ on S  c





a> 5 aj o
■2 7  2  oj
fc? O  ro V , ro >  £‘ E o E -a -B
o <u
Z  O' J3
- .2 ro
E 3
'05 .= SZ in  Q.
T 3  ™ o
Q) c  C
7 3  . 2  <U T>
• g s s ^ S
«» QJ -m  C
C  >  p  3  ojo = C -O >,2 8  S3 W) £
3  ro ^  2  "5





QJ O 03 o
*- •- 03 ^ c >.
°  7 3  E  -Q  _9  —!5 oj — I t: 5ro ti to 1 '5; •->  S  c  OJ ~  c5 0) •— u 3 to
<u Q - ,SP ro c r  oo
x  4 . q . u  4-
U  a t o  u i ro  o
E  O  DO C 2 ^° I 2
3  u  3  tl 
HI 41 O  5  3 u 0) 13
« '5 E 2
2  o  iDO o 40 t l  T 3  O  .—U fll U +J
03 *
.E  O
CUD Q; 3 £ 3
7 3  O  CUD <U 
QJ C OJ c
'S’ 2 2? 5 ^ t; 2 P
L i £  i  > * -2  o _Q iS  CUD CL
^ O |_
O  E  03
cud iZ  E
£  U3 M  2  3  
cl w_ .E -Q
QJ QJ 3 5j QJ o
65 c o
n >* I
_QJ £  2 ?  £  £
-Q E = 5 C
03 QJ -Q  . >  3
C  CUD 03 C  O  1
CL
E fuJo I -O
<u 
.2 •
tS £  ro ro »_ 73& a* 7
QJ 03
i Io b-
| o. ro — o O
</>0)0 > -* £o  43 .2 „  43
JO 10 *-> Dp +3ro -J 3 .2 ro
s  I ~  'E f  tJSo 40 £j S 3 g00 LU to ™ O O-2 S 5 2 Sb S
re a
£  ’S  §
- 11 S*§ -g n M g 










7.2. Barriers to firm growth
The barriers to small firm growth can be subsumed under the rubrics of internal 
factors (owner- management and resource - acquisition related) and external factors 
(Rapidly changing environment, Industry structure, competition and market 
limitations -  See: Chapter 2, Table 2.3). These factors will be analysed in the next two  
sections 7.4 and 7.5. when assessing their relative importance as growth inhibitors 
on the development of indigenous firms in the small, open state.
7.3. Internal barriers to growth
The Kl in Foodl identified finance (Section 1.2, Table 7.3) as his major resource 
constraint. This is holding back his ability to find and support new international 
distributors. He advocates setting up an export credit insurance scheme and an SME 
bank to support internationally growth orientated firms and help surmount the 
'funding for growth' issue. The Kl in Biotechl states that he intends his firm to 
continue on its growth trajectory by adding to its core competencies in genetic 
engineering and molecular biology. The firm is now well funded and generating 
internal funds to fund growth and the Kl has lost some opportunities for growth 
trying to licence technology from Universities and he bemoans the lack of the 
'commercial imperative' not only in Irish universities but also in Australian ones too. 
ICT1 intends to continue its growth trajectory by 'productising and regionalising 
(employing local staff) as the firm grows. The entrepreneur has repurchased shares 
from staff members and VC's and now has overall control of the firm. The firm is 
profitable and generating internal funds for growth (Figure 6.2). Like Biotechl, ICT1 
had difficulty recruiting experienced staff during the boom (pre-2008) when they
found it difficult to compete with the MNC's and the large corporates. This has 
abated now and recruitment is no longer a blockage on growth. The Kl in ICT1 finally 
noted that the small domestic market and raising finance were still challenges for 
him. Overall, whilst the barriers or blockages identified for this cohort were 
significant nevertheless the leaders managed to overcome them and drive profitable 
growth.
7.3.1 The Shareholder Value decreasing firms
Having raised the requisite funding for their growth strategies -  what barriers did the 
Kl's in the shareholder value decreasing firms encounter in implementing their 
growth strategies? One issue common to ICT6 and ICT2 was their inability to recruit 
high quality sales staff in US and Japan (ICT6) and ICT2 (Worldwide). ICT3 also had 
problems with US staff whilst ICT4 and ICT5 did not gain traction either on the sales 
side. This highlights a problem for small overseas firm trying to recruit quality staff 
(market assets) in markets such as US and Japan. If an experienced sales person is 
successful in their home country -  it is unlikely that they would leave a successful 
career for an unknown foreign start-up unless the offer or opportunity is exceptional. 
This is an issue not unique to Irish internationalising firms but is a particular problem 
for small firms from small states trying to gain sales traction in overseas markets -  
under time pressure from outside investors. Another strategy adopted by NTBF s to 
break into markets is to acquire smaller firms -  this was a strategy adopted by ICT6 
and ICT2. They used the money raised in funding rounds to fund these acquisitions. 
Both of these acquisitions gained the respective firms access to the US market. 
Indeed it was a strategy used by ICT3 also with the funds raised in flotation.
The Kl in ICT6 notes:
The amount of the initial finance that we raised - we spent on interesting things. I 
think of the first amount of cash that we raised - I'd say we spent about 85 per cent of 
it on buying this new company and doing one trade show in the States. Building that 
initial momentum and appearance of US-ness, to the determent of paying salaries and 
all the other things, which was tricky for the first year or so, but that, I think, was 
instrumental, and we got really lucky with our brand [which was perceived as US — 
author added] (ICT6 Case: p. 22).
Timing is also important and ICT6 indicated in Section 1.1 Table 7.4 that they did not 
commit to the US market quickly enough. ICT2 attacked too many market 
simultaneously - ICT5 sold direct as did ICT4. Smallbone et a!. (1995) re-iterate that 
the product/market strategy is key and that 'active' strategies differentiate -  i.e. 
proactive strategies differentiate between growers and non-growers. It is clear that 
none of the ICT's product/market strategies of the Shareholder value decreasing 
firms lived up to ex ante expectations. Whilst the founding entrepreneurs came 
exclusively from technology backgrounds, they appear to have had little or no 
experience (except ICT5) of commercialisation (Adams et al., 2005) and/or 
international marketing (Ibeh, 2006). These value creation processes are critical and 
need to be managed as assiduously as other facets of the business. Adams et al. 
(2005) noting that even in the literature on innovation m anagem ent-that 
commercialisation is the least developed in terms of research focus yet innovation 
as a value creation process fails if it is not successfully commercialised. The lack of 
traction in the marketplace then may be substantially attributed to the 
entrepreneur(s) lack of sales/marketing experience and a lack of experience in 
accessing and making appropriate acquisitions. Bessant et al. (2005) argue that the
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barriers to firm growth appear to be more of a commercial than a technological 
nature. The inability to attract high quality customer-facing staff demonstrates the 
inability of the founding entrepreneurs to form, develop and 'balance' their 
management team with staff from differing functional backgrounds but particularly 
high-level experienced sales/marketing staff (Marlow, 2006; Smallbone & Wyer,
2006, 2012). The Kl in ICT2 raised €15m in a single round of funding and yet even he 
noted:
Recruitment was never an issue apart from getting the right sales guy, do you know?
Good sales leadership (ICT2 Case: p. 27).
Thus, in most of the shareholder value decreasing firms acquiring financial resources 
appears to have been successful. All raised funding in the marketplace and the state 
to help fund the strategies for growth. Unfortunately none of the technology based 
firms in the cohort managed to create a sustainable competitive advantage -  as 
evidenced by the collective lack of profitability. External factors will be considered 
next but the analysis of the internal factors indicates that the most significant 
internal barriers to growth appears to be the lack of 'commercialisation' skills and 
the absence of prior 'bootstrapping' experience in the top management teams. This 
might be expected given the technical backgrounds of all the firms' founders. 
However it may also point to substandard levels of absorptive capacity in the 
management teams. This deficiency in environmental scanning and diagnostic skills is 
consistent with the findings of earlier studies of indigenous firms by Arnold et al. 
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7.4. External barriers to growth
As previously noted all three firms in the value creating cohort had commercially 
experienced leaders entering the analysis period for this study. 'Backcasting' (Storey 
& Greene, 2010) affords us the opportunity to observe that that all three leadership 
teams weathered whatever commercial storms the firms encountered during the 
period to return profitable growth over the period. This is a testament to the 
management teams' ability to cope with, predict, comprehend and deal with 
changes in the proximal and distal environments of the firm. It confirms the presence 
of sufficient levels of absorptive capacity in the management teams to deal with 
growth barriers encountered along the way (Bessant et al., 2005) When questioned 
about perceived environmental barriers the Kl's in the three firms all noted (See: 
Table 7.1) that, whilst growth plans had in two cases (ICT1 & Foodl) not gone 
according to plan, that they had found ways to circumvent the barriers to growth and 
keep or return to a profitable growth trajectory. Biotechl in contrast manages 
growth in a much more controlled fashion and thus is -  size wise -  a smaller firm 
(See: Figure 6.2). The Kl in Foodl was the only leader to admit that despite his best 
efforts he could not solve his distribution issues in the marketplace (Table 7.4). He 
acknowledged that, given the scale of the market, the intense brand driven 
competition and the resources required - his firm would not satisfactorily solve this 
problem. It would take someone with greater marketing resources then he can 
access to resolve this. He reflects:
I didn't enter this business to make money. I entered this business to see if I could 
enter the business. I certainly entered the business as a proof in my strong belief that 
indigenous entrepreneurship is the way forward. And to see - and I ve very specific
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targets - to see could an Irish company become an internationally competitive export 
business. Because that's what the future is and the answer is 'nearly'- because we 
haven t got the distribution right yet and my fear and my expectation is that 
somebody will come in and take that off us one way or the other so I won't achieve it, 
because I'll fall down on distribution. (Foodl case: p.22/23).
In contrast to the demand side issue raised above by the Kl in Foodl, the Kl in ICT1 
noted that in his estimation the domestic market was a particular problem for 
businesses trying to scale-up. It has the obvious drawback of having a small 
population and therefore a relatively small number of financial institutions to sell 
into. He also commented however that, in his opinion, the investment market is a 
bigger blockage on growth. He notes:
... not so much even the size of the domestic market but the size of the investment 
market and the available pool, but still you see the Irish software guys keep comparing 
themselves to the American software Silicon Valley which is, you know, that's like the
Premier League in  where we're, you know, it's going to be hard for Ireland ever to
get there because we don't have a natural [Homogenous -  author added] market on 
our doorstep of 350 million people with a huge economy that the whole world looks 
to as a place to buy so we don't have that market on our doorstep and unless that 
chap is prepared to lift his boots and go to the States and live over there for a few 
years and go to the US as a lot of Irish people have done, to Silicon Valley, and raises 
money and builds his business and then come back here if he wants to. Otherwise he's 
got to face the fact that he's always going to be smaller than a US company. But if he 
can build a business that's sustainable and that's got a good strong model there's lots 
of places he can go without having to go to the States or even in the States and he can 
still win business because, you know, the US guys there's is a very fast growth 
trajectory and lots of their businesses are either sold or burnt very fast. (ICT1 case: 
p.29).
7.4.1 Shareholder value decreasing firms
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The perceived external barriers to growth for the shareholder value decreasing firms 
mirror to a large degree the internal barriers highlighted by the Kl's -  particularly the 
NTBF s. Consumerl differs again, in that, it was the only case firm with significant 
domestic business and the market contracted quickly and deeply. The firm was left 
with no other option but to scale back and re-group. Employment went from ninety 
six to twenty four in two years and so the external environment was a major driver in 
the scaling down of the firm.
The remaining firms are from the ICT sector (6) and the Biotech (1) sectors - all these 
firms experienced 'lack of traction' in their revenue generation attempts. Whilst 
they approached the internationalisation of their businesses in differing ways -  ICT6 
and ICT2 and ICT3 used a combination of organic and acquisition strategies in their 
attempts to grow -  organic on world markets and acquisitive for the US market. ICT4 
and ICT5 using an organic growth strategy to try and grow. ICT6 for instance found a 
German firm to acquire which opened up the US market for the firm. However they 
encountered difficulties in finding suitable in-market sales and marketing s ta ff-  as 
explained earlier in the perceived internal barrier analysis. The Kl noted:
I can never actually put my finger on a time when we found itvery difficult to find 
people in Ireland. The States - yeah. The States was always a challenge to find people 
in the States, and in Japan, setting up a Japanese office was always very tough because 
you're looking for Japanese people to essentially join a European operation which is 
very difficult. And since then I think that's probably been similar, although what we've 
focused on [in his subsequent business — author added] is hiring here and then moving 
people out to the States if we needed that to happen (ICT6 case: p.21).
Indeed a common thread with the technology—driven businesses is the unforeseen 
difficulties that they encountered in the global marketplace due; it would appear, to
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a lack of experience, knowledge and research in the senior management team as to 
the requirements for successful targeting, entry and expansion into the respective 
overseas target markets.
The Kl in ICT2 notes:
One of the things I did was to try and get into too many markets at the same time 
[market skimming strategy] because we had resources, so I went to Hong Kong, 
Singapore, everywhere. One thing I hadn't figured out is that there are costs 
associated with it, do you know? Really it would have been better to have two or three 
markets [market penetration strategy] rather than trying to be everywhere. As I said, I 
suppose it's easy in hindsight, but I think a clearer vision right from day one would 
have been very helpful for everybody, do you know? And that's coming back in terms 
of saying, okay, this is where we want to take the company to and this is what our exit 
strategy is, and I feel that our exit strategy there was probably wrong in thinking 
you're going to take this public (ICT2 case: p.27)
Thus, whilst the vagaries of the external environment -  rapidly changing market, 
increasing competition and market limitations are all important factors, it is the 
leader or leadership team's interpretation of the opportunities and threats that the 
environment presents which is most important (Their diagnostic capabilities-Arnold 
et al. 2004) and the Kl in ICT2 is honest in declaring that strategic mistakes were 
made (market skimming versus market penetration, organic versus acquisitive 
growth, wrong exit strategy etc.) as he clearly did not prioritise his target markets 
nor his growth strategy.
O'Gorman (2006, 2012) notes that two key strategic decision choices need to be 
made - where to compete and how to compete. These choices have a significant and 
lasting effect on the organisation and its performance (ibid) and the ICT2 case is a
clear illustration where neither of these key decision choices were adequately 
addressed before the (well-resourced) leadership team began executing (on their 
flawed strategy). Success strategies for gaining clear competitive advantage by 
growing firms revolve around the implementation of a focused, differentiated niche 
approach (Sandberg & Hofer, 1987) -  which clearly was not the case here.
ICT3 similarly raised significant resources in an IPO to execute on its 'strategy' for 
taking advantage of perceived opportunities in the US market except, as the current 
CEO noted:
W e're a company that went public without a business plan. Lost $180m. I mean, how 
hard do you have to work? xxxx didn't lose 180 million dollars by trying to take the big 
risk. It lost it by you know...the CEO's office was in xxxx. So my office, the first day I 
walked in, 1800 square feet! This company lost $180 million and my office had its own 
bar in it! (ICT3 case: p.33).
ICT5 was another software firm which tried to enter the US market. The Kl in this 
firm reflected on the difficulties encountered in setting up sales distribution 
channels:
Yea, I think the main difficulty there is getting a sales channel you can trust or even a 
direct sales person in place abroad who is unsupervised. No we did direct sales. [Did 
this put o lot of pressure on the people here because you are travelling all the time?]. 
Yes -we were doing sales at all levels - its complex selling (ICT3 case: p.22).
Unfortunately the Kl in ICT5, like the other Kl's in the shareholder value decreasing
firms underestimated the time and effort and most importantly the level of research
required to acquire the marketing and market assets required to execute the growth
strategy — even if the requisite resources are raised — as in this case. The firm had
received significant external investment funding and so the pressure was on for sales
traction in the firms key markets.
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Biotech2 on the other hand is trying to market a 'disruptive technology' in the 
medical device sector. The barrier to growth is essentially the entrenchment of the 
existing technology (inertia) even though Biotechl's technology is superior. It has a 
multinational partner to market the product but so far the product has been slow in 
gaining traction as it requires a significant amount of re-training and upskilling by 
surgeons. Kl in Biotech2 notes:
 so we're at the stage now where we've got the 10%, a lot of exciting guys [early
adopters] but to get it downstream from them, we're going to have to make this 
device simple and reproducible to use. I'm making their life more difficult, the same 
way that laparoscopic surgery made it more difficult. It was a harder thing to do. There 
was increased incidence of bile duct injuries and -  from whatever, so we have to deal 
with that. That's what we're focusing on now is getting to the 80%. So, no, it's -  there's 
no problem getting into the market. You just have to make it happen (Biotech2 case: 
p. 24).
Biotech2 differs from the other value decreasing firms in that, apart from the 
sectoral differences, it is disruptive technology. Contrast this to the software 
products above which tend to be new applications of existing technology (Breznitz, 
2007) and despite the medical devices benefits, it is taking longer than expected to 
become the hoped f o r ' industry standard' (Mohr et al., 2010). In terms of the 
'technology adoption lifecycle (TALC) it has yet to 'cross the chasm 'and become 
mainstream (Moore, 1991). Should the technology gain traction the Kl estimates the 
global market at between $300-400m. Investors have remained patient to date and 
supported the firm despite the modest sales traction so far (See: Figure 6.3). Again 
the success or otherwise of the firm - in this case - will be majorly influenced by 
market related factors.


















































































7.5 Summary and Conclusions
Despite the diverse market situations facing the case firms, the international 
environment has an impact on firm growth in all situations - but to varying degrees. 
Small firms, by definition, must adapt to their environment. Small firms from small 
states must do so earlier and to a greater degree. The perceived internal and 
external barriers analysed in this chapter must be considered in tandem with the 
findings in Chapter 6 on the influences and determinants of small firm growth (See: 
Table 6.12). Dobbs & Hamilton (2006) noting that it is 'idiosyncratic configurations of 
context-specific factors which determine small firm growth'. Conversely it is unique 
'configuration sets' of factors which act as barriers to indigenous firm growth. 
However in the cases analysed in this study it was found that value creators and 
value decreasing firms were differentiated in terms of barriers to growth along a 
number of dimensions.
Internal firm  barriers
It is firstly the entrepreneur/managers ability to create sustainable competitive 
advantage, as evidenced by their ability to develop sustained and growing 
profitability over successive time periods which is the most important differentiator. 
Backcasting (Table 7.1) allows us to see the consequences of the strategy-in-action. 
The entrepreneurs behind ICT1, Biotech 1 and Foodl all demonstrated their abilities 
to develop and implement commercialisation strategies driven by the profitable 
growth imperative' (Table 7.1 & Table 7.2). This highlights the importance of the 
owner-manager related factors noted by Bessant et a i, 2005; Smallbone & Wyer, 
2006, 2012; O'Gorman, 2006, 2012 in their typologies in Table 2.3. It was found in
this chapter that the resource—acquisition barriers listed were less important in these
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cases — it was resource deployment - as evidenced in the development of competitive 
advantage that mattered. The lesser impact of resource-acquisition may be explained 
by the fact that the analysis period of 1999 — 2005 (when state investment was made 
in the cohort of firms in the study) was a period when the Irish economy was growing 
at unprecedented rates and obtaining investment finance and other resources was 
less problematic than in slower growth or recessionary times.
External barriers
Shareholder value creators (ICT1, Foodl and Biotechl) were able to cope with, 
predict, comprehend and deal with environmental threats whilst maintaining or 
returning to profitability during the analysis period. ICT 2-6, Biotech2, had on the 
other hand, not sufficiently developed their value propositions or implemented 
robust strategies to create competitive advantage and profitability. This was 
primarily due to the leadership teams' lack of skills and experience in 
commercialisation strategy and/or international marketing. In addition, the 
management team had, in most cases, increasingly ceded strategic direction to 
outside investors over the analysis period. Consumerl (as a value decreasing firm) is 
an outlier in the sense that the external environment changed so radically that it was 
left with little strategic choice but to scale back.
In conclusion
This chapter analysed the barriers to indigenous firm growth and found that it is a 
combination of external and internal factors which can retard profitable firm growth. 
Indigenous firms in small states face myriad external challenges from their host 
country and international environments in terms of rapid, open-ended change and
uncertainty, industry structural change, international competition and domestic 
market limitations. However it is the indigenous firms' ability to cope with these 
external challenges and still deliver sustained profitability through profitable trading 
which marks out the shareholder value creators from the value decreasing firms.
This value creation ability is underpinned by entrepreneurial leaders whose growth 
strategies are differentiated niche with a clear value proposition, who have 
'financially bootstrapped' previous operations, who have a 'profitable' growth 
imperative guiding strategy, who have retained strategic control of the business, who 
seized profitable growth opportunities from their product/market space, whose 
business is older (8 years+) and who retain significant ownership in the business. 
Conversely the value decreasing firms did not have the above profile and whilst they 
were younger in age (3 years +), their growth trajectories (Figure 6.3) suggest (apart 
from ICT6) that unless radical change occurred they will not create value as 
independent businesses. Indeed four of the NBTF's (ICT2, 4, 5 and 6) were acquired 
before the analysis period was complete. Finally the role of luck/chance/serendipity 
cannot be discounted and its importance increases depending on the levels of 
uncertainty encountered in the firms' environment.
Chapter 8 
The role & contribution of Public Venture Capital to indigenous firm 
performance in the small late developing state -  A Contribution 
Analysis
This chapter examines the relationship between public venture capital and firm 
performance within and across sectors. It is a meta-analysis of the findings in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and additional case material from Volume 2 not already utilised in 
the preceding empirical chapters. The analytic technique used to complete the 
empirical analysis in the study is 'Contribution analysis' (Mayne, 2001, 2008, 2012) -  
a theory-based approach to evaluation. Thus this chapter assesses whether the 
public venture capital policy did make a contribution to firm performance, 
collectively and individually in the study. 'Contribution analysis' is discussed briefly in 
the literature review in chapter two and in more detail in chapter fo u r -th e  research 
methodology chapter.
The logical proposition - as set out in Figure 8.1 - and examined in this chapter is that 
the public venture capital 'contributed' (Mayne, 2012) to accelerating the creation of 
shareholder value in the individual case firms. The 'theory of change' for public 
venture capital intervention holds that the recipient firms invest the states' capital 
investment in R&D and human capital assets to drive growth -  at an accelerated rate
i.e. Has the intervention made a noticeable contribution to an observed result and in 
what way?
The second proposition investigated is that growth - oriented firms, by definition, 
require risk capital to fund accelerated growth. Does the fact that it comes from the 
state add value to the investment intervention? If it does contribute in a significant
way then this constitutes a positive outcome for the policy. However if it was found 
that the intervention made a marginal or no identifiable contribution then it merely 
contributes towards deadweight and/or displacement in the economy. This would 
indicate that scare resources are being sub-optimally allocated.
The triangulation of information (Datta, 1997) from the mixed research methods 
employed allows key inferences to be drawn on whether the public venture capital 
had a material effect on 'accelerating' or 'scaling up' of shareholder value creation in 
the individual firm  and on whether 'direct state involvement' added to the value of 
the investment intervention.
The share investment is expected to be repaid five years after the investment period 
from retained earnings or in the event of the firm being sold (Enterprise Ireland, 
2010). The extent of this direct intervention approach is unique to Ireland and the 
state had venture capital investments in six hundred and forty seven indigenous Irish 
firms valued at over €184m at cost in 2005. (Enterprise Ireland, 2005). El claimed 
subsequently to be the largest venture capital company in Europe (Horn, 2011). This 
study is therefore unique in that the contribution of this type of state intervention to 
firm performance has not been empirically evaluated in Ireland before. However 
theory based evaluation (TBE) and 'logic models' are beginning to gain credence in 
the evaluation literature in Ireland. Lynch et al. (2009) propose a logic model for 
'business networks'. This has not been empirically tested as yet (2012). Lenihan 
(2011) also proposes a logic model approach for evaluating enterprise policy based 
on the Lynch et al. model. This also remains to be empirically tested.
ixaiuoo aieis ||Euus ajnjejain saws news
Given the focus then on public venture capital in the study — and its association with 
the strategic direction of the firm - the emphasis in this Chapter is on the potential 
contribution of the state investment at the enterprise level. This is in contrast to the 
many studies in the area which have focused on the project level (OECD, 2006; 
Clarysse et al., 2006).
8.1 The firms in the study
The cases chosen for participation in the study were selected on 'theoretical 
sampling' grounds for their overall sectoral representativeness of the cohort of firms 
in the study (Glazer & Strauss, 1967; Pettigrew 1988; Strauss & Corbin, 1988; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002). Whilst there is no ideal number of cases, Eisenhardt 
(1989) recommends between four and ten noting that: 'with more than ten cases, it 
quickly becomes difficult to cope with the complexity and volume of the data' (P. 
545). Thus this study utilizes the maximum number of recommended cases. Table
8.1 illustrates the relationship between the overall cohort of firms (n=51) and the 
selected cases (n=10).
The four sectors in the study are each represented in the case analysis in this 
Chapter. The ICT sectors having the most cases (n=6) followed by the Industrial 
products (n=2) and Food (n=l) and Consumer products (n=l). Note however that 
whilst ICT represents 57 per cent of the number of firms in the cohort, the cases in 
this sector captured 67 per cent of the funding allocated to the selected cases. This 
illustrates once again, the preference of the state for firms in the ICT sector - 
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8.1.1 Financial performance of the case firms
Table 8.2 illustrates the financial performance of the selected case firms before and 
after state investment. Five firms -  Consumerl, Foodl, Biotechl, ICT1 and ICT3 were 
all profitable, to a varying degree, before the public venture capital investment. The 
remainder of the cases were unprofitable -  See: Table 8.2 -  column 4. The profitable 
firms were on average eight years old. The unprofitable firms were younger and on 
average were less than two years old.
Post-state investment, only two firms increased their mean ROIC -  Foodl and 
Biotechl. ICT1 was close to breakeven and was on a growth trajectory and is 
therefore categorised with the performing firms. The remaining firms have significant 
accumulated losses post-state investment. All firms remained in business over the 
eight year analysis period although the ownership status of seven of the firms had 
changed over that period. This ownership change was due in the main to the poor 
financial performance of the founding management teams. This poor financial 
performance indicating the inability of the management teams to develop 
sustainable competitive advantage and thus profitability (Hill & Jones, 2009; Doyle,
2010) -  (See: Chapter six and seven also for further details). Notable exception to the 
poor financial performance was ICT6 which was sold to the investment arm of a US 
multinational for C llO m  — over ten times firm turnover at the end of the analysis 
period.
Section 8.3 looks at the impact from a 'contribution analysis (CA) perspective of the 
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The focus will be on following the proposed 'theory of change' behind the policy and 
gaining informants perspective on the contribution of the state investment on the 
growth and development and/or survival of the case firms. This will be considered 
against the backdrop of the results from the overall cohort in Chapter 5.
8.2 The role & contribution of Public Venture Capital to indigenous firm 
performance
The Contribution analysis framework is complemented by the input/output analysis 
in Chapter five. This analysis in Chapter 5 investigated 'what' happened when the 
state investment took place. The analysis in this chapter attempts to explain the 
'how' and 'why' of the state intervention.
The post investment period of five years is the period after which the firm should 
(per its contract with Enterprise Ireland) repay the share investment to El. It is 
therefore an appropriate timeframe to evaluate the changes that have occurred in 
each case firm - to that point. However, it is important to remain cognisant of the 
limitations of 'back casting' as a research methodology and the influence of 'post 
facto' rationalisations (Halo effects) by the key informants (Storey & Greene, 
2010:303/304).
8.3 Contribution Analysis
8.3.1 The cause-effect issue addressed
The state, through Enterprise Ireland, has a policy of directly investing in growth- 
oriented indigenous SME's to help 'accelerate' their growth. As the primary 
indigenous industry development agency El declares its overall mission to be.
To accelerate the development of world-class Irish companies to achieve strong 
positions in global markets resulting in increased national and regional prosperity (El 
annual report, 2008:p.l)
Established firms apply for investment on foot of a business plan and those 
successful in their application are regarded as high- potential 'scale up's' or potential 
fast/high growth firms. Separate venture capital investment schemes apply to help 
start — up businesses with seed funding requirements and these are beyond the 
scope of this study (See: Enterprise Ireland - Seed and Venture fund annual reports). 
The pro's and con's of state involvement in seed funding, including co-funding or 
hybrid programmes however have been well covered in the literature (Lerner, 2009; 
Murray & Liu, 2009; Murray & Lingelbach, 2010; Mason & Pierrakis, 2011; Murray et 
a l 2012).
Picking and making winners?
The established firms selected for funding in this study are the potential 'winners' 
which the state wishes to back with public venture capital investment. The rationale 
for the policy is that growing firms, such as these -  particularly those in technology 
driven businesses (NTBF's) - cannot access the necessary funds to underpin growth -  
in many cases due to lack of collateralisable assets. This is especially true for NTBF's. 
Debt financing is therefore not an option and so equity financing is seen the only 
viable option, particularly for research —based firms where internal funds may not be 
generated for many years (Storey & Greene, 2010). There is therefore a perceived 
'finance or equity gap' blocking the growth of otherwise potentially successful 
businesses. This is interpreted in many states as a market failure and in many 
countries — particularly in Europe, policymakers believe that the state must step in
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and correct (Leleux & Surlemont, 2001; Murray et al., 2012). Mulcahy (2005a:p.36), 
although referring to earlier stage funding, nevertheless outlines what she believes is 
the rationale behind the Irish state s policy and notes that her research identifies a 
number of complementary and contradictory rationales for why the Irish state 
(through El) has become a Venture capitalist'. These are: 1. To close the equity gap,
2.To create a domestic venture capital industry 3.To smooth the cycles of the 
venture capital industry 4. To foster economic development and 5. To help firms 
compete internationally. Mulcahy questions the rationales or raison d'etre above and 
concludes:
  Based on a review of the evidence that the 'equity gap' is closed and that
Ireland has succeeded in developing a vibrant and robust venture capital industry. 
These successes render El's continued intervention in the VC industry difficult to 
justify based on the evidence, and make a strong case for discontinuing government 
funding of the industry. This chapter also examined whether continued state 
intervention was warranted based on goals of smoothing the cycles of the VC 
industry, economic development, or 'levelling the playing field' with other nations. It 
concluded that there is not a compelling case for intervention based on any [Emphasis 
Author added] rationale (Mulcahy, 2005a:p.54).
Thus the basic logic of the intervention is questioned and this will be examined
further as the analysis progresses (See also: Breznitz, 2007, 2012; Horn, 2011).
The Irish state then has invested a minimum of €635,000 (IRP 500,000) in each of 
the firms in this study and the contract requires the firm to repay the share 
investment after five years from retained earnings. In addition to the goals cited by 
Mulcahy, state investment is expected to also help address the acknowledged 
underinvestment by indigenous firms in R&D — which is generally below the socially 
desirable level (Arrow, 1962; Metcalfe & Georgiou, 1998). The state reasons that by
making risk capital available (with stipulations for R&D and human capital spend 
only) for investment that the firms will 'scale-up' their R&D efforts and employ more 
staff. Curiously the firms are (officially) precluded from investing in market(s) or 
marketing assets -  in the commercialisation of their knowledge assets - (The ultimate 
stage in the innovation process, Adams et al., 2005). This has been shown, time and 
again (including this study -  See:Chapter 6 & 7) to be a significant barrier to growth 
for Irish firms -  particularly on international markets (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992; 
Enterprise Strategy group, 2004; Forfas, 2004; Small Business forum, 2006).
Thus the expectation of the state in terms of performance is that the state will 
'unblock' these supply-side market failures, which will unleash the latent growth on 
the demand-side in the potentially 'fast/high growth' firms -  picked by the state. This 
will in turn create employment and value added in the economy. After five years the 
firm is expected (through profitable growth and/or trade sale/IPO) to payback the 
state. The state will take the funding and re-invest in new firms -  picked by it and so 
the cycle goes on. Given that the investment is in 'risk' capital (and the state is 
sharing or mitigating the firms risk) and growing firms face 'unknown, uncertain' 
environments then failure of either the firm and/or the investment is possible -  
particularly in NTBF's. Arguably this could be seen as fostering a situation where 
losses are socialised and (most) gains are privatised.
Investments are made by the state in either preference and/or ordinary shares. The 
preference shares are normally cumulative preference shares which carry a coupon 
interest rate (Mulcahy, 2005a).The state, like standard VC industry practice in the US, 
retains the right to convert the preference shares to ordinary shares if it sees upside
potential or the firm cannot repay its investment. Both Mulcahy (2005a) and Breznitz 
(2007) highlight the potential for conflict in El s dual role of economic development 
agency (job creation) and Venture capitalist' (ROIC) within the economy.
Given the above background then the 'contribution problem' to be addressed is -  
what is the 'contribution' that public venture capital makes to firm growth 
performance - post-state investment and has it made a noticeable contribution to an 
observed result and in what way. The second requirement is to establish whether the 
funding was used for the purposes intended and thirdly this Chapter attempts to 
determine whether the source of the VC -  public funding -  added value to the firm.
8.3.2 Develop the postulated 'theory of change' and the risks to it including rival 
explanations -  synthesise the existing evidence from Chapters 5, 6 and 7 on the 
'Theory of change'.
Addressing the Supply-side problem
The rationale for the policy of public venture capital investment by the state 
emanated originally from a need by the state to divert funding from grant assistance 
(Precluded by the EU from 1999) to a new solution which would fall within EU 
regulations.
The theoretical rationale and context -  for how the policy was to operate was 
explained by a former state executive who was involved in the planning of the 
scheme.
At the tim e it was a good idea, we had two problems we needed to deal with. First, 
there was political pressure after politicians became concerned when, on one hand, 
many software firms who got grants went bankrupt, and , on the other hand, a few  
were sold to MNC's, with the founders making a large profit. The second was the need 
of technology companies that do R&D to get a large quantity of capital upfront, which 
we could not do with employment grants, especially as software start-ups just do not
create that many jobs. Thus equity-based grants seemed like an ideal solution for both 
and could be worked within existing regulations. I also must say that in the beginning, 
when we did not make a profit, it worked like a charm (cited in: Breznitz, 2007: pgl84).
Thus the rationale explained in this quote appears to accept that the primary barrier 
to indigenous firm growth is supply-side related and that providing repayable grants 
in the form of share investments will substantially help alleviate this problem. The 
most worrying aspect of the genesis of the policy is that it appears to have been 
initiated in response to political pressure rather than in response to 'empirical 
evidence' that there was a real funding or equity gap which required closing. The 
second reason given -  that NTBF's did not fit the existing employment grant 
structures available - illustrates how deeply ingrained the 'grant mentality' is in Irish 
industrial policy-making bodies and by extension Irish indigenous industry (Mulcahy,
2011). It further demonstrates the widely accepted view in policy-making circles that 
the state should intervene at the micro-level in the economy - down to the individual 
firm level. This, despite the strong international evidence that micro-level 
interventions are not, in the main, empirically supported in the firm growth literature 
(Bannock, 2005; Storey & Greene, 2010; Davidsson, 2008; Bridge et al. 2009; Bill et 
al., 2009). Indeed the state executives comments quoted above gives a good 
indication of how a scheme designed in response to political pressure brought the 
implementing organisation into an unintended new sphere of activity -  venture 
capital. This resulted in the implementing organisation trying to reconcile its 
conflicting economic development and venture capital remits. The former state
executive further noted that:
The problems started when El holdings in a few firms were suddenly worth millions. 
The more El turned into the most successful VC organisation in Ireland, the more
profits became a yardstick, with the result that investment decisions are becoming 
more and more conservative and profit-orientated. El is now so obsessed about 
making money and does not care enough about the overarching goal that the state 
should have -  the development and growth of the industry (cited in :Breznitz, 2007: 
p.184).
Share in ves tm ent, in th e  fo rm  o f repayable equity  grants th e re fo re  was agreed as a 
w ay to  correct th e  perceived 'finance or equity  gap' fo r g row th -through- 
in te rna tio n a lisa tio n  in technology and la ter trad itiona l firm s. A ceiling o fte n  per cent 
ow nersh ip  w as im posed on th e  state by the  EU and thus it was envisaged th a t th e  
state  w o u ld  becom e and rem ain a m inority  shareholder in the  firm  until th e  
sharehold ing  w as sold. The state, in addition, did not take or seek a seat on th e  firm s' 
board and thus becam e a 'benign' investor in the  firm .
O ne o f th e  Kl's (6) noted:
What does tend to happen, and the things that can be difficult for smaller companies, 
is dealing with that sort of architecture and bureaucracy and having rules change 
underneath you and that sort of stuff.... yes they did [invest in shares in the firm].
Yeah, it was brilliant, because El are a very benign [Emphasis added by author] 
investor. They're not going to be doing certain crazy financial engineering from the 
board perspective or anything like that, and it's not so much seen as a stamp of 
approval, but it's just seen as a -  well, we're assuming you're going to get that. When a 
VC comes on board, they like to see their money being doubled up and they like the 
fact that it's coming from a very benign source. [So they acted as kind of a catalyst to 
draw the money in]. They can do. Absolutely, it's just seen as more value for money 
for the VCs.
In th e  ICT and B iotechnology sectors, El on behalf o f the  state has invested, and 
invested again in succeeding funding rounds, in growing firm s to  help fund grow th . 
Figure 8 .1  sets o u t th e  'th eo ry  o f change' applicable to  this policy.
The theory of change requires the state to intervene to help fund firm growth. It 
invests tax payer funds in individual firms in the expectation that the firms' 
leadership and management team has the ability to identify and exploit growth 
opportunities in international markets for the firms' product/market offerings. The 
'logic chart' in Figure 8.1 clearly shows the number of potential confounding and 
influencing variables involved in the growth process. Context-specific configurations 
of these variables combined with an unspecified amount of luck can produce an 
overall positive result of sales, profit, employment and ultimately shareholder value 
creation (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2006; Storey & Greene, 2010; Smallbone & Wyer,
2012). The states expectation is that the firm will grow as expected/predicted that it 
will then be in a position to repay (or begin repaying) the share investment (plus 
coupon interest -  if preference shares) back to the state. In reality the state, like 
VC's, will adopt a portfolio approach to its investments risk (Mohr et al., 2010). In the 
VC sector, this model requires close micromanagement and intimate sectoral 
knowledge to work. Information asymmetries associated with investing in NBTF's in 
specialist areas by VC's are mitigated by specialising sectorally and by having deep 
insights into the technology roadmaps of the ICT, Biotechnology and Cleantech 
sectors in particular. VC's succeed by 'adding value' in terms of management advice 
and access. They sit on the Boards or have nominees on the board of all their 
investments. They are active investors and will take decisive action if the aggressive 
growth targets (towards their profitable exit) are not met. Behaviourally they are the 
polar opposite to 'benign' investors. They perceive that their funding is smart 
money' and they have a defined time horizon for their investments (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001; Mulcahy, 2005(b); Gompers et al., 2006). The Irish state and the local
fledgling VC industry on the other hand are inexperienced in this sector (Mulcahy, 
2005a; Breznitz, 2007). The local industry is populated primarily by ex-bankers and 
fund managers from outside the venture industry and thus the industry does not, as 
yet, have the embedded knowledge or experience required to drive the firms to 
profitable exits on a consistent and large scale. One Kl (3) noted:
Most V enture capitalists' (in Ireland) are fund managers and accountants. They can't 
coach executives. They don't have the experience. They have never done it, they 
need to have people like me to be quite frank with you who can coach leaders and 
quickly be able to get the guy and say -'Look we think this fifty million dollar company 
has potential - and we are willing to put five million into it, not three hundred 
thousand!
Enterprise Ireland (Formed in 1998), as the state agency implementing the states 
share investment policy would appear not to have the in-house venture capital 
expertise either, as its staff come originally from technical or marketing backgrounds 
but at this stage -  given public sector recruitment embargoes - most are long term  
public servants. It is the classic Weberian structure. Lerner (2002) muses:
Why one would want to encourage public officials instead of specialized financial 
intermediaries (venture capital organisations) as a source of capital in (early-stage 
investments) is not immediately obvious (Lerner, 2002:p. 74)
These limitations in the state support system have been recognised and El s seed
and venture funds (outside the scope of this study) are now managed, per Lerner s
(2009) recommendation, jointly with VC industry involvement (See also: Murray et
al., 2012). This however has also been problematic (See Breznitz quote below). The
VC involvement has been primarily 'local' so far and so the added value is
questionable (Breznitz, 2007). Indeed El's influence in the local market is now so
pervasive that its current chief executive (2012) claimed, at a major industrial 
conference in 2011, that El was the largest venture capital company in Europe (Horn, 
2011). This claim was based on the scale of funds invested - but not on the 
performance of the funds. The lack of performance reporting (non-industry 
standard), exit discipline and transparency around El investments have been heavily 
criticised (Mulcahy, 2005a; Breznitz, 2007:178 Horn, 2011). It would seem that it 
suits the state's (Government, policymakers and development agency) purpose to be 
opaque about its investment performance as it apparently does not wish to publicise 
its (windfall) gains or investment losses. Breznitz (2007; 2012) points to the unusual 
situations that can arise when the state intervenes in providing venture funding:
El, in one of the most paradoxical twists of the Irish neo-liberal interventionalist 
[Developmentalist; 2012] ideology, claims on the one hand that the state can and 
should take stakes in private companies. However, adhering to neo-liberal principles 
on the other hand, El wishes to avoid a situation in which a government agency 
determ ines the market capitalisation evaluation of a private company. This creates a 
situation in which the firm seeking El aid must find private market investors that 
would resolve the private valuation process. Only then will El join the investment 
round on the same valuation basis. Many investors, though, agree to invest only in 
companies that have already received El's seal of approval. This seemingly Catch -  22 
situation is even more complex when we realise that El is in itself the single largest 
financier of the Irish VC industry . Hence, in many cases El actions make the Irish VC 
industry even more conservative in its investment decisions than it already is (Breznitz, 
2007:p. 181 /2  ).
A final point on the rationale behind the theory of change is worth mentioning. 
Enterprise Ireland is a development agency which also makes investments as a public 
venture capitalist. This, as pointed out by Mulcahy (2005), creates an inherent 
conflict with its original economic development remit. The tension between these
conflicting remits tends to manifest itself in various ways such as: investments in VC 
funds and firms with explicit regional investment objectives; an opaque valuation 
policy that mitigates the political risk of lower returns and an ad-hoc policy that 
neither maximises returns (per market driven VC's focus on small number of high 
potential firms) nor prioritises economic development (funding less attractive firms) 
(Ibid: p.56). It is not clear where, when and in what circumstances either of these 
conflicting objectives takes precedent.
In a small state which has historically faced high levels of unemployment, emigration 
and economic crises on its economic development trajectory, it is not surprising to 
find that 'job creation' had been elevated, from a policy perspective, to the de facto 
national objective. This has been the case since the state embraced export-oriented 
industrial policy and free-trade principles in the late 1950's (Stationary Office, 1958a, 
b). However the development of Irish industrial policy appears to have been heavily 
influenced from this period by the inherently contradictory ideology of 'neoliberal 
developmentalism'. This is a local ideology that developed to pursue the loosely- 
defined national objective (Breznitz, 2012). Consequently the states' economic 
development organisations tasked with trying to achieve this objective are vested 
with immense power, influence and resources by the state. The MNC policy promises 
and delivers on substantial numbers of jobs although spillover effects and direct 
linkages into the wider economy have been more limited than anticipated (Ruane & 
Ugur, 2005; Gorg, 2007). Indigenous industry, in contrast, promises not only smaller 
numbers of jobs per project but high failure rates and they remain problematic for 
policymakers to deal with.
MNCs thus gained policy priority whilst indigenous industry faced institutional 
discrimination with regards to tax rates, financial support and land allocation 
(0  Riain, 2004, Sterne, 2005). Whereas the Irish state sees its role as facilitating the 
activities of MNCs in Ireland through its economic development agency - IDA Ireland, 
it takes a more direct 'd e v e lo p m e n ta l' approach to indigenous industry through 
Enterprise Ireland (El). Both agencies reporting since 1994 to Forfas, the national 
policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation in 
Ireland.
Providing public venture capital is therefore a micro-level supply-side intervention to 
help reach this national 'job creation' objective. However it is suggested here that 
equal focus should be given to the demand (firm) side of the firm growth equation. 
Helping firms grow profitably creates sustainable employment and thus the focus on 
job creation per se may be misplaced as sustainable jobs are a consequence of 
profitable growth and shareholder value creation.
Addressing Demand -  side issues
External funding however is but one variable (from the external environment of the 
firm) which can possibly influence the growth trajectory of the firm and its attempts 
to create long-term shareholder value. Storey (1994); Smallbone & Wyer (2006); 
Storey & Greene (2010); Carter & Jones-Evans (2012) all highlight the myriad factors - 
both internal and external - which can influence the growth behaviour of the firm. 
These factors are categorised into the four broad but related areas of. the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur, the characteristics of the firm, managements 
strategy and external influences. Figure 8.1 shows these factors as antecedents of
firm growth but Storey and Greene also delineate these as pre-start -up  factors, at 
start —up and post start —up factors. Chapter five in this study investigated the 
influence of the state investment on the performance of the cohort of firms in the 
study, using the geo-demographic profiles of the cohort of fifty one firms as control 
variables and found that there was no statistically significant relationship between 
the state s investment and subsequent firm performance. However the state 
investment variable was retained in the most parsimonious model developed and so 
it can be concluded that the state investment variable made a marginal contribution 
to the model at best.
The cross-case analyses in chapters six and seven conclude that the biggest 
differentiator to firm performance (as defined in this study) is the product/market 
strategy adopted by the firms founding entrepreneur. There are a number of 
differentiating dimensions to this between the firms creating shareholder value and 
those decreasing it. These dimensions are summarised in Chapter 6 - Table 6.12. The 
shareholder value creators were led by 'commercially' experienced entrepreneurs, 
with previous experience of financially 'bootstrapping' operations. They were on 
profitable growth trajectories at the outset of the analysis period. The value 
decreasing firms — bar one — had no 'bootstrapping' experience and limited frontline 
'commercial' experience. The value creators also 'owned' the strategy of the firm 
which was, in each case, a differentiated, niche/focus strategy aimed at creating 
customer value propositions and sustainable competitive advantage. They were not 
beholden to external (VC or Angel or state) shareholders who might unduly influence 
strategy. The value decreasing firms were beholden to such external investor forces.
The value increasers had a 'profitable growth' imperative (based on their
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bootstrapping experience). The value decreasing firms were scale-driven - this 
strategy was heavily influenced by the investment portfolio agenda of the external 
shareholders.
The implications of the above findings are that 'profitable growth' can come from a 
variety of sectors — and in a variety of ways. There are myriad factors at play in 
determining and influencing the growth performance of the growth-orientated 
indigenous firm but that the product/market strategic competencies of the 
leadership team is key - with customer-facing competencies and capabilities a 
necessary requirement. All firms in the study (n=51) were successful in raising 
funding and accumulating resources to underpin growth but only a minority could 
generate a profitable return on the capital base accumulated over the eight year 
period under analysis (even with state support). This suggests that policy 
interventions, if appropriate, need to focus on developing the firms' ability to 
diagnose and validate potentially profitable growth opportunities. The findings in this 
chapter suggest, in line with the findings in Chapter five and seven that blockages to 
growth in indigenous firms do not centre on 'availability of finance' per se. This was 
only referred to by the growing firms. However the timing of capital injections 
appears to be important. The major barrier to growth would appear to centre on the 
inability of the leadership teams in seventy per cent of the case firms analysed here 
(and seventy nine per cent of the overall cohort of firms in the study) to develop - 
through their strategies a sustainable competitive advantage ergo longterm  
profitable customers (Drucker, 1985). Indeed the collective evidence gathered here 
points to a lack of 'Well thought out, well managed projects (Walsh, 1985) and thus
a shortage of 'investor — ready' firms (Mulcahy, 2005) as the primary blockage on
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indigenous performance in the period under study. This may well be highlighting the 
'Limited endowment of managerial resources' available (Penrose, 1959) and the 
deficiencies in absorptive capacity levels (Arnold et al., 2004; Forfas, 2005) - not just 
in individual firms but in the wider economy.
The findings are therefore suggesting that external capital (from where ever it is 
sourced) is best utilised by firms (from differing sectors) who have a clear 
product/market strategy and whose management team have the collective ability to 
implement that strategy. Bessant et al., (2005) reminding us from their review of the 
literature to that point, that barriers to firm growth tend to be of a commercial 
rather than a technical nature and Henrekson and Johansson (2008, 2010; Mason & 
Brown, 2012) noting that fast or high growth firms can come from any sector - and 
that if any sector is overrepresented then it is in the service sector and not NTBF's 
perse. Those firms which decreased shareholder value in the case firms (and in the 
overall cohort -  63 per c en t) in this study came primarily from the technology driven 
sectors and the leadership teams in all but one case firm lacked commercial 
experience.
8.3.3 Assemble and access the contribution story, and challenges to it. Seek out 
additional evidence, if available
The analysis so far has noted that state funding 'contributed' to the creation of 
shareholder value in the profitable case firms (3) but not in a material way as the 
projects would have progressed anyway according to the Kl s.(See: Tables 8.3, 8.4 & 
8.5). The quantitative analysis in chapter 5 showing that it made a marginal 
contribution to the overall cohort.
As the shareholder decreasing firms (7) - (see: Table 8.2) were not 'investor ready' 
(Mulcahy, 2005a) in terms of the development of their product/market strategies, 
the funding from external shareholders did not 'contribute' to shareholder value 
creation but merely added to the pressure on the management team to scale-up 
from an employment perspective. It can be argued that the state funding in these 
cases merely exacerbated the situation - especially where the state invested as part 
of a funding round with the VC's. This situation also placed El in a conflict situation as 
it tries to reconcile the development needs of the firm with the 'return maximisation' 
imperatives of the VC (Mulcahy, 2005a; Breznitz, 2012). However it must be pointed 
out that, despite the poor overall financial performance that each of the ten case 
firms remained in business at the end of the analysis period (and 45 from 50 of the 
overall cohort in one form or another). These case firms remained in business not 
because of their trading record (apart from the three self funding firms) but due 
almost entirely to the support of their external shareholders. It is also important to 
note that four of the ten firms (all ICT) were 'taken over' by overseas corporations' 
post-state investment (with 9 firms in the overall cohort experiencing the same 
outcome) and whilst the purchase consideration was made public in one case (ICT6), 
the remainder were not made public. It can be reasonably assumed - given the firms 
performance to that point - that they were primarily distress sales (See: Table 8.2). 
Considering the level of state support for these firms - in terms of repayable and 
non-repayable grants, 'soft supports' and the states investment in the wider 
innovation eco-system (O'Malley et a!., 2008) -  it is reasonable to question where 
the ultimate value in the firms is realised. Is the state inadvertently helping fatten- 
up' indigenous firms (with tax payers funds) for consumption by overseas firms
(Mason & Brown, 2010). This is worth noting given the low IPO success rate of Irish 
firms (Mulcahy, 2005; Breznitz, 2007; 2012). The state however did help in funding 
the creation of jobs (See: Chapter 6: Figures 6.4 & 6.5) and it is a 'cost per 
sustainable job calculation that El uses as one of its own metrics in its annual report 
(Enterprise Ireland, 2010). However it is questionable how 'sustainable' these jobs 
are if the host firms are persistent loss makers.
To provide further evidence of the 'contribution' or not of state funding to the 
performance of the case firms, the relevant sections have been extracted from the 
Key inform ant interviews in the ten cases (Full case analyses available in Volume 2 of 
the study). In each case the key informant was asked a series of questions (See: 
Appendix B for the complete topic list) on their perception of the contribution of the 
state funding to their respective firms. They were also asked about the nature of 
their relationship with the State agency providing the funding -  Enterprise Ireland. 
Their responses are categorised by sector.
Tables 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 then summarise the responses and these are added to the 
evidence base in this analysis. Table 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 analyses the responses of the 
Kl's to the question of how the state might assist firms in future.
Table 8.3: Traditional industry firms -  The contribution of public venture capital




The amount was irrelevant actually. I couldn't tell Enterprise Ireland the amount 
was irrelevant but it actually was. (laughter). We would have done it anyway but it 
was important, it was significant in the way that by them coming on board - it was 
___________________  seen very positively in xxx (22)
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Foodl
€1,270,000
' i t  was marginal for us yeah.' (27)
It was new management. It was xxxx and the new xx guy said well why are you 
not getting money from Enterprise Ireland yeah because we do a huge amount of 
R&D in terms of product development, label development. And process development, 
actually no we got process grants as well. For putting in more efficient processes'
(27).
T h e  tra d it io n a l cases had o n e  firm  w hich  w as p ro fita b le  and o ne w h ich  dec lined  
o vera ll b u t bo th  ackn o w led g ed  th a t th e  in v e s tm e n t by th e  s ta te  -  in re tro s p e c t -  did  
n o t m ake  a d iffe re n c e . C o n s u m e rl ackn ow led g in g  th a t  th e  in v e s tm e n t w o u ld  have  
p re c e d e d  a n y w a y  - a c lear case o f 'd e a d w e ig h t'. H o w e v e r th e  in v e s tm e n t p roved  
im p o rta n t fo r  o th e r  reasons -  see Tab le  8 .3 . The  Kl in F o o d l in d icating  th a t it w as th e  
in tro d u c tio n  o f  n e w  m a n a g e m e n t w h o  w e re  a w a re  o f th e  'su p p o rt' ava ilab le  th a t  
h e lp ed  raise th e  fu n d in g  fro m  th e  sta te .
Table 8.4: Biotech firms -  The contribution of public venture capital
Biotech industry Question from Topic list -  Would you have undertaken the investment
Case firms even if El funding was not available?
P4V . >4 . 4 "• ; ' J
Biotech 1 
€650,000
We would have, but it would have been at a slower rate .To be quite honest, you wouldn't be 
taking grant money unless you really needed it because there's a lot of paperwork. And you
would have to stop and say am 1 getting more from this than it's costing me. If projects were•
not successful, you could spend a whole load of time apologising. So 1 would have no interest
j ? '<•’;> • '' •• - .  - 'vV /vf V-’:
at this stage in any grant support, 1 like the independence, we are very fortunate that we can 
afford to fund the things we need to do (21)
 ^ / ■■;' ' . - 
'It made no difference. It helped, but we would have done it anyway' (20).
Biotech 2 
€820,000
'... 1 think it was basically cash. Yeah, they have stock as a result of that. Preference shares. 1 
think they own 3%.... ' (20).
Again th e  B iotech  firm s  d iffe r  in p e rfo rm a n c e  and a tt itu d e  to  th e  s ta te  su pp o rt. 
B io te c h l, as a successful firm  ind icating  th a t th e  fu n d in g  helped  acce le ra te  th e  
g ro w th  o f th e  firm . In te res tin g ly  th e  Kl refers  to  th e  fu n d in g  as 'g ra n t' m o n e y  w h e n  in 
fac t it is a re p a y a b le  share in v e s tm e n t o r eq u ity -g ra n t. The Kl in B io tech2 ind icating
th a t  th e  in v e s tm e n t h e lp ed  b u t th a t  he w o u ld  have been  ab le  to  raise th e  fu n d in g  
a n yw ay . His te c h n o lo g y  is d is ru p tive  and so th e  firm  has been  w e ll s u p p o rted  by 
sh are h o ld e rs  o v e r th e  years.
__________ Table 8.5: ICT firms -  The contribution of public venture capital_______
ICT Case firms Question from Topic list -  Would you have undertaken the investment 
anyway even if El funding was not available?
ICT1 'They have a decent size shareholding. No, no it doesn't make any difference but it was
€2 986 000 welcome at the time. And it was kind o f ... they haven't ever interfered although now I don't
know because of the financial difficulty this country is in, we can certainly give them a partial exit 
if they wanted it but they've haven't asked for it. I don't know if they need the money or not. 
Yeah, they probably should be asking us for money because they've got lots on their agenda in 
terms of creating jobs with new start-ups and ail that but they're not'.
\
ICT2 'For us, not, because we were very well funded. In fact, both our rounds were oversubscribed,
€1 155 000 *3Ut 1 wantec  ^^e m  in. But we didn't really want them in for the money... Often the El people are
embassy staff in a number of Asian countries, you know? And that really helps to open doors, 
and then we went on a lot of trade missions. Again organised through El. '(24)
ICT 3 
€635,000
Yes -  clearly plans were afoot to go public when El invested -  it is not clear \
party to these plans
'' ;x.:;■'/ ■ . -  ■
'I don't know - we would certainly have taken an early dip and whether that would have 
discouraged us to the point that it would have broken up. Or whether we would have struggled 
on until we got VC funding, I don't know". So it was timely? It was certainly timely at the start as 
you know. You know like any intimate relationship. At the start and at a couple of other times 
you know. They gave money that was significant in itself and they gave the name of support 
which was significant' (24).
'We were looking for our final round of funding and we had at the time a couple of new major
customers who, although not signed up were almost over the lin e  we needed the funds as
well - we had two VC's in at the time and Enterprise Ireland was another option and they liked 
what we were doing. We had a relationship with them all along because we were doing it mainly 
for export markets. We said that we were raising funds and did they want to be part of it and 
they said yes. They had the same type of shares as the venture capitalists ... which were
preference.
' It's very hard to say. If we hadn't gotten it, we would have still done what we've done, even if 
we'd had to go back to the capital market earlier or find other alternative investors or who's to 
say if we hadn't got the El investment that we wouldn't have got the VC on board. It's very hard 
to say. Yeah. I think this sort of thing is a really important catalyst. In any sort of forum where I've 








The ICT firm s  again  in d ica tin g  co llective ly  th a t (bar ICT4) th e y  w o u ld  have raised th e  
fu n d in g  e ls e w h e re  fo r  th e ir  plans. ICT1 and ICT6 w e re  firm s th a t u ltim a te ly  g re w  and  
b oth  o f th e ir  exp erien ces  w ith  El w e re  in te res tin g . ICT1 is regarded  as being  skilled at 
e x tra c tin g  fu n d in g  fro m  th e  s ta te - realising th a t th e y  are  tak ing  on a benign in vesto r  
(M u lc a h y , 2 0 0 9 , 2 0 1 1 ). ICT6 ind icates th a t th e  s ta te  in ves tm en t h e lped  leverage  VC
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in v e s tm e n t. H o w e v e r th e  Kl in ICT3 in d ica ted  th a t  th e  VC in d u stry  w as using th e  s ta te  
in v e s tm e n t to  m itig a te  th e ir  risk and th a t  he had been  a t p re s e n ta tio n s  w h e re  th e  VC  
firm s  w e re  u p fro n t a b o u t th is . The responses h ere  in d ica te  th e  p o licy -in -ac tio n  
across six ICT firm s . For th o se  w h o  g re w  th e ir  business (ICT1 &  ICT6), th e  s ta te  
in v e s tm e n t a p p e a re d  to  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  firm s ' g ro w th  and expansion . For th e  
re m a in d e r  o f  th e  firm s  it appears  th a t it c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e ir  survival -  o n e  IPO 'd and  
th e  re m a in in g  th re e  w e re  e v e n tu a lly  ta k e n  o ver by overseas firm s.
Table 8.6: Traditional Industry case firms -  The funding process and the use of
_______________________________ public venture capital_______________________________
Traditional industry Have you received share investment support from Enterprise Ireland and
Case firms___________________________ what was it used for?_______________________
Consumerl 'I mean I had a choice when we separated before the joint venture. I had a choice to either move
€640 000 t0 IDA or stay with EnterPrise Ireland. And I know both agencies pretty well. You know because I've
worked with both so my choice was to stay with Enterprise Ireland. Now there were two reasons 
for that, one was the network of overseas offices. Okay and the second were; at that time 
Enterprise Ireland had a very strong technology department (22).
■ - .'x . •
* 5 < ‘ ~ ‘ . % 
'Yeah - they invested because we were expanding. And also because the joint venture had
dissolved. We went back to them and we said look - well actually they approached us and askedI n  ill §  i S i  I'Si, .}»'• iV |!‘ , % us what our plans were and we explained ....' (22).
€1,270 ,000
Foodl 'Enterprise Ireland for about 15 years never supported us at all because they said it couldn't work.
Then at one stage they gave us a one million Irish pound preference share loan (€1,270,000) which 
we are now repaying, in the last two or three years with new management. They have become 
much more supportive - well also because they see it's not going to go bust. So they support us, 
now quite significant money but equally well we are very active for them not only through 
Enterprise Ireland but Bord Bia (The Irish Food Board) (25)'.
• Warehouse. I'm fairly sure I can't even remember, it's probably 15 years ago now (it was 10) that's 
how it can be repaid now, so with the €600,000. What's the coupon on that? 5%. This was fixed. 
Yes which I'd rather not because it's money I'd use elsewhere but they want it - they insist on it - 
€600,000 I'd put into marketing. I'd build another warehouse'(25)
The fu n d in g  w as used to  help  build a fa c to ry  and a w a reh o u se  according to  th e  Kl's in 
th e  tra d it io n a l firm s . T he  e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t was in ten d ed  to  su pp o rt R &D and  
h um an  cap ita l d e v e lo p m e n t. It appears  th a t th e re  w as a libera l v ie w  ta k e n  o f w h a t  
co n s titu tes  R &D .
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Have you received share investment support from Enterprise Ireland and 
what was it used for?
Biotech 1 
€650,000
'The last grant (Share investment) we had was for €650,000. Most of this was a redeemable 
research grant and the remainder a low interest loan. Enterprise Ireland annual report in 
2005 records it  as a direct equity investment in the firm. That was a low interest loan, they 
would have had shares in the company had we not paid it off. So we just decided that we still 
like to be independent' (21).
/ pi f ,  I I  § f |  i t  || * fffPP §j " I v *
Funds were used to help build a molecular biology laboratory.
Biotech 2 
€820,000
'.... it helped to have them in the early days. But, 1 mean, Enterprise Ireland, other than 
money, is of no -  has never been any use to us at all. 1 don't mean that in a bad way. It's just 
that they tend to -1 don't know. Money is probably the best way to support people, but 
again, they don't know. They'll give money -  they don't have the time to get into my business 
(20). Funds were used for R&D.
A gain fu n ds  w e re  used to  help  build a la b o ra to ry  and R&D in B io te c h l and fo r  R&D in
B io tech 2  w h o  notes  th a t  El did n o t add any va lue  -  it w as ju s t th e  m o n ey .
Table 8.8: ICT case firms -  The funding process and the use of public venture capital
ICT Case firms Have you received share investment support from Enterprise Ireland and 
what was it used for?
ICT1
€2,986,000
'...and all of a sudden they changed and said we'll give you the headcount grants but we want 5% 
as well. They started taking shares. Preference or ordinary shares is it? Ordinary shares mainly. 
:hen they continued to put money in, any time anybody put money in (VC's) they put money in and 
anytime we got grants they looked for shares so they've ended up with quite a big slice of xxxx, 
over 10%, and they have some preference shares because they even came in on that investment 
round. When really 1 didn't see the need for that but they wanted to do that as well, but they 
were very strong on us - they thought they were going to make a fortune on us (24).
■ ' =  ^• : , ' : : 
ite funny -1 approached them for headcount grants which they were giving to everybody (24).
■ ! : ; : s  i . - ;  ; ; • %  j
ICT2
€1,155 ,000
The pre-investment situation is unusual in that xxxx was only formed in 1999 and yet El invested
€1.155m in the firm (24).
However this was during the dotcom era (1999/2000) and there may have been a certain amount 
of 'irrational exuberance' in the backing of the firm -  considering the firm held the record in 
Ireland for raising money for a technology start-up at €15m. Enterprise Ireland joined the fray 
(despite the private investment raised) (24).
'El invested when the institutional investors come in, they would invest too - but they had 
invested it based on, 1 think it was based on headcount, and then separately they gave you an 
R&D grant as well. All of the money raised from El effectively was used for employing people and 
also then R&D as well' (24)
ICT3
€635,000
'XXX is a classic example - it got €635,000 off Enterprise Ireland In 1999......."We're a company
that went public without a business plan. Lost $180 million ..........
Raissing six hundred thousand euro 's-from  the state in a company that had huge ambitions 
clearly because it went public in two thousand whatever'. (31, 33).
Share capital raised was spent on Headcount and R&D.
ICT4
€698,000
'There was funding from Enterprise Ireland and 1 suppose it's like any relationship - they were 
key at the start. We mightn't be here but for that very early support' (20).
"Yeah we had an angel let's say who funded the first cheque and we were being promised money 
bv a big VC and it was slow coming. And in the end it never came and E.l. came in - in that gap. So
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then eventually other VC's came in. And then their imprimatur was on it and therefore other 
people followed in so it worked in that way' (23).
Share capital raised was spent on R & D and market development.
ICT5 'We had a relationship with them all along because we were doing it mainly for export markets.
€700 000 We said that we were raisinSfuncls ancl did they want to be part of it and they said yes. They had
the same type of shares as the venture capitalists ... which were preference'. (18)
.... I want to emphasise one thing ... Enterprise Ireland were the one organisation external to us 
that were unbelievably supportive in terms of help, in getting contacts abroad, they were very 
proactive, very helpful and I think they still are..' (18, 20).
R&D and customer development as product was bespoke initially.
" ... ' ’ .... ' ' ■ ■; . '■ ’ v- .
'They are a great advantage for Ireland. I know from talking to other people (from other countries) 
that very few countries have that degree of connected support for small enterprises starting up, 
and we've used, I think, just about every scheme that has been going. It's worked out really well 
and I think -  and vice versa as well, through other concerns, but no, we've always found 
Enterprise Ireland to be -  it's a dual thing because dealing with the individual is absolutely 
fabulous, particularly their remote (overseas) offices have always been very helpful'(17). The 
availability of scheme's - brilliant, but then there's always -  it still is a public service, it still has to 
dot the I's and cross the Ts - it still has to answer to EU law and all that (18). R &D and 
headcount.________________________________________________________________________
The ICT firms, like the biotech firms as technology intensive firms were early (in their 
growth trajectories) seekers of outside equity. El engaged with each in different 
contexts. The funding in all cases appeared to have gone into R&D and human capital 
and in tw o it also spilled over into market development.
8.3 .4  Is there  any additional evidence to  add?
The Kl's finally were asked what role they foresaw or would recommend for state 
support in future. Interestingly none mentioned equity or grant support for 
established firms going forward. It is maybe a sign of the growing maturity of the  
entrepreneurial base that they don't see grant support or state share investment as a 
panacea for their growth funding ills. The case firms, broadly speaking, would like to  
see an environm ent in the state which is conductive to doing business. This would 
include competitive input costs, fair regulation and incentives geared to export 
orientated firms and to those creating wealth. They see the state agencies in a 
'facilitating' role for g ro w th —orientated firms. The detailed comments from the Kl s 
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Firm and state co-evolving relationship
The relationship then between the indigenous firm and Enterprise Ireland (on behalf 
of the state) is an intimate -  though not always a smooth one (as explained by an ICT 
Kl's). It also appears that the relationship is of a developmentalist rather than of a 
facilitative nature. The negotiating process between the state and the firm is 
interesting in that it clearly displays the imbalance of power in the relationship 
between the firm and the state and the weakness of the firm's position when seeking 
state support.
There was funding from Enterprise Ireland and I suppose it's like any relationship - 
they were key at the start. We mightn't be here but for that very early support. [Did 
they come to you or did you go to them?]. I mean I was on the course that they were 
sponsoring and so I'd be meeting them there. And I knew them from the Industry 
association. So you know, we knew each other. They were very supportive very early 
on and they continued to support - there is a frustration that you have dealing with 
these organisations - you meet the sales person and they tell you how wonderful they 
are to support you and then you get the contract and it has lots of fine print and then 
you start working and you try to claim the money that you were promised and you are 
meeting a totally different department and they just point to some line in the fine 
print of the contract and for that reason it turns out you owe them money instead of 
them owing you money. And you know - we've had some, I would say, very bad 
experiences. Where we dealt with their representatives and were told to prepare a 
proposal and you know you work with your contact guy. [Development advisor] Yes 
the Development advisor and he advises you what to put in your proposal - oh no that 
wouldn't fly - you know. We can't fund that type of activity but you change what you 
are going to do and you put in a proposal and he discusses it with his manager and he 
comes back and he says - really we would want you to do something else so you scrap 
that and you do something else. It's time - and then you finally get one that he goes to 
his board with and his board turn it down!
The process clearly leads to frustration on the part of the firm as having put significant 
effort into putting a business plan together and 'form filling' it finds that its request is turned 
down.
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A firms' success in extracting funding from the state depends in many cases on the quality of 
their relationship with the agency -  in this case all El client firms have a 'Development 
advisor' who is their primary point of contact with the agency. The relationship does not 
always run smoothly and the difference between the 'commercial' world and the 'non 
commercial' is stark. The Kl concludes:
If I was a CEO or a senior sales manager, did a big negotiation with a customer back 
and forth and negotiated the contract and the board turned it down he would almost 
feel he had to quit - but the Enterprise Ireland advisor says "yeah you lose some you 
know" - it's just, I don't think a board should work in the way. Enterprise Ireland - they 
make a big thing of having an external board. You know external people sitting on the
board, on these boards, it's not the top board it's the The investment boards yeah,
but you know I think a board should set policy for the advisors - it should be a major 
disaster if an advisor brings a proposal to them, either he didn't understand the policy 
they said rather than them all taking it and coming in and voting and this one get's 
voted in, that one get's voted out. We've also had, as I say, good experiences -and very 
bad experiences. And you have that sort of love/hate relationship.
Thus with no overt 'Enterprise policy' in the state (O'Gorman & Cooney, 2007), a 
loosely-defined national objective and a neoliberal developmentalist ideology 
guiding it and it is little wonder that firms are faced with a 'patchwork quilt' of micro­
level interventions. Thus policy, such as it is, is emergent rather than deliberate and 
appears to be driven by the economic development implementation agency. This 
helps explain the inconsistency in the relationship between the agency and the client 
firm explained by the Kl above. Another Kl (3) -  who had a track record of raising 
venture funds in the US noted the dysfunctional situation that can be created when 
the state is involved in the venture funding market (compared to the US).
On indigenous technology firms:
We bleed them through the Enterprise Ireland system from the research grant for 
€100,000. And the problem is it creates a culture where the venture capitalists sit 
outside it and go "Well why would I put money in when I can wait for Enterprise 
Ireland to put their 600k in and then I will come in.
On El:
... and they either invest and believe that you can do it or they put a guy in who can do 
that, or they won't [invest]. But they won't sit there and try and bat [Researcher 
added] you away with €300,000 and go "well why won't you go away"? You got to 
build...you got to have strategy. Its called venture - which means there needs to be 
risk. I think Enterprise Ireland have failed at that.
On Irish VC's:
All those venture capitalists raise money off money that Enterprise Ireland gives them. 
So they get twenty million off Enterprise Ireland and then they go raise another eighty. 
They go out and their tagline, I've seen their presentation says, "Irish Governments is 
already funded, has already guaranteed 20. We're raising ..."
Breznitz (2007) concludes:
In sum, it seems as if the co-evolutionary process of state-industry relations is now out 
of step. With El's centrality in each and every point of the system and with its new zeal 
for profit-generating investment, one must wonder whether the future development 
of the indigenous software industry in Ireland [and all other sectors -  added by author] 
is now in danger of suffering a stage two failure -  the inability of the state to 
relinquish its own powers over the sectoral industrial system (Breznitz, 2007:186).
8.3.5 Can the contribution story be revised and strengthened or changed?
The case firm evidence
Table 8.10 summarises the findings of the 'contribution analysis' process outlined in 
steps one to five. This tells in broad outline the 'contribution story relating to  the  
Irish states policy of investing venture capital directly into individual firms. The logic 
chart set out in Figure 8.1 outlines the 'theory of change which shows that the states
micro-level public venture capital policy was initiated to help accelerate growth in 
the targeted firm -to 'scale-up' faster by closing the equity gap -  even though the 
initial inspiration for the policy was to find another route to directly funding firms 
when non-repayable grants were disallowed by the EU. This inadvertent move or 
'policy drift' brought El into the 'venture capital business' as it sought ways to  help 
stimulate job creation. El has since morphed into the biggest provider of VC in 
Europe (Horn, 2011).
The analysis of the financial results of the case firms (See: Table 8.2) indicates that 
tw o out the ten firms increased their return on shareholders' funds post-state 
investment and thus eight did not. The two firms which did increase shareholder 
value indicated that they would have undertaken the investment anyway. The eight 
with negative returns did not make use of the state funding to drive profitable 
growth and in five of the eight cases they merely helped accelerate the shareholder 
destruction. Indeed it is clear from the case analysis that the firms were not 
'investment-ready' (Mason & Harrison, 2001; Mulcahy, 2005a; Mason & Kwok, 2010) 
as their customer value proposition (CVP) had not been sufficiently developed and 
validated in the marketplace when the funding was taken on board. Only one case 
firm had moved (on one factor -  Balance sheet total) beyond the EU definition of an 
SME. All others -  after the analysis period, had remained below the key thresholds of 
250 employees, €50m  turnover and a €43m balance sheet total. Thus none of the ten 
case firms grew to become, per EU definition, a 'large firm' and so - if the state 
funding did help to accelerate the growth of case firms (as in the two profitable 
firms) — it made a marginal contribution in terms of helping to scale the firm. In all 
other case firms it contributed to increased R&D and headcount spend (and thus firm
scale) but not to profitability  or profit growth  and ultimately shareholder value 
creation.
The overall cohort evidence
In the overall cohort, 40 of the 51 firms decreased shareholder value with four of the  
40 ceasing trade and eight taken over by international firms. Forty five of the 51 
firms remained trading after the analysis period with 10 taken over by other firms - 
nine international.
Overall the aggregate ROIC Post -  Pre state investment return across all 51 firms in 
the study (El invested €50,376,000 in 51 firms) was minus 11.86 per cent. This does 
not account for any windfall gains by El as these are not publically disclosed 
(Mulcahy, 2005a).
In addition the logistic regression model developed in the study and described in 
Chapter 5 found no statistically significant relationship between state investment 
and firm performance as defined in this study.
M any of the non-technology driven firms in this study would not be considered as 
appropriate firms for VC in a private sector driven market. Thus the chain of evidence 
gathered here suggests that the required 'theory of change' for the Public Venture  
Capital policy is not verified in this analysis. Indeed the result of the six-stage 
'contribution analysis' is that the state's public venture capital policy is not reaching 
the primary objective envisaged for it — to close the perceived 'equity gap' for growth 
-o rien ted  indigenous firms.
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The public venture capital was expected in turn to help accelerate the growth of
the developm ent of world-class Irish companies to achieve strong positions in global
markets resulting in increased national and regional prosperity7 (Enterprise Ireland
annual report, 2008) thereby contributing towards the national objective of 'job
creation7 (Breznitz, 2012). Murray et al., (2012) noting that:
A clear lesson from the experience of advanced Western economies is that supply-side 
measures alone cannot create a viable VC industry. In addition there has to be major 
changes to the environmental ecosystem that also allow for significant improvements 
in the quality and prospects of the firms seeking VC finance (Murray etal., 2012; p.17).
Thus cognisance must also be taken of the drivers and constraints on firm
performance other than external financial resources (See: Chapters 6 & 7). This study
identified and highlighted the deficient diagnostic capabilities and implementation
skills of the leadership teams in indigenous growth-oriented firms as the primary
factor in the sub-optimal firm performance. The owner-manager related barriers
which retard the development of sustainable competitive advantage can be
addressed by increasing the absorptive capacity of the leadership team and/or by
facilitating the provision of resources to overcome growth constraints (Arnold et al.,
2004; Bessant et al., 2005).
Storey and Greene (2010) are therefore persuaded that there is, on balance, an 
economic case to  be made for public support for technology businesses in terms of 
early stage R&D support, justified on spillover grounds and funding uncertainty — 
essentially justified on 'market failure7 grounds. They cite some support for loan- 
guarantee schemes also. However Bannock (2005), Davidsson (2008), Bridge et al.
(2009) and Bennett (2012) all broadly agree with Bill et al. (2009) when they note 
that:
Numerous research studies have failed to find any positive correlation between 
support measures and development programmes on the one hand and firm growth 
and development on the other (Bill et al., 2009: p.1136).
Storey and Greene (2010) note the dearth of rigorous evaluation methodologies 
applied to  micro-level policies either -  most evaluations only reporting the views of 
recipients. This despite the fact that the OECD (2004) advocates a robust six stage 
evaluation process developed by Storey (2000).
Thus the findings from the contribution analysis in this chapter -  which is essentially 
a meta-analysis combining the empirical findings from Chapters 5, 6 & 7 and 
additional case material (Volume 2 of study) in a structured theory-based evaluation 
(TBE) fram ework -  finds no significant contribution to the acceleration of indigenous 
firm growth from the public venture capital policy intervention in the study period.
8.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has outlined the theory-based approach to evaluating the contribution  
of public venture capital to firm performance. The technique used is 'Contribution 
Analysis' — a six stage approach developed by Mayne, 2001. Firstly the logic of the  
proposed 'theory of change' was illustrated in Figure 8.1. This indicated that the  
public venture capital was intended to 'accelerate' the growth of the targeted firms 
by providing share investment for R&D and human capital. The assumption made is 
that lack of financial resources or the 'equity gap' is the major blockage on growth- 
oriented indigenous firms. Although commercialisation is considered a key barrier to
successful implementation of innovation and growth -  marketing and sales related 
spend was excluded as allowable spend. The logic map in Figure 8.1 also shows the  
large number of confounding factors present that can influence the firm growth 
process -  external funding (from whatever source) is but one.
The 'contribution analysis' approach is a meta-analytic fram ework which synthesises 
and analyses the evidence from the empirical Chapters 5, 6 & 7 and additional case 
material from Volume 2 of the study to answer the question of w hether the public 
venture capital intervention made a noticeable contribution to  an observed result 
(firm performance) and in what way?
All ten case firms analysed in the study (See: Chapter6 &7 and Volume2) were  
selected from the overall cohort of 51 for their representativeness. Each of the ten 
firms survived the post state investment analysis period of five years but only tw o  
firms increased their shareholder value through profitable trading (See: Tables 8.1; 
8.2 & 8.6). Eleven out of the 51 in the overall study created shareholder value. Five 
case firms were acquired by overseas firms (9 from 51 in the overall study), two w ent 
public (IPO) and one became an unlimited firm. Six out o f 51 firms in the cohort 
closed during the analysis period. None of the firms in the study grew beyond SME 
status in the analysis period (Only three did in the overall study). Whilst the timing of 
the state investment was considered important in a number of cases, the key 
inform ant indicated in nine of the ten cases that the investment would have 
proceeded anyway (See: Table 8.3 &.4). Six of the ten case firms have the ability to  
begin repaying — to some degree - the state share investment after the analysis
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period but only tw o could begin to do so from retained earnings as envisaged in the 
programme design.
The aggregate ROIC Post -  Pre state investment return across all 51 firms in the 
study (El invested €50,376,000 in 51 firms) was minus 11.86 per cent which is non­
performing when viewed from an investment portfolio perspective. The logistic 
regression analyses in Chapter 5 also found no significant association between the 
value of public venture capital and the firm performance measure utilised in the  
study.
The 'Contribution analysis 'shows that the primary rationale for the p o lic y -to  close 
the perceived equity gap for growth-oriented firms -  did not hold in the analysis 
period. This period (1999-2005) was a period of unprecedented economic growth in 
Ireland with low interest rates and high liquidity. Availability of capital was found 
therefore not to be the major barrier to growth performance in the period.
The evidence presented in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 6 (See: Table 6.12) and 
Chapter 7 (See: Table 7.2) and summarised here in Chapter s (Section 8.3) suggests 
that the key differentiators between performing and non-performing firms was not 
financial or resource constraint perse  but the product/m arket strategy pursued by 
the founding entrepreneur(s). Performing firms created sustainable competitive 
advantage and shareholder value through a profitable growth strategy. IMon- 
performers - primarily from the technology driven sectors - were loss making and 
thus decreased shareholder value in the analysis period by pursuing a growth to  
profit strategy. Other important differentiators were the commercialisation and 
financial bootstrapping experience of the performers, the control o f ownership and
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strategy, the relative age and sector and the diagnostic capabilities for opportunity 
and threat identification. Taken together these factors indicate that the major 
constraining factor on indigenous firm growth would appear to be the lack of 'well 
thought out, well managed projects' (Walsh, 1985).
The states involvement in the VC funding market - through El as a public venture 
capitalist -  also had a distortive effect on the risk capital provision market in Ireland 
in the analysis period. Whilst the state has been successful in seeding a VC industry in 
Ireland in the late 1990s (Mulcahy, 2005a), its continued presence after 14 years has 
not only caused market distortion -  particularly around deal pricing, valuations, exit 
policy and performance metrics -  but it has also distracted it from its original remit 
as an economic development agency. The states continued presence in providing 
direct venture capital has continued to perpetrate a 'grant mentality' and 
dependency culture not only in the client firms but also in the fledgling VC industry. 
This conflict between El's economic development goals (Job creation) and its pursuit 
of 'returns' on its venture capital investments appears to  create confusion and 
uncertainty in its relationship with its client firms. El's original mandate, as an 
economic development agency (1998), did not include 'venture capital funding'. The 
origin o f how this dual mandate arose is explained in the Contribution Analysis -  
Section 8.3. El's current remit, though conflicting, puts the agency in an all-powerful 
developmental role with client firms as the agency, on behalf o f the state, is involved 
in all stages o f firm  growth and in most of the early stages of the firm financing cycle 
also (Breznitz, 2012).
It would appear, based on the evidence presented here in the meta-analysis, that it is 
now tim e for the state to review the effectiveness of its micro - level policies given 
the weight of evidence, both in this study and internationally, questioning the 
rationale behind and effectiveness of micro-policy instruments. It is suggested that 
the state requires a deliberately-stated 'profitable firm centric' rather than 'job 
centric' enterprise policy to offer clear guidance to its implementation agency. Clear 
policy guidance would then deter the implementation agency from leading policy 
into areas outside its remit and expertise. An enterprise policy would also prevent it 
from adding to the plethora of micro-policy instruments currently available to  
indigenous grow th-oriented firms.
Finally it is suggested that this enterprise policy be developed along Simonian 
(Simon, 1968) lines so that as policy is developed - based on rigorous analysis of 
theoretical and empirical evidence and sound 'theories of change'. The policy results 
must then be rigorously evaluated as part of the industrial policy process. Policy 
learning can then take place. This then will feed into future industrial policy 
developm ent thus qualifying it as 'evidence-based'. This will ultimately lead to 
improved outcomes from the state/firm  co-evolving relationship.
Chapter 9 
Indigenous Firm Performance & Public Venture Capital in Ireland: 
Policy Implications
This chapter addresses the policy implications arising from the empirical findings in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this study.
In an increasingly globalised 21st century, R&D-intensive and rapid innovation-based 
industries are pushing the technological frontier further and at a faster rate. In such 
circumstances, a small late-developing state such as Ireland which aspires to be a 
sustainable knowledge-driven economy is required to have more sophisticated 
national economic objectives than simply 'job creation' and GDP growth.
From an industrial policy perspective, it is important that innovative 
entrepreneurship and growth-oriented indigenous firms - as key drivers of future  
growth - have their roles articulated in deliberate policy terms. It is suggested 
therefore that Irish policy-makers prioritise the development of an enterprise or 
entrepreneurship policy which articulates a clear vision for the contribution of these 
key constituencies to economic development. This deliberate entrepreneurship and 
firm-centric policy should be based upon facilitating the development o f profitable, 
high and fast growth indigenous firms on their growth trajectories. This contrasts 
with the emergent 'job-centric' policies historically pursued in Ireland.
Further, it would seem appropriate that this important value creating constituency 
are directly represented at the highest levels of government so that their interests 
can be directly considered in the formulation of fiscal, taxation, competition, 
regulatory and emigration policy.
9.1 The Future Role of an Economic Development Agency for 
Indigenous Industry in Ireland
The analysis in the empirical chapters in this study indicates that the State's attempts 
at combining the incompatible developmental and venturing remits have been 
shown to create confusion and inconsistency in the State/firm  co-evolving 
relationship. This suggests that new institutional arrangements will be required 
going forward to  rectify the situation.
The dominance of El as an agent of the state -  and the largest venture capital firm in 
Europe (Horn, 2011) in the supply side of the Irish SME financing market signifies a 
'm arket failure' not of the 'equity' or 'hard capital rationing' type but one of a more 
systemic nature. It signals the malfunctioning of the risk capital market for growing 
firms (Leleux & Surlemont, 2003) in the economy. In most developed states, risk 
capital is provided primarily by the private sector -  even if it is initially seeded by the  
state (Leleux & Surlemont, 2003; Barry & Topa, 2006; Breznitz, 2007; Senor & Singer, 
2009; Lerner, 2009; 2010). Indeed, Levine (1997) notes the direct relationship 
between the development of a states' financial system and economic development.
Even if the state intervenes and seeds a 'market failure' situation - as the Irish state 
did when seeding the infant VC industry in the 1990's (Barry & Topa, 2006) - it 
should, in the interests of market efficiency, step back and allow the private sector to  
drive the development of the market. This will ensure that perceived market failure 
is not replaced by government failure (Senor & Singer, 2009). Enterprise Ireland is 
now in its second decade in the venture capital market and continues to deepen its 
involvement.
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W ithdrawal from the venture capital role would allow Enterprise Ireland, as an 
economic development agency, to redefine its relationship with its client firms from  
its current directive approach to a more facilitative one (See: Kl comments in Section 
4 of Chapter 8 - Contribution analysis). It would also allow it to re-focus on its 
developm ent agenda around uncontested 'm arket failure' areas such as the 
facilitation o f high potential start-ups (HPSUs), business R&D under-spend and in­
market support for firm internationalisation through its overseas office network, the  
building of stronger linkages with the FDI base and facilitating access to public 
procurement for SMEs.
Finally this refocusing in approach would also have the benefit of lessening 
indigenous firms dependence on grant-aid (Mulcahy, 2009; 2011, 2012) and also 
elim inate the Irish States subsidising of private sector venture capital investment.
9.2 Indigenous Firm Development in Ireland -  Policy Implications 
(Supply-Side)
The primary role of the State, from a supply-side perspective, is to provide a 
conductive macro-economic environment and regulatory framework for competition 
to flourish in all sectors of the economy (Lerner, 2009; Storey & Greene, 2010). In 
particular, the State must ensure that the financial system has the institutional 
arrangements and liquidity to provide the necessary private sector funding for the  
international development of indigenous firms (in all sectors) as an important 
elem ent in the 'w ider setting' of the National Innovation System (Lundvall, 2010).
The functioning of the market system is even more important in a small state, like 
Ireland, given the increased levels of social cohesion found. A greater tendency
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therefore exists for the state to intervene in areas best left to the market to  
arbitrate. The industrial history of the Irish State since it became outward focused in 
the 1950's (Donnelly, 2012; Breznitz, 2012) demonstrates that the contradictory 
'neoliberal developmentalist' ideology that took hold in that period still pervades 
industrial policy thinking today (Breznitz, 2007; 2012).
The empirical findings in this study mirror those of studies in other jurisdictions in 
confirming that micro-level policy interventions are shown to make marginal or no 
identifiable contribution to firm performance (Bannock, 2005; Davidsson, 2008; Bill 
et al., 2009; Bridge et al., 2009; Bridge, 2010). Micro-level policy instruments are also 
not rigorously evaluated for policy learning purposes (Storey & Greene, 2010). For 
these reasons, it is suggested that, in future, 'hard' micro-level interventions in 
Ireland are only utilised in severe capital rationing or economic crises situations. If 
utilised then they should be rigorously evaluated using theory based evaluation (TBE) 
(See: Chapter 8).
9.3 Indigenous Firm Growth Performance in Ireland -  Policy 
Implications (Demand-side)
In addition to  the institutional deficiencies in the State support system, the empirical 
evidence presented here also finds that there were deficiencies in the dynamic 
capabilities and core competencies of the selected indigenous firms in the study. The 
firms in the study were selected for support by the State as potential 'fast or high 
growth' firms. The selection of the firms in the study shows a bias by the state for the 
technology sectors in general and the software sector in particular (See: Chapter 5). 
The State, by investing in 'selected' firms is intervening in the more efficient market 
process of allocating scarce resources from less innovative to more innovative actors
within the state (Schumpeter, 1934). It therefore runs the risk of creating 
deadweight and/or displacement and filing a perceived 'equity or finance gap' which 
may not exist (M urray et al., 2012).
M ore importantly, the performance outcomes demonstrate the inability of the 
majority of leadership teams in the case-study firms to create competitive advantage 
through the strategy-making process. As potential high growth firms, all firms in the  
study were successful in raising funding and accumulating resources to underpin 
growth but only a minority could generate a profitable return on the capital base 
accumulated over the eight year period under analysis. The role o f policy-makers at 
the micro-level in the small state, would appear to be to 'facilitate' growth-oriented  
firms to develop their diagnostic capabilities and implementation skills to identify 
and surmount those barriers which retard the development of sustainable 
competitive advantage. This can be achieved by assisting in increasing the absorptive 
capacity of leadership teams and/or by facilitating the provision of resources to  
overcome growth constraints (Arnold et al., 2004; Bessant e t al., 2005). This type of 
intervention, if appropriate, is best achieved by providing firm owner-managers with 
opportunities to develop the requisite diagnostic capabilities and resource 
acquisition skills. This will then underpin effective strategy development and 
im plem entation to create competitive advantage (O'Gorman, 2012).
Providing resources, particularly financial, to firms with strategic and structural 
deficiencies (e.g. young and/or internationally-inexperienced) without correcting for 
these weaknesses, can be expected to lead to a higher probability of such firms being 
unable to  reach their projected growth targets (See: Chapters 5, 6 &7). Requiring
small firm owners to produce formal plans however, will not help them  address and 
correct the strategic and structural deficiencies identified above. 'Soft' micro-level 
interventions may be appropriate in helping address the strategic and structural 
deficiencies of indigenous firms but should be utilised only where the private sector 
is incapable or unwilling to address the validated need.
Given the heterogeneous requirements of the SME sector, the State would be well 
advised to  avoid 'hard' micro-level interventions in the future except in the most 
extrem e situations (Bennett, 2012). Profitable growth can come from a variety of 
sectors -  and in a variety of ways. There are myriad factors at play in determining  
and influencing the growth performance of the growth-orientated indigenous firm  
but the product/m arket strategic competencies o f the leadership team is key - with 
customer-facing capabilities a necessary requ irem ent.'
Finally the case-study evidence suggests that the State should, given its rich firm - 
level data bases, actively engage in empirical evaluative research with the local and 
international academic communities. This will allow greater involvement by the  
academic community in 'evidence-based' policy development (Mason & Brown, 
2011). This would in turn improve the states' level of insight into SME growth 
performance and the contribution that Government macro and micro-level policy 
might make to that performance. Adopting this Simonian approach (Simon, 1968) 
will allow appropriate iterative policy learning which can input into future 'evidence- 
based' policy making and thus facilitate future 'rapid policy deployment' in Ireland.
9.4 Summary & Conclusions
This chapter addressed the policy implications emanating from the empirical findings 
from chapters 5-8.
Enterprise policy has evolved historically in the Irish state in an emergent and fluid 
fashion since the advent of the states export-oriented industrial policy in 1958. It is 
suggested that a deliberately stated enterprise or entrepreneurship policy is now  
required to  provide guidance and coherence to the state support system for growth- 
oriented indigenous firms.
As a consequence of this historic lack of policy guidance, the institutional 
arrangements which evolved in Ireland to support indigenous industry are operating  
sub optimally. Enterprise Ireland (El) -  the implementation organisation to emerge 
from  the evolving policy process - now has responsibility for the economic 
developm ent of indigenous industry and public venture capital. This was shown to  
create conflict and inconsistency in the state/firm  co-evolving relationship. 
W ithdrawing from public venturing would allow El to re-define its relationship with  
its client firms from a directive to a facilitative approach and also allow it to focus 
exclusively on its economic development remit.
The findings in this study further corroborate the findings in other jurisdictions on 
'hard' micro-level policy interventions, namely that there is no evidence as yet of 
their contribution to individual firm performance. It is therefore suggested that 
rigorous theory-based evaluation (which there is also no strong evidence of) is 
required to build up the evidence base. In the absence of such evidence it is further
suggested that micro-level instruments might only be utilised by policymakers in 
severe capital rationing or economic crises situations otherwise there is a risk of 
misdiagnosis o f the causal issue and the potential for the creation of deadweight 
and/or displacement.
The primary role o f the state, from a supply-side perspective, should be to provide a 
supportive macro-economic environment and regulatory fram ework for competition 
to flourish in all sectors of the Irish economy. In particular the state must ensure that 
the domestic financial system can support the international development of its 
indigenous stock as an important part o f the wider setting of the national innovation 
system.
The empirical evidence presented in this study demonstrates the difficulties faced by 
the state in attem pting to pick and make winners. In the past the state has biased its 
choices towards the technology sectors in general and the software industry in 
particular. In future policymakers must take a broader view of the knowledge- 
creation and diffusion possibilities of all sectors with internationally trading 
potential. High and fast growth firms can emanate from a variety of sectors -  and in 
a variety o f ways (Mason & Ross, 2010).
Finally the performance of the firms in the study demonstrates the inability of the  
m ajority o f leadership teams to create competitive advantage through the strategy 
process in the period under analysis. Policy interventions, where appropriate, must 
focus on developing the skills and capacity of the leadership teams to identify, 
validate and exploit profitable growth opportunities.
Chapter 10
Indigenous Firm Performance & Public Venture Capital in Ireland: 
Conclusions & Implications
The Irish State has been actively attempting to stimulate increased export activity by 
its indigenous stock of firms since the late 1950s. This was done to help achieve the  
national mission of 'job creation' (Breznitz, 2007, 2012). W hile indigenous exports 
have increased substantially in value since then and the composition of those exports 
has evolved into more technology-driven sectors, the prognosis is not all positive.
The contribution of indigenous exports has reached a plateau in recent years, 
growing by just 1.2 per cent in value between 2000 and 2005 -  an acknowledged 
boom tim e for the Irish economy (Forfas, 2006). The contribution of indigenous 
industries to overall exports in 2009 stood at nine per cent by value, down from 26 
per cent in 1991 (Forfas, 2009). These trends reflect the increasing dependence of 
the Irish economy on multinational enterprises. They also call into question, not only 
the international competitiveness of Ireland's SME stock, but also the role and 
effectiveness of the State support system for indigenous firm development in 
Ireland. If international competitiveness needs to be built upon improved levels of 
productivity and innovation then, in Ireland's case, it is indigenous industry where  
the greatest improvements in competitiveness can be made (Small Business Forum, 
2005; Forfas, 2007). Small and medium-sized firms account for 99.5 per cent of 
Ireland's firm stock, 66.5 per cent of its industrial employment but only 55.6 per cent 
of value added to the national economy (Chapter l:Table 1.1, Deakins & Freel, 2006).
The contribution of Government support -  particularly direct public venture capital -  
to indigenous firm growth and development in Ireland and other smaller states is 
therefore an interesting area that has been given insufficient emphasis in the firm  
growth and SME policy literature. This thesis contributes to closing this research gap 
by analysing the contribution of direct public venture capital to indigenous firm  
performance in Ireland. This chapter restates the principal research questions and 
objectives and reviews the research methods deployed in the study. The main 
sections of the Chapter summarise the empirical results and discusses their 
implications.
10.1 Indigenous Firm Performance & Public Venture Capital in Ireland: 
Objectives of the Study
As noted in Chapter 1, this study is based on the central research questions of: W hat 
role does public venture capital play in accelerating the growth performance o f 
indigenous grow th-oriented SMEs in the small late developing state and how might 
its contribution be evaluated at firm  and policy level? Three related research 
questions are framed around the factors which positively influence indigenous firm  
performance, the barriers to firm growth and the possible lessons for other small 
sovereign states and self-governing regions from the Irish policy approach.
M ore specifically, these research questions are stated as research objectives. The 
principal objective of the study is to evaluate the role and contribution of direct 
public venture capital (as a policy instrument) in stimulating or accelerating the  
growth performance of Irish growth-oriented SMEs. A second objective is to identify 
other possible factors that positively influence the performance of growth—oriented
SMEs in Ireland whilst the third objective is to establish the possible factors
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constraining the growth performance o f indigenous Irish SMEs. Based upon the 
empirical findings for Ireland, the next objective is to  recommend a future role for 
State support in the growth and development of SMEs. The final objective is to 
assess the extent to which the lessons learned from the Irish experience are 
applicable to  other small later developing states.
The study uses a proprietary dataset of fifty-one Irish firms (67 per cent technology- 
based and 33 per cent from traditional industry). Each firm received public venture  
capital from the Irish State - a minimum of €635,000(IR£500,000) up to a maximum  
of €3 ,291 ,000 in one of the calendar years 1999-2005. The mean public venture 
capital investment per firm is €987,000. These share investments were provided 
through the Irish State's economic development agency for indigenous industry -  
Enterprise Ireland (See: Chapter 5, Table 5.16).
The firms selected for investment by Enterprise Ireland are prime examples of the  
Irish State's attem pt to 'pick and make winners' (Carr, 2000a) and are thus an 
appropriate firm population for study. This cohort of firms allows clear distinctions to  
be made between those firms creating shareholder value through profitable trading  
and those firms decreasing shareholder value over the analysis period. The fifty-one 
firms in the study received 33 per cent (€50.4m) of the total direct venture funds 
dispensed (€153.lm ) to individual firms in the analysis period 1999- 2005. This, in 
spite of accounting for only 8 per cent of the total number of firms supported by the  
end of the analysis period. The State therefore signalled that it viewed these firms as 
having the greatest potential for 'fast or high growth'.
All major Irish indigenous exporting sectors are represented in the study; policy­
makers demonstrated a clear selection bias for younger technology-based firms -  
particularly those from the software sector (O'Riain, 2004; Breznitz, 2007, 2012). 
Fifty-four per cent of the public venture capital funding in the study was allocated to  
firms in the ICT and high-technology manufacturing sectors -  a total of 35 firms, with  
an average investment of €733,000 per firm. The sixteen firms in the traditional 
sectors received €1,456,000 on average per firm, reflecting the age, scale, sectoral 
and capital intensity differences between the two groups.
The study uses a 'mixed method' research design which facilitates a triangulation 
approach (both data and methodological). This approach utilises a combination of 
com plem entary quantitative and qualitative research methods to increase 
confidence in the overall research findings.
In this study, triangulation is achieved in a number of ways. In data terms, this is 
done by collecting differing types of data relating to the participant firms. Financial 
and legal data, such as profit and loss statements, balance sheets, articles and 
mem orandum of association and share registers, are combined with press data, 
archival data, key informant interview data and database sources to provide a 
richness and credibility to the study that a single source could not achieve. In 
methodological terms, the study is careful to combine quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, such as logistic regression, case analysis, cross-case analysis and 
contribution analysis to provide the requisite internal validity and reliability.
10.2 Indigenous Firm Performance & Public Venture Capital in Ireland: 
Principal findings
This section summarises the principal empirical findings of the study in order of 
importance.
Finding 1 is on the Policy Rationale & Policy Development Process for Public 
Venture Capital Support in Ireland
Finding 2 is on the Role & Contribution of Public Venture Capital to Indigenous 
Firm Performance in Ireland
Finding 3 is on the Factors Differentiating between Performing & Non-Performing 
Firms in Ireland (Cross-Case Analysis)
Finding 1: On the Policy Rationale & Policy Development Process for Public 
Venture Capital Support in Ireland
Industrial Policy Rationale & Evolution in Ireland
Ireland is a small state that has historically faced high levels of unemployment, 
emigration and economic crises in its economic development trajectory. It is 
therefore not surprising to find that from an industrial policy perspective, 'job 
creation' has been elevated to the de facto  national objective. This has certainly been 
the case since the Irish State embraced an export-oriented industrial policy and free- 
trade principles in the late 1950s (Stationery Office, 1958a, b). The development of 
Irish industrial policy in this period however, appears to have been heavily influenced 
by the inherently contradictory ideology of 'neoliberal developmentalism' in pursuit 
of the loosely-defined national objective (Breznitz, 2012). Consequently the Irish 
State's economic development organisations tasked with trying to achieve this 
objective have been vested with immense power, influence and resources. The policy 
towards foreign multinationals promises and delivers on providing substantial 
numbers of jobs although the related spillover effects and direct linkages into the  
wider economy have been more limited than anticipated (Ruane & Ugur, 2005; Gorg,
2007). In contrast, indigenous industry in Ireland promises not only smaller numbers 
of jobs per project but higher corporate failure rates and thus they remain 
problematic for policy-makers to deal with.
Foreign multinational enterprises therefore gained policy priority in Ireland. 
Indigenous industries, on the other hand, have faced institutional discrimination with  
regard to tax rates, financial support and land allocation (O'Riain, 2004; Sterne, 
2005). Whereas the Irish State sees its role as facilitating the activities o f the 
multinationals through its economic development agency -  IDA Ireland - it takes a 
more direct 'd e v e lo p m e n ta l' approach to indigenous industry through its 
developm ent agency, Enterprise Ireland. Since 1994, both agencies have reported to  
Forfas, the national policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology 
and innovation in Ireland.
Enterprise Policy in Ireland: Emergent & Fluid
The Irish State first began to adopt a more positive attitude to indigenous industry 
afte r  firms from the emergent software sector began to achieve global success in the  
early 1990s without significant state support (Sterne, 2004). While the policy for 
attracting foreign multinationals to Ireland is a deliberate and well developed one, 
the enterprise policy for indigenous industry remains largely emergent and fluid, fifty  
years on. This helps explain the plethora of micro-level policy instruments available 
to  indigenous firms in Ireland and the lack of policy coherence at the 
State/indigenous firm interface (O'Gorman & Cooney, 2007). The subsequent lack of 
rigorous evaluation of these micro-level instruments (Lenihan & Hart, 2006) can also 
be explained by the lack of policy guidance and the absence of an evaluation culture.
This emergent micro-policy approach therefore brings the economic development 
agency into areas outside its originally intended remit and expertise in pursuit of the  
national 'job creation' objective (Section 8.3).
Public Venture Capital in Ireland as a Micro-Level Policy
As a consequence of its attempts to help accelerate the international growth of 
indigenous firms though direct share investments, the Irish State finds itself with an 
investment portfolio of over six hundred direct investments (2005) in indigenous 
firms (Table 5.3). Enterprise Ireland's entry into the venture capital market on behalf 
of the State in 1998 originally arose from Ireland's attempts to remain within EU 
state-aid rules on grant aid. It achieved this by replacing non-repayable grants to 
firms with repayable equity grants. These repayable grants were subsequently 
amalgamated into a share portfolio with share investments that Enterprise Ireland 
inherited on its formation from the Industrial Development Authority (IDA). Share 
acquisitions in indigenous firms on behalf of the State originally began in 1988. 
Consequently the Irish state has become the largest venture capital company in 
Europe in terms of the numbers of projects funded (Horn, 2011).
Economic Development & Public Venture Capital in Ireland
The Irish State entered the venture capital market in Ireland originally to  correct a 
perceived 'm arket failure' (Mulcahy, 2005a) - fourteen years later, it remains the  
largest domestic player. The Irish State's continuing presence causes market 
distortion around deal pricing, valuations, exit strategy and performance reporting 
(Chapter 8:Section 8.3, Mulcahy, 2005; Breznitz, 2007). This 'policy drift' into public 
venture capital has resulted in a broadening of the economic development agency's
remit. It is now responsible, by default, for economic development and for 
generating financial returns as a public venture capitalist -  all with respect to the 
same cohort of growth-oriented firms. It is unclear which role takes priority in any 
given situation and this involvement places the State in a difficult position when 
economic development objectives clash with the venture financing objectives of its 
implem entation agency. This dual mandate has had a detrimental effect on the co- 
evolving relationship between the Irish State and the grow th-oriented indigenous 
firm  (Chapter 8 -  Section 8.3.5; Breznitz, 2012).
Sustainable Job Creation in Ireland as a Consequence of Profitable Growth
The Irish State's logic for financially supporting indigenous firms is to close the 
perceived 'equity gap' that exists for them . Investing in these firms, it is argued, 
stimulates them  to accelerate their international growth. This has the theoretical 
effect of increasing employment and contributing towards the national objective of 
'job creation'. The State's focus on job creation perse  as an overarching objective 
however, appears to blind it to the myriad other factors besides State investment 
that might determ ine or influence job creation by indigenous firms (Figure 8.1). 
Sustainable jobs are a consequence of profitable growth and value creation by 
indigenous firms and it is therefore not an appropriate measure o f growth and value 
creation. This study demonstrates that the 'chain of logic' in value creation is 
im portant; i.e., 'profitable' firm growth leads to the creation of sustainable 
competitive advantage which leads to shareholder value creation and this, in turn, 
leads to increased employment once the value is retained in the firm (Chapter 2: 
Appendix 1). The primary long-term objective of industry policy therefore should be 
to facilitate the 'profitable' international growth of the maximum number of growth-
oriented indigenous firms (Chapters 6 & 7) given their disproportionate contribution 
to economic growth (See: Table 3.1).
Finding 2: The Role & Contribution of Public Venture Capital to Indigenous Firm 
Performance in Ireland
Having outlined the findings on the policy rationale and policy development process, 
it is possible then to summarise the findings on the role and contribution of the  
public venture capital investments to subsequent indigenous firm performance.
Indigenous Firm Performance in Ireland
Eight years of financial data was gathered on each firm in the study (n = 51) and a 
post minus pre State investment performance measure was developed as a 
dependent variable. A before-and-after measure indicates w hether a firm increased 
or decreased shareholder value in the period after the public venture capital 
injection. Based upon this 'going concern' measure, forty firms decreased 
shareholder value and eleven increased shareholder value. The aggregate ROIC post 
minus pre State investment return across all firms in the study was minus 11.86 per 
cent. This indicates that, in the absence of windfall gains (which are not publically 
disclosed), the cohort of firms in the study have collectively been unable to begin 
repaying the Irish State's investment after five years (post- investment) from  
retained earnings as envisaged (See: Chapter 5: Section 5.2). Considered as a 
portfolio of venture capital investments, this cohort of firms would therefore be 
considered as non-performing — on the basis of its collective trading performance 
(M ohr e ta l., 2009:4).
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Firm Performance & Public Venture Capital in Ireland
The logistic regression model developed to test the relationship between State 
investment value and Shareholder Value (Model 2) was found to be statistically 
significant, p-value=0.031<0.05. 'Pseudo7 R2 (3 2 .3 5 -4 3 .2 % ) and Hosm er&  
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic = .457>.05. The classification table classified 78.4  
per cent correct which is well above the chance 'hit rate '(PRE) for the null model of 
48 per cent. W ell fitting models are 25 per cent or more above the base rate. The 
statistical significance of the model held when the model was run entering all 
independent variables in tw o blocks and when using a backward stepwise procedure. 
There was one statistically significant predictor variable - Firm age, p-value= 
0.043>0.05. Although contributing to the overall significance of the model, all other 
control variables and the variable of prime interest -  State investment was not 
statistically significant for this cohort of firms.
In conclusion, the model developed for this study suggests that Public Venture 
Capital (PVC) made a marginal contribution at best to indigenous firm performance.
Finding 3: On the Factors Differentiating Between Performing & Non-Performing 
Firms in Ireland (Cross-Case Analysis)
This study also investigates other factors besides public venture capital that are 
regarded in the literature as influencing factors on indigenous firm performance. Ten 
representative case-study firms drawn from the overall population of the 51 firms in 
the study were selected (See: Chapters 4, 6 & 7). The performance measure 
considered is shareholder value creation (as in the overall study). Those firms with a 
positive return on invested capital (ROIC) from profitable growth were grouped into 
one cohort. Three firms in the study (Foodl, Biotechl and ICT1 — Chapter 6. Figure
6.2 & Table 6.5) qualified for inclusion in this group based upon their profit 
generation performance. The remaining seven cases all decreased -  to varying 
degrees -  shareholder value over the eight-year analysis period through unprofitable 
trading. Any shareholder value growth recorded by this group was a result of further 
capital injections only. These were (ICT2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Biotech2 and Consumerl). See 
Chapter 6: Figure 6.3 & Table 6.6). These seven firms were grouped into the 
Shareholder Value-decreasing cohort.
The influences on firm shareholder value creation or value decrease were then 
analysed in these case firms (See: Volume 2 for case-study firm profiles) utilising a 
fram ew ork developed by Storey (1994) and Smallbone & W yer (2006). The cross­
case analysis highlights the factors that differentiate between the performing and 
non-performing firms over the eight-year analysis period. Chapter 6: Table 
summarises the variables considered in the analysis.
The 'Profitable Growth' Imperative & Defined Product/Market Growth Strategy as 
Key Differentiators in Ireland
The cross-case analysis differentiates between shareholder value creators and firms 
decreasing shareholder value along a number of related dimensions (Chapter 6:
Table 6.12). Shareholder value creators are those case-study firms that returned a 
profit on shareholder investment by the end of the eight-year analysis period 
through profitable trading (Chapter 6: Table 6.5 & Figure 6.2). These profits arose as 
a consequence of the firms' successful product/m arket strategies, all of which were  
differentiated, niche strategies (Smallbone e ta l, 1995) and which created sustainable 
competitive advantage. The profitable growth firms all combined market 
developm ent and product development strategies (Ansoff, 1957). These firms also
executed their deliberate and/or emergent strategies with a clear 'profitable growth' 
or 'commercially-driven' imperative (Davidsson, 2005; Davidsson eta !., 2008a,
2008b, 2010; Steffans et al., 2009). This contrasts with the scale-driven 'grow to  
profit' strategy pursued in the majority of non-performing firms.
The performing case-study firms included here were able to maintain or restore their 
profitable growth in spite of the constraints that they encountered along the way. 
The resource-acquisition barriers listed in Chapter 2: Table 2.3, particularly capital 
acquisition was perceived by both value creators and value decreasers alike to be 
less influential in the analysis period. It was the quality of the resource usage and 
deploym ent - through strategy development and implementation - which was 
regarded as most important. Firm leadership competence therefore, including its 
diagnostic, analytic and absorptive capacities and capabilities, are captured in the  
strategies pursued (O'Gorman, 2001). The lesser impact of resource-acquisition 
barriers may be explained by the fact that the investment analysis period 1999 -  
2005 was a tim e when the Irish economy was growing at unprecedented rates. 
Obtaining investment finance and funds from outside sources was therefore less 
problematic in Ireland than in tim e of slower growth or recession (Finfacts, 2012).
Financial Bootstrapping Experience as Key Differentiator in Ireland
The entrepreneurs behind the profitable case-study firms all had previous 
commercial experience and had financially 'bootstrapped' (Bhide, 1992; Winborg & 
Landstrom, 2001; Harrison et al. 2004) their current or previous ventures. They 
therefore had a clear vision and realistic growth ambitions for their ventures, as well
as the skills/experience to achieve their growth aspirations. The entrepreneurs in the  
non-performing firms, on the other hand, lacked international customer-facing and 
commercial experience. The majority of the owner/managers came from either 
operational, technical or research backgrounds (See: Chapter 6: Table 6.5). In 
particular, the ICT case-study firms appear to have experienced major problems 
hiring board-level sales/marketing staff thereby impairing their market opportunity  
identification and customer acquisition capabilities. The leadership teams were  
therefore unbalanced. These findings are consistent with the contention of Bessant 
et al. (2005) that the barriers to small firm growth are commercial rather than of a 
technological nature. In small states, this commercialisation barrier is exacerbated 
when the shallow pool of leadership talent is factored in.
Firm Ownership & Control of Strategic Direction as Key Differentiator in Ireland
The founding entrepreneurs in the profitably performing firms all retained ownership 
control of their businesses to the end of the analysis period. Two of the firms remain 
privately-owned and one was a non-quoted PLC with a loyal shareholder base.
A common feature of the non-performing firms however, was that the external 
funding raised appears to have been prematurely  taken on board; in hindsight, the  
firms appeared not to have been 'investor ready' (BWCA, 2003; Mulcahy, 2005a). 
Funding was provided by investors and accepted by the founding entrepreneurs 
before a clear customer value proposition (CVP) had been developed. Control of 
strategic direction was thus 'ceded' early in the growth process and was being driven 
increasingly over tim e by the external shareholders. This happened in those case- 
study firms where the growth performances projected by the founder(s) failed to
m eet investors' expectations and the internally-generated funding remained 
inadequate to fund growth (Chapter 6:Table 6.4 & Figure 6.3).
By the end of the eight-year analysis period, only one case-study firm from the non­
performing cohort remained independent. Two were taken over by US corporations, 
one by a UK corporation, one by a European corporation, one by an Asian 
corporation and one became a PLC. Value realisation for shareholders in these firms 
therefore occurred not only outside the original firm ownership structure but also, in 
five of the seven cases, outside the State.
Firm Age/Sector as Key Differentiator in Ireland
The case-study firms that experienced shareholder value decreases came primarily 
from the ICT (5), Biotech (1) and Consumer (1) sectors. These firms were younger on 
average than the value-creating firms (a mean of 3.5 years versus 8.1 years 
respectively). The consumer products firm (Consumerl) decreased shareholder 
value primarily as a result of the severe downturn in the construction sector and was 
forced to scale back its operations significantly while staying in business. The 
remaining firms were from technology-driven sectors with each receiving early-stage 
external funding which 'encouraged' the firm along a 'growth to profit' trajectory. 
One ICT firm - ICT6 - was just reaching profitability by the end of the analysis period 
while the remaining four ICT firms remained on loss-making trajectories until their 
acquisition by overseas firms. The Biotech case firm (Biotech2) remains independent, 
loss-making and dependent upon the continued support of its investors for survival 
(Table 6.4 &  Figure 6.3).
Market Growth as Key Differentiator in Ireland
Each of the shareholder value-creating firms, while from different sectors, operated 
in markets that experienced growth over the analysis period; with each of these 
firms capitalising to some degree on the growth opportunities that this presented. 
These strong performing firms were found to be capable of dealing with 
environmental threats and were able to recognise, evaluate and grasp environmental 
opportunities while maintaining or returning to profitability during the analysis 
period. They therefore displayed 'diagnostic capabilities' for opportunity and threat 
identification (Arnold e ta /., 2004; Dimov, 2012). On the other hand, shareholder 
value-decreasing firms from the technology-driven sectors did not develop and 
im plem ent robust strategies to create sustainable competitive advantage.
In almost all cases, the non-performing firms experienced difficulties, for the reasons 
explained, in gaining sales traction. While international markets were buoyant in 
most sectors, the ICT firms in particular, were attempting to market software and 
hardware products and services utilising established technologies. As the markets 
had form ed, they therefore encountered competition and /o r  customer resistance to  
their value propositions. The Biotech firm (Biotech2), markets a disruptive 
technology which has yet to be established as the dominant design in its sector 
owing to end-user resistance; investors have however continued to support the  
firms' efforts.
Implications of the Findings for indigenous Firm Growth in Ireland
It is possible to  conclude from the evidence found in the quantitative, cross-case, 
contribution and underlying case analysis (Volume 2) that the primary growth 
constraint in the study period was internal firm-related factors rather than external
resource availability. The primary barrier to firm growth in the period would appear 
to  have been a lack of 'well thought out, well managed projects' (Walsh, 1985). The 
evidence further suggesting that it was the ability of the individual firms' leadership 
teams to develop competitive advantage through the strategy process which 
differentiates the profitable from unprofitable firms.
10.3 Policy Implications for Other Small Developing States
The policy implications of the empirical findings in Chapters 5-8 for Ireland are 
addressed in Chapter 9. Although this study is a case analysis on Ireland, there are 
resonances for other small open states from the findings in this study. Those small 
states wishing to maximise the value-add from their stock of indigenous firms, must 
firstly create an institutional framework and innovation eco-system which 
incentivises and facilitates the development of knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship, fast and high growth firms and firm internationalisation. This is 
best done by having a deliberately stated Enterprise Policy to guide policy actions. 
The small states taxation, emigration, regulation, fiscal and competition policy will all 
impact on growth-oriented firms and therefore this key wealth generating 
constituency's interests should be separately represented at the highest political 
levels.
Secondly, it is recommended that Enterprise Policy at the micro-level should focus on 
shareholder value creation (as defined in this study -  See: Chapter 2: Appendix 1) 
rather than on firm growth per se - as a necessary precursor to sustainable job 
creation. Shareholder value can best be created (and retained in the state) by 
facilitating and incentivising the entrepreneurial leaders of fast and high growth firms
to build businesses where appropriate, to IPO. Small states, based on the findings 
here, should avoid the tem ptation to use 'hard' micro-level policy instruments as 
there appears to be little or no empirical evidence as yet to show that they work in 
practice. They can - in the worst case be counter-productive - creating deadweight 
and/or displacement. Additionally, their use fosters a grant or hand-out mentality in 
indigenous firms and an interventionist ethos in policy implementation bodies -  
particularly in the absence of clear Enterprise policy guidance. Capital rationing or 
economic crises situations would appear to offer the only justifications for their use. 
'Soft' micro-level policy instruments may be appropriate if they can be shown to help 
develop competitive advantage in indigenous firms. Either way, small states should 
inculcate a strong and transparent evaluation culture so that industrial policy 
interventions, where appropriate, are rigorously assessed for performance and policy 
learning purposes.
10.4 Limitations of the Research
Although this study is comprehensive in addressing the research questions posed, it 
does have a number of limitations from a data and methodological perspective.
These limitations are acceptable given the novel nature of the research area.
Data Issues
In terms of data, the study depends upon the number of firms obtaining over 0.5m  
Irish Pounds (€635,000) in public venture capital during the analysis period (1999- 
2005). This data was extracted from the Annual Reports of Enterprise Ireland and
cross-referenced to the FAME database to create a unique proprietary dataset for
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the study. The total number of recipient firms came to fifty-one from 1999 to 2005 -  
representing 33 per cent of the total direct public venture capital invested in the  
period under analysis. Information is not publicly available for firms receiving less 
than 0.5m Irish pounds for this period. In addition, only tw o years financial data was 
available for the selected cohort of firms -  pre-State investment. This was owing to  
incomplete filings of annual returns in the early part of the period under review. 
Sufficient data was collected however, to establish a baseline of data for the pre­
state investment period. This dataset provides im portant new evidence on the role 
and contribution of public venture capital investment to indigenous firm  
performance in Ireland and also provides a baseline for future research on the  
subject.
Methodological Issues
The methodological limitations of the study stem directly from the data limitations 
outlined above. The variables analysed in the dataset are of a non-param etric  
nature. A robust non-parametric quantitative technique, in addition to qualitative 
case, cross-case and contribution analysis however, are employed to mitigate the  
effects of the limitations of the proprietary dataset. In spite of these limitations, the  
study is an im portant addition to the empirical knowledge base in this currently 
under-researched area. This study also has resonance in the wider 'Policy evaluation' 
and 'small firm growth' empirical literature.
10.5 Avenues for Future Research
To the author's knowledge, this study is unique in its use of the combination of data 
analysis techniques employed to answer the research questions and research
objectives. It is thus an example of how mixed methods can be used to answer 
complex research questions in future research at the public policy and small business 
interface in small states such as Ireland.
Additionally the study raises a number of interesting questions on the development 
of Innovative entrepreneurship, growth-oriented Indigenous firms and early 
internationalisation in small states. Comparative studies with other late developing 
small states would yield further insights into the behaviour of these key engines of 
economic growth in small states. It would also extend the generalisability of the  
results to  other small economies.
A lack of funding and tim e limitations have prevented further research in the present 
study but the research techniques and approach adopted here serve as a useful 
blueprint for future studies in each of the research areas mentioned, both within and 
between small states.
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Re: Indigenous Firm growth in a small, open knowledge-based economy
Dear [Name]
I am writing to you to request your participation in a nationally important research 
project on the drivers of growth in established Irish based businesses. This study is 
being conducted by me, Tony Buckley, http://ie.linkedin.com/pub/anthonv- 
bucklev/13/360/506 as part of my dissertation for the award of PhD in management 
in Lancaster University Management School 
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/phd/profiles/anthonv-bucklev/.
My research is fully supported by my employer the Dublin Institute of Technology. 
See: http://www.dit.ie/studv/postgraduate/browse/programmes/title.545.en.html
If you are willing to participate I will arrange for a convenient time and place to 
conduct an in-depth interview lasting around 60 minutes. The interview will explore 
the growth path of your company since the turn of the century. I have already 
accessed the public documents on your company and so the interview will focus on 
the influences on and the determinants of the company's performance as perceived 
by you.
With your consent I would record the interview with the undertaking that it would 
not be available to anyone other than me and the transcribers. A copy of the typed 
transcript will be provided to you to check for accuracy and to add any additional 
comments. Names of businesses and people can be withheld. The project has 
received approval from the research ethic s committee in Lancaster University.
I will contact you next week to see if you can participate and if possible we can 
arrange a time and place to meet.
Yours sincerely,
Anthony Buckley
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Consent form
Lancaster University Management School
Consent form for participation in a research study
Title: Indigenous firm growth in a small open knowledge-based economy
Researcher: Anthony Buckley
Supervisors: Dr. Robert Read, Mr. Paul Ferguson
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to enhance the understanding of the growth paths of 
indigenous Irish firms. The aim of this interview is to gain additional insights and information 
on the critical incidents in the subject firms' history that influenced or determined firm 
growth - be it negative or positive.
Voluntary participation
Participation in this study is voluntary at all times. You may choose to not participate or to 
withdraw your participation at any time.
Questions
Any questions regarding the study please contact 
Authorisation
I have read the information in this consent form and the accompanying letter. All my 
questions about the study and my part in it have been answered. I freely consent to take 
part in this interview.
If I sign this form, I do not lose any of the rights that I would otherwise have as a subject in a 
research study.
Printed name of Interviewee: Signature of Interviewee: Date
I confirm that I have adequately explained the research and the subject has consented to 
participate:
Printed name of Researcher: Signature of Researcher: Date:
Appendix B
Interview topic guide -
Introduction
This study is part of requirements for PhD in management at Lancaster University -  
supervised by Mr. Paul Ferguson and Dr. Robert Read. See: 
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/anthonv-bucklev/
•  Aim is to increase understanding of growth patterns of internationally trading Irish 
firms and the influences on and determinants of that growth.
•  Interviews with firms in the technology intensive (ICT, Cleantech and Lifesciences) 
and traditional sectors (Food/natural resources/consumer) will be undertaken to 
examine the drivers of and constraints on the respective firms growth trajectories.
•  In the final report your company and you can remain anonymous if you so desire.
•  You do not have to answer any questions that you do not want to.
•  I would like your permission to record the interview. This will only be listened to by
me, possibly my Supervisors and a professional transcriber. You will have the 
opportunity to review the transcript to provide any corrections or additional 
comments. I also plan to take notes during the interview. My work is conducted in 
line with the research ethics standards of Lancaster University 
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/
•  Have you any questions at this stage?




Gender M/F Age range Founder Y/N
Time with firm







Characteristics of the founder(s)/Entrepreneur(s):
•  Is (was) this the first business ever started by the founder(s)?
•  What motivated the founder(s) to start the business [Unemployment, 
opportunity, dissatisfaction, freedom, money-explain?]
•  Are you actively involved in any other businesses at the moment 
(directorships/advisory) -  Portfolio approach?
•  What is (was) the main benefit to you of running your own business?
•  How would you describe your leadership style?
•  Family business history?
•  What outside advisers to the business do you have?
•  Are you a member of any business networking organisations - 
- elaborate, general/industry specific?
•  Have you made any major mistakes (in the running of the business) along the way 
and what did you do to correct them?
The firm's growth path to date: 
Characteristics of the firm:
•  Can you explain how the organisation is structured at moment -  how has it evolved 
since 2000 (This will differ per firm) in terms of employee numbers and roles?
•  Can you elaborate on the roles and responsibilities of the senior management team -  
how has this changed since 2000 -  what functions have been added and in what 
years?
•  Do you have more time now to focus on strategic issues than you have had in the 
past -  explain what has enabled this?
•  How would you describe the culture in your organisation -  how has it changed since 
2000
Management Strategies:
•  Can you articulate your strategy for survival and growth -  how has it evolved since 
2000
•  Would you describe the approach as driven primarily by sales growth or profitability 
growth?
•  Do you formally plan -  please explain your system and the planning horizon? How has 
planning evolved since 2000?
•  Do you undertake marketing research -  formally/informally - elaborate?
•  Do you have an Innovation policy (including technology roadmap as appropriate)?
•  Do you or the firm hold any patents -  how many and for how long?
•  Do you have a human capital development policy -  what training,
development, up skilling and teambuilding, coaching/mentoring does the firm 
undertake?
•  Do you have an internationalisation strategy? What percentage of current 
consolidated turnover is accounted for by international sales? How does it differ from 
2000?
•  Do you anticipate the firm going public or do you have a different growth path in 
mind for the next 3-5 years- elaborate?
External environmental influences and constraints:
•  Describe the competitive situation you face currently -  how has it changed since 
2000? What would you describe as your competitive advantage -  how has it evolved 
since 2000?
•  Comment on the input costs to your business relative to your closest international 
competitors- highlighting any major differentials?
•  What geographic markets do you serve in order of importance -  how has this 
changed since 2000?
•  What % of total turnover is generated in Ireland -  how much in 2000? Do you have a 
major Irish competitor
•  Does anyone customer or geographic market account for more than 30% of total 
turnover
•  Is your location a competitive advantage or disadvantage? Has e-business had an 
impact on how you conduct your business?
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•  Have you received support from Enterprise Ireland (financial or otherwise) - please 
detail as best you can?
•  What was the investment used for and what difference did it make -  can you 
quantify?
•  Would you have undertaken the investment anyway if El funding was not available?
•  Have you been supported (financially or otherwise) by any other state agency that 
you can recall?
•  How might the state help in future?
Growth experience since the turn of the century:
•  Growth phase - Can you recall what led to the increase in growth? Why did this 
increase stop? What sort of staff was added at that time - Management (Technical 
and /o r commercial) roles or support staff?
•  Decline phase -  what led to the decrease in growth?
• What was happening in the stable/steady period?
• Overall has the business performed as planned or as expected?
• What do you consider to be the major constraints, if any, on growth in the period




• New market entry
• Obtaining finance
• Operational improvements
• Other - elaborate
•  Were there any periods when there were opportunities to grow and these were not 
taken up -  why, what, when?
Final questions!
•  Anything else you would like to add or anything important on the subject that we 
have not covered?
•  Would you like to receive a transcript -  by e-mail or post?
Many thanks for your input and co-operation -  the information provided will enhance the 
findings in the study.
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Appendix C
Individual case analysis outline -  Details in Volume 2.
Table of Contents
1. Firm summary profile
2. Background - History, development and performance
3. Determinants of and influences on firm performance
3.1 Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
3.2 Characteristics of the Firm
3.3 Management strategy
3.4 External environment
3.4.1 Public Venture Capital
4. Growth experience and barriers to growth
